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I.

Acronyms

AST
(B)EOC
CARICOOS
CERT
COA
CRRC
CTWP
CWA
DNER/DRNA
DOI
DPP
DRC
EAS
EMS
EOC
ESF
EWW
FEMA
GOM
GSA
HHW
HLS
IDSS
IOOS
IOC
IPaC
ISER-Caribe
JFO
MEOW
MER
MOM
NARA
NCR
NEA
NEH
NESDIS
NFWF
NGO
NHC
NMEAD
NMFS
NOAA
NOS

Atlantic Standard Time
(Business) Emergency Operation Center
Caribbean Regional Association for Coastal Ocean Observing
Community Emergency Response Team
Course of Action
Coastal Response Research Center
NOAA NWS Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program
Cyclone Watch Area
Puerto Rico Department of Natural and Environmental Resources (Spanish=DRNA)
U.S. Department of the Interior
Disaster Preparedness Program
NOAA’s Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center
Emergency Alert System
Emergency Management System
Emergency Operations Center
Emergency Support Function
Extreme Wind Warning
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
Gulf of Mexico
U.S. General Services Administration
Household Hazardous Waste
Hurricane Local Statement
Impact-Based Decision Support Services
Integrated Ocean Observing System
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Information for Planning and Consultation
Institute for Socio-Ecological Research, Inc. – Caribbean
Joint Field Office
Maximum Envelop of Water
U.S. Coast Guard Marine Environmental Response
Maximum of MEOW
The National Archives and Records Administration
Natural and Cultural Resources
National Endowment for the Arts
National Endowment for the Humanities
National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Services
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation
Non-governmental organization
National Hurricane Center
Negociado para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administracion de Desastres (The Bureau
of Emergency Management and Disaster Management of the Department of Public
Safety)
National Marine Fisheries Service
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Ocean Service
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NRPT
NRT
NWS
OEM
OFA
OR&R
PA System
PPAPG
PSMA
PRASA
PREMA
PRSN
PTWC
RRF
RSF
RSS
SJFO
TCV
TWC
TWFP
UPR
USACE
USDA
UNESCO
USEPA/EPA
USCG
USVI
VHF
VITEMA
VTEC
WEA
WFO
WWTP

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training
National Response Team
NOAA National Weather Service
Office of Emergency Management
Other Federal Agencies
NOAA Office of Response & Restoration
Public Announcement System
FEMA Public Assistance Program Policy Guide
Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority
Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency
Puerto Rico Seismic Network
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
Resource Request Form
Recovery Support Function
Rich Site Summary and Really Simple Syndication (respectively) is a type of web feed
which allows users and applications to access updates to online content in a
standardized, computer-readable format.
San Juan Forecast Office
Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning
Tsunami Warning Center
Tsunami Warning Focal Point
University of Puerto Rico
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Department of Agriculture
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Virgin Islands
Very High Frequency
Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency
Valid Time Event Code
Wireless emergency alerts
Weather Forecast Office
Wastewater treatment plant
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III.

Introduction

On April 23-25th, 2019, CRRC and DPP co-sponsored a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT) Workshop at the USEPA facility in Guaynabo, Puerto
Rico. The workshop, titled “Learning from the Past and Moving Forward: Response* Challenges from
Severe Weather or Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources and Mission Responsibilities”, focused on
preparedness, planning and improving response to an extreme weather event or natural disaster.
*For the purpose of this workshop, the term “response” includes a continuum from emergency
response activities through recovery activities.
Forty-five participants (Appendix B) represented federal, commonwealth and local agencies, academia,
and industry.
This was the fourth workshop in a series of NRPT events, the goal of this workshop is to provide focused
discussion regarding lessons learned from hurricane and natural disaster response for specific regions.
NRPT workshops are conducted to improve preparedness and build a common understanding of how
disasters can be addressed when they threaten personnel, infrastructure or natural resources. This
program uses NOAA resources to address localized problems and concerns with respect to emergency
preparedness and planning. The focus of the workshop was improving preparedness- through
communication, logistics and building relationships/planning season for the Caribbean region (e.g.,
Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands) following the 2017 hurricane.
Workshop Objectives:
1. Improve knowledge and skills to enhance risk communications before and after a damaging or
disastrous tropical hurricane (cyclone) or tsunami event.
2. Apply lessons learned to “disaster readiness” for safety of staff and families as well as shared
trust resources.
3. Enhance effective mission response and recovery activities.
4. Build resilient local coastal communities on the islands through preparedness planning to: (a)
gain knowledge, (b) enhance cross-agency and cross-regional coordination, and (c) foster
response/recovery planning and informed actions.
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Workshop Goals:
1. With adequate information and communicated knowledge, the public and response community
will make informed decisions relative to personal protection and safety.
2. With adequate information and effective communications, responders and natural resource
managers are prepared for and respond effectively to mitigate disaster impacts.
The workshop consisted of plenary presentations, three breakout group discussions and two table-top
exercises. The first two days included plenary presentations from local and federal emergency
responders outlining organization missions and responsibilities, lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane
season and improvements for the future. A summary of the presentations can be found Section III
“Plenary Presentations”, slides are located in Appendix C.
Participants were split into four breakout groups (Groups A-D), and remained in these same groups for
all three of the breakout group discussions. Breakout groups were tasked with: (1) identifying
lessons/practices/skills learned from the plenary presentations, (2) highlighting actions to improve/put
into practice the previously identified “lessons learned”, and (3) recommend actions for
implementation. The third day consisted of two table top exercises, the first was on tsunami
preparedness and planning, and the second focused on hurricane emergency response planning and
preparedness.
The agenda for the workshop can be found in Appendix A.

IV.

Plenary Presentations

Day 1 – April 23, 2019
Carmen Guerrero-Perez, Director of EPA Region 2’s Caribbean Environmental Protection Division,
discussed lessons learned with respect to terrestrial and marine chemical spills and response following
Hurricane Maria. Director Guerrero-Perez drew specific attention to the quantity of disaster debris
generated and removed (e.g., approximately 12 million cubic yards of debris, 52% construction debris
and 44% vegetative debris) and the management of household hazardous wastes (HHW) (e.g., 322,148
HHW containers in Puerto Rico, 145,575 HHW containers in USVI). Following the hurricane, 22 of 51
wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) in Puerto Rico were out of service, three WWTPs completely
flooded, and 222 of 714 pump stations were out of service. Out of service facilities and infrastructure
resulted in sewage overflows into surface and coastal waters. Coastal flooding was also exacerbated
due to inoperable stormwater management systems. In order to protect public health and determine
environmental conditions post hurricane, the restoration of the water- and air-quality monitoring
networks were a priority in the emergency response.
There were many pre-existing conditions that were exacerbated by the hurricanes. Examples of these
include: the fiscal situation, deterioration of infrastructure, lack of maintenance and resources, history
of non-compliance, threats from extreme weather and natural disaster events (e.g., hurricanes, drought,
precipitation, sea level rise, salinity intrusion to aquifers).
Director Guerrero-Perez discussed methods to move forward and improve disaster preparedness and
planning. The first recommendation emphasized the need for continuous improvement because “being
Coastal Response Research Center
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prepared is not a one-time effort”. In order to do this, multisector and multidisciplinary engagement is
needed to clarify roles during a response and improve emergency preparedness. Stakeholders for a
multisector approach include local government (e.g., DNER, PREMA), Federal government (e.g., NOAA,
DOI, USCG, FEMA, USACE, USEPA), academia (e.g., UPR, Sea Grant, CARICOOS, PR Seismic Network,
etc.), NGOs (e.g., Para la Naturaleza, Foundation for Puerto Rico, ISER-Caribe) and the private
sector. The second take-away message was focusing on emergency management plans, specifically on
pre-selected locations for temporary staging areas, pre-agreements with municipalities, waivers and
permit pre-approvals with local and federal agencies. Third, was leveraging resources allocated by the
federal government and disaster recovery plans to avoid duplication of efforts. Finally, she
recommended focusing on risk communications before, during and after an extreme weather
event/natural disaster to minimize public health impacts and coordinate a successful emergency
response.
Ernesto Rodríguez, NOAA NWS, introduced the mission and vision outlined by the NWS. The mission is
to provide weather, water and climate data forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and
property and the enhancement of the national economy. Preparation for the hurricane season is a yearlong event, which requires building trust between emergency response organizations to minimize stress
during actual events. NWS employees meet with decision makers to work through various tabletop
exercises, full-scale exercises and outreach activities. There are pre-event coordination meetings
conducted with island commonwealth, local governments and federal agencies that include briefings
and information sharing sessions. Core partners (e.g., PREMA) use information provided by NWS to
make critical decisions; exercises and briefings provide a venue for NWS to teach partners how to
correctly interpret information, weather maps and forecasts.
NWS also coordinates internal meetings to update graphic outputs to be more user friendly, answer
questions asked by decision makers, and discuss the best ways to tailor information with respect to
region. Internal coordination meetings allow NWS to be on the same page in case one office needs to
cover for another other during an emergency event. This occurred in 2017; the Miami office was in
charge of day-to-day work when the San Juan office was supporting the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC) following Hurricane Maria.
The highlighted lessons learned were: (1) the need for back-up communication in the event of a disaster,
(2) the realization that not all tools will be available following a catastrophic event, and (3) contingency
planning including multiple back-up NWS offices outside of threat zone to act as support offices.
CAPT Ricardo Alonso, USCG Marine Environmental Response (MER), focused on the USCG’s mission
response and the role of the Coast Guard during a response operation. The National Response Team
(NRT) is activated in the event of oil or hazardous substances discharge, transect national boundaries, or
threatens public health, property, or natural resources. CAPT Alonso stressed the importance of good
communication and understanding the framework for how the federal government operates in an
emergency. He also recommended that all response organizations read the overarching regulatory
authority (e.g., 40 CFR 300 National Contingency Plan), and know the functions (e.g., roles and
responsibilities) of each organization and personnel when responding to a disaster. Although
preparedness is a slow and tedious process, it is the most important piece when saving lives.
Preparedness planning needs to be done both internally (e.g., local, district, families) as well as
externally (e.g., area contingency plans). The local and regional scale should include tabletop and
Coastal Response Research Center
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hands-on exercises (e.g., pre-staging equipment) to identify weaknesses and gaps prior to a disaster.
Exercises should also encourage interaction between stakeholders, opening early lines of
communication and introducing critical players.
CAPT Alonso documented five key points: (1) USEPA and USCG coordinate and direct the response,
USEPA for inland areas and USCG for the coastal zone; (2) other federal agencies with appropriate
jurisdiction and expertise support the lead agency; (3) activities are done in partnership with
state/commonwealth and local officials; (4) industry is responsible for being prepared for, responding
to, and paying for cleanup and damages from pollution incidents when they are designated the primary
responsible party; (5) the NRT uses the National Incident Management System/Incident Command
System to bring these parties together to manage response actions.
Throughout the presentation, four response and recovery challenges were identified: (1) interagency
coordination, (2) the ability to rapidly set-up communications for interagency coordination, (3) response
dependent upon logistics, surge forces and equipment, and (4) infrastructure critical for survivors and
responders.
Major lessons learned following recent hurricane responses include: (1) issues identified with respect to
USCG flood response assets (e.g., equipment, communication); (2) satellite phones capable of placing
and receiving calls should be used during response operations; and (3) additional internet technology
support should be on-hand during a disaster. A more general summary of lessons learned that can be
applied to an array of agencies consist of: (1) use of resources to enhance alignment with partner
agencies’ goals; (2) use of Flood Punt Teams to conduct urban Search and Rescue; (3) Emergency
Support Function (ESF)-10 and mission assignment training; (4) training of unmanned aircraft system; (5)
plan for and execute exercises spanning across multiple districts; (6) ensure personnel support teams
are adequately staffed to manage call volume for accountability of CG members an family; and, (7)
continually engage with external agencies pre and post hurricane season, as well as leverage
relationships during event.
Jennifer Koss, Director of the Coral Reef Conservation Program at NOAA, gave an overview of NOAA’s
presence in the Caribbean, including NOAA’s role as a science based organization to provide the best
available science when assisting decision makers. Additionally, NOAA NWS/NOS keeps citizens aware of
any climate and weather related changes, help with fisheries management, and provide support to
fisheries commerce. With respect to response organizations, NOAA maintains the NWS Caribbean
Tsunami Warning Program (CTWP), the National Hurricane Center (NHC), the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Ocean Service (NOS), the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS), Sea
Grant and the National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service (NESDIS).
Following Hurricane Maria, there were mission assignments through FEMA to conduct coral
restoration. FEMA and NOAA/NFWF reattached over 17,000 corals at 70+ field sites and surveyed over
400,000 m2 of reefs. This was the first ever mission assignment FEMA authorized for coral assessment
and triage work; it was recognized by FEMA that coral reefs are the first line of defense to reduce storm
related impacts (e.g., storm surge, wave energy).
Charlie Henry, NOAA OR&R DPP, noted all of the line offices in NOAA have a role in disaster
response. The FEMA pre-scripted mission assignments assigned to NOAA’s National Ocean Service
(NOS) include: coastal science support coordinator, geodetic surveys, aerial imagery/LIDAR,
Coastal Response Research Center
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hydrographic surveys, scientific support for oil and chemical spills, and marine debris assessment. If
there are other needs or requests by FEMA for NOAA support (e.g., recovery functions) additional and
new missions can be assigned. NOAA OR&R’s mission is to provide world-class science and informationbased solutions to protect and restore the nation’s resources and their uses from coastal environmental
hazards. The Disaster Response Center (DRC) was established as a hub in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM)
which serves as the center for emergency preparedness and response in the case of a
disaster/environmental hazard.
Jose R. Marchand-Parnell, FEMA Acting Deputy Director for the Capacity Building Sector of FEMA
noted the main challenge when responding to Hurricane Maria was the lack of preparation, better
preparedness supports a faster recovery. The FEMA mission was to provide essential support, guidance
and tools to the whole community including federal, commonwealth, municipal, private sectors and
NGO partners. To build upon, restore and strengthen their capability and capacity as entities and
individuals, to be prepared and able to perform their essential functions effectively, efficiently, and
sustainably in response and recovery efforts. The core partners that FEMA worked with during recovery
included the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA), Puerto Rico Planning Board and 78
local Emergency Management Offices. The programs/units that fall under recovery include: community
resiliency/preparedness, continuity of operations, training and exercise, mass care, and others.
Mr. Marchand outlined major innovations/lessons learned: (1) The need for assessing current
capabilities of local communities to determine their level of preparedness when responding to a
disaster. If preparedness seems to be inadequate, then teaching communities and providing technical
advice to improve the baseline knowledge level is essential. Outreach programs include, the FEMA
lifelines situational reporting integration which was developed to ensure response is coordinated in the
same manner regardless of language, background to ensure that all communities are on the same page
when preparing for an event. The initiation of the Youth Preparedness Council provides in-school
learning opportunities to practice preparedness, and spreads knowledge through community outreach
and projects. Another outreach program is through the Core Advisory Groups; these are made up of
community volunteers and different NGO’s throughout the island, working with various planning tools,
whose goal is assessing and identifying population needs that should be accounted for during a
response, and to ensure disability integration throughout all emergency planning phases. (2) The
establishment of the Business Emergency Operation Center (BEOC) that involves private businesses in
planning and response stages. In the past, engagement with private businesses was limited, but it is a
valuable asset during a response. (3) The need to work with academia to engage local colleges and
universities in developing an emergency management curriculum to encourage students to think of it as
a career path. (4) The need to minimize the high employee turnover rate within local organizations and
improve the flow of information for new employees. In order to keep people prepared, continuous
training of employees is necessary.
Debra Payton, Department of Interior (DOI) noted that FEMA operates as a coordinating agency
following five frameworks associated with disasters: prevention, protection, mitigation, response and
recovery. Following Hurricane Maria, DOI is supporting FEMA as the Natural and Cultural Resource
coordinator under the Recovery framework. DOI’s mission is to protect natural and cultural resources
and historic properties through appropriate actions to preserve and restore them consistent with postdisaster community priorities and best practices, and in compliance with applicable environmental and
historic laws and orders. This objective is delivered through the Natural and Cultural Resources (NCR)
Coastal Response Research Center
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Recovery Support Function (RSF) which encompasses primary agencies such as DOI, NOAA, USEPA and
FEMA and several supporting agencies. There are many classifications of cultural resources, including
archeological sites, buildings and structures, landscapes, burial sites, objects/collections/records.
Additionally, DOI focuses on protection and restoration of natural resources, which includes wildlife,
vegetation, land, water (e.g., salt and fresh, surface and groundwater, drinking, irrigation), and
recreational sites.
The effort to restore damaged natural and cultural sites begins through a series of assessments.
Following Hurricane Maria, DOI conducted over 40 different types of assessments. It was imperative to
do the work upfront because it is hard to capture the devastation once restoration begins. The initial
assessments resulted in courses of action (COAs); there are a total of 276 COA’s that were in the
governor’s report. NCR “owns” 22 of those COAs. COA development was supported by many agencies
and partners (e.g., DOI, NOAA, EPA, USDA, NEA, GSA, NEH, NARA, the Commonwealth, UPR and NGOs),
and was conducted by using Solutions Based Teams. Solution Based Teams can identify solutions to
COAs, provide advice/recommendations and expertise to the Commonwealth, provide the
Commonwealth assistance in prioritizing projects, determine/suggest appropriate sources of funding,
and provide technical assistance in scoping projects. Most resources under NCR do not qualify for FEMA
funds. Therefore, the next step after assembling the COAs is to identify potential funding sources and/or
partnerships to move projects forward (e.g., public/private partnerships, grants, Federal Agency
supplemental funds, NGOs, philanthropic sources).
The lessons learned from the perspective of DOI included: (1) the scope of potentially impacted
resources is difficult to determine initially and damages may not be known upfront; 18 months later
there are still a few assessments that are underway, (2) in tropical areas, downed wood is not
necessarily debris, (3) application of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Policy Guide (PAPPG) for nontraditional natural features is complex, and (4) it is important to be bold when conducting initial
assessments.
Carlos Huertas-Hernández, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), noted that during a declared
disaster response, the USEPA operates under “Emergency Support Function #10: Oil and Hazardous
Materials Response” of the National Response Framework. Under this function, USEPA provides
personnel to assist FEMA and other EOCs in response operations. Additionally, USEPA is responsible for
removal, cleanup and disposal of oil and hazardous materials. This includes collection and disposal of
household hazardous waste (HHW) and monitoring immediate threats to public and environmental
health and safety in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Following Hurricane Maria, USEPA was also
tasked with drinking water monitoring in the U.S. Virgin Islands, repairing ambient air monitoring
stations in Puerto Rico and providing emergency power to non-PRASA systems in Puerto Rico.
Coordination and execution of all necessary assessments, evaluations, sampling and analytical
services/support was performed by USEPA employees to ensure the safety and quality of drinking water
and wastewater systems in Puerto Rico.
These tasks brought to light a number of challenges/lessons learned, which included: (1)
difficulties/delays in transporting personnel and equipment into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
via flights and barges, (2) many responders were not Spanish speakers, but local translators
were (success story), (3) USEPA coordinated the segregation, transportation and disposal of all oil and
hazardous substances collected under ESF#10 by both USEPA and USCG, (4) equipment was held up in
Coastal Response Research Center
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U.S. Virgin Island ports due to demands for tax payments, (5) equipment was held in the continental U.S.
/hard to get on a barge because of low priority compared to food or water (i.e., pre-staged equipment),
(6) administrative hurdles from FEMA in efforts to make non-PRASA systems eligible for temporary
repairs or emergency power, (7) all hazardous materials needed to be transported to the mainland, (8)
contracting issues associated with the procurement of ambient air monitoring equipment for Puerto
Rico, (9) use of DOI’s IPaC system to conduct Endangered Species Act Section 7 consultations for HHW
staging areas worked well, and (10) central drop off locations for community members to bring HHW
was the most efficient collection system.
Ernesto Diaz, DNER/DRNA, started the presentation stating that communities were not prepared for a
category 4 or 5 hurricane. For example, the power grid failed, communications went down and fuel
(e.g., gasoline) was not being distributed post-disaster. In the midst of the disaster, DNER submitted a
request for Mission Assignments under FEMA ESF 10 to work with the USCG, USACE, and NOAA. DNER
submitted a resource request form (RRF) for sunken vessel removal in coordination with USCG, as well
as an RRF for coastal, nearshore and beach debris removal with the USACE. The USCG came prepared to
respond and had a clear path towards response which helped to guide DNER protocols. Through this
process, DNER began developing and fine tuning their own protocol for sunken vessel removal and
recommended that the protocol be further refined. Due to legal issues, marine debris removal halted
progress and a lot of the work has not been completed. The process was divided into two phases: the
first was manual removal of debris the second is debris removal using heavy equipment. Phase two has
not been started. Additionally, DNER requested FEMA (i.e., NCR) to conduct damage assessments and
support progress when developing COAs for coral reefs, seagrasses, beaches, dunes and wetlands. In
order for coral reefs to be eligible as a critical maintained natural infrastructure’ and receive funding,
FEMA required documentation through a scientific review, regarding how reefs protect coastlines. In
cooperation with CariCOOS, they were able to show that waves were attenuated by reefs and that
damage costs were minimized and not incurred by FEMA because reefs were able to protect shorelines.
Now, insurance has recognized that reefs are an important coastal protection and worth rebuilding and
maintaining.
Due to short staffing and limited resources the DNER was divided, some employees conducted damage
assessments, while others stayed at the JFO to work on reports. A major lesson learned was that some
communities did not know what an RRF was, how to submit it and check that it was filed properly. If an
RRF was not submitted, then FEMA was unable to address the issue. It is recommended that training be
conducted at the municipality level to inform workers what an RRF is and how to properly file one.
In order to be prepared for future natural disasters and storm events, DNER recommends that detailed
maps of built up areas and natural assets be compiled ahead of time. This will help to set a baseline and
streamline the damage assessment process. Through this rebuilding process, it has been highlighted
that infrastructure must be built back stronger than before, and retrofitting of homes needs to provide
resiliency for future events. Additionally, corals and natural infrastructure must be maintained and
restored to protect coastal communities, critical infrastructure and biodiversity.
Carlos Irigoyen Gonzalez, Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA), noted that the
mission of PREMA is to coordinate all resources from the government and private sector, in order to
provide the fastest and most effective services before, during and after emergency situations to ensure
the protection of life and property of citizens. Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rican municipalities,
Coastal Response Research Center
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and many were designated eligible for the Public Assistance and Individual Assistance programs. 70,000
homes lost their roofs and there was a total collapse of essential services such as communications and
warehouse space. The Emergency Operational Plans of the government agencies and municipalities
were scaled up from lower category hurricane to address damages from a category 4 or 5 hurricane such
as Hurricane Maria.
As a result, uniform systems of plans, training and exercises have been developed. The
state/commonwealth and the municipal emergency management structure is strengthened, and
changes have been made to the supply distribution plan, so as to avoid running out of warehouse space
and commodities, and to ensure citizens receive important necessities quickly and in an orderly fashion.
Working on the installation of satellite communication systems is a major priority; radios of 100 watts
are being installed in hospitals, police stations, fire stations, EMS Central Communications Center, and
OEM offices around the island. These radios have the ability to work without the need for
repeaters. An alliance with the private sector has been initiated, which is the first time private
companies have been included in the EOC. Sectors such as manufacturing, food, hospitals,
telecommunications, broadcasters, media, infrastructure, transportation and fuel industries have all
been part of this conversation. Many lessons were learned during the implementation of ESFs and now
we must apply those lessons learned to change the way response is implemented.
Christa von Hillebrandt-Andrade, NOAA NWS Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program, discussed
missions, products and protocols that can be expected in the event of a tsunami. Communication is
crucial because time is of the essence. Once the earthquake occurs there is limited time for citizens to
go to high ground (minutes to as most hours). There are both natural and official warning signs of a
tsunami that people need to know. In the case of a local earthquake and tsunami, the first natural
warning will be strong earthquake shaking; other natural cues are rapid sea level changes and roaring
sounds. Self-evacuation is key for survival and requires individuals to identify and act on these natural
warnings. Official information will be distributed through federal, state/commonwealth and local
entities.
Tsunami warning centers (TWC) monitor seismic and sea level data 24-hours a day, 7-days a
week. There are five types of messages that they issue:
•
•
•
•
•

Warning (highest threat level, inundation expected)
Advisory (second level, strong currents expected, but not coastal flooding)
Watch (for distant tsunamis, when travel times are greater than three hours, threat level still
under evaluation)
Information Statement (no tsunami threat expected)
Cancellation (dangerous waves/currents no longer expected - different from all clear which is
issued by emergency management indicating safe to return)

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) tracks the Caribbean and is responsible for issuing the
official tsunami alerts for Puerto Rico and the U.S. and British Virgin Islands. If the TWC detects a strong
earthquake, the data are analyzed and, if necessary, a message is pushed out to the public and
authorities through various communication channels. Communication channels include NOAA Weather
Radio, Emergency Alert System, NWS website https://tsunami.gov/. State EOCs, local weather forecast
offices, the Puerto Rico Seismic Network (in the case of PR and the Virgin Islands) and USCG, which
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distribute to specified audiences (e.g., USCG in charge of alerting mariners), all support the
dissemination of tsunami alerts. In the case of a warning, certain wireless phones and other compatible
mobile devices will receive a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) from the TWC. The text like geo targeted
message will alert of the imminent tsunami threat in the area. The WEA will probably be the fastest way
to receive a tsunami warning as it is generated directly from the PTWC. PRSEMA is also authorized to
send WEAs.
Once the initial tsunami warning goes out, local authorities use this information to alert the community
and initiate evacuation plans. The warning messages include information useful to emergency
managers and responders, such as threat level and an estimate time of arrival and forecast wave height
and duration of the tsunami. The most important take-away message from Ms. von HillebrandtAndrade was to keep messaging to the public consistent, use a central information source and be
familiarized with tsunami messaging prior to an emergency response.
More detailed description of tsunami preparedness was discussed on the third day of the workshop and
can be found in the NRPT Training Section: Tsunami Scenario.

Day 2 – April 24th, 2019
Ernesto Morales, NOAA NWS, discussed his agency’s role in assisting decision makers for emergency
management and preparation before an extreme weather event. The NOAA/NWS mission is to provide
weather, water and climate data, forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property and
enhancement of the national economy. Within NWS there are two offices: the Weather Forecast Office
(WFO) San Juan and the National Hurricane Center (NHC), which have the same mission, but a different
scope. The NHC focuses on the forecast of the intensity and trajectory of tropical cyclones whereas,
WFO San Juan concentrates on local forecasts and impacted areas based on the NHC forecast.
Communication between NWS and emergency managers is an intensive process which begins prior to
and continues throughout the extreme weather event. Depending upon the timeframe prior to an
extreme weather event, the types of graphics and information available to decision-maker changes.
Very long-term forecasts (e.g., 7 day) are less accurate than a short-term forecast (e.g., 48 hour), and
the graphics available to external partner changes. Once a cyclone begins forming, and confidence in
the storm intensity is established, meteorologists conduct hazardous weather outlooks, emergency
management briefings, media interviews, social media posts, graphicasts and NHC tropical weather
outlooks.
As time gets closer to the predicted extreme event (i.e., day 2 to 12 hrs.), NWS puts out multiple
products: a hurricane local statement, Tropical Cyclone Valid Time Event Code (VTEC), track forecast
cone, hurricane watch, hurricane warning, and NHC wind speed probabilities. A new forecast cone is
developed displacing the old forecast cones; updates include highlighted warnings and a smaller cone
due to less model error. The newer forecast cones give more information regarding wind speed at the
center of the cone and miles outside of the center that are likely to be impacted by tropical storm winds.
As the extreme weather event gets closer (i.e., 12 hr. to 3 hr.), hurricane local statements, Tropical
Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV) and other short term standalone products are available to decision
makers. Just prior to the weather event, a notice of extreme wind, flash floods and other potential
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Page 12

NRPT: Learning from the Past and Moving Forward:
Response Challenges from Severe Weather or Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources & Mission Responsibilities

hazards is released. A major lesson learned is the need for decision makers and emergency managers to
build a relationship with local weather service folks prior to extreme events. This helps build trust and
formulates a central, official source for weather information. Additionally, it is important for emergency
responders to understand how to read forecasts and interpret important graphics.
A more detailed description regarding how to read and interpret weather and forecast documents is
covered in the NRPT Training Section: Hurricane & Coastal Flooding Scenario.
Carlos Irigoyen Gonzalez, Negociado para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administracion de Desastres
NMEAD, detailed the importance of risk communication, outlined challenges when responding to severe
weather events and discussed ongoing projects. During severe weather, it is important to keep in
contact with the NWS and maintain an official source of information. Once the official source is
identified and messages are formed, information needs to be distributed to the
community. Information generally flows from the Hurricane Center in Miami and NWS to the EOC
headquarters, from there to regional EOCs and then to the municipalities. It is important to have
redundant systems of communication (e.g., satellite phones, 100 watt radios, internet, media, TV, radio
stations), such that messages are being properly relayed to municipalities and the public.
NMEAD is working with FEMA in a pilot program to install new all warning sirens systems, including the
87 sirens already existing for the Tsunami Program in Puerto Rico, of the 46 sirens in coastal
municipalities, only 28 are working after Hurricane Maria; the other are still pending for insures
companies to pay for the repairs. In coordination with FEMA, the new all hazard warning systems will
cover all municipalities in Puerto Rico. All hazard warning systems include places such as Guajataca
Dam, in case it fails a proper warning system would be in place. Additionally, installation of 100 watt
radios in different municipalities has been underway, to increase back-up communication in the event of
an emergency. There has been a lot of effort to educate communities on preparedness and planning, as
well as keeping the public engaged about the potential threat of tsunamis and hurricanes.
Dr. Mirelsa Modestti González, Universidad del Sagrado Corazón, provided feedback and tips on how
to successfully use social media in the event of a natural disaster or extreme weather event. It is
important to recognize that people of all ages and demographics are using social media as a valued
source of information. In order to build an audience and maintain followers before an event,
organizations need to be an online presence by posting on a regular basis. Posts need to be created
taking into consideration the public and characteristics of the different types of social
media. Information needs to be presented in an easy to read manner, with critical information at the
forefront and secondary information via links to other webpages. Use of graphics (e.g., videos,
interactive maps, pictures) and simple, common language in the form of bullets are aesthetically
pleasing and essential when reaching all demographics. Culture should be taken into consideration
when developing posts and announcements, and celebrities and 'influencers' should be invited to
trainings, as they can be extremely valuable because of their outreach. They should have access to
official information websites and be asked to share official posts on their pages. Also, they should be
encouraged to have links to official information websites on their fan pages.
Special care should be taken with certain types of messages. For example, when a Tsunami Warning
cancellation is emitted, many people will interpret the cancellation as an “all clear” notification and will
try to go back to their homes. It is of utmost important to state that it is NOT safe to go back to the coast
before using the word "cancellation".
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In the event of an emergency, downloading large files (e.g., videos, graphics) may not be possible given
data limitations. Therefore, content should be concise and ingestible when data is limited. Prior to
writing public messages, consider the audience trying to be reached (e.g., cultural preferences,
language). When formulating them, use bolded fonts and colors to convey your information efficiently
(e.g., bold, red letters indicates warning).
Misinformation or incomplete information is a problem. During emergencies, many people share
incorrect or incomplete information. Therefore, a central page for disaster information that can be
accessed by the public is highly recommended. In addition, each municipality could use their own
specific platform as a central form of communication. It could be used to update the public about open
or closed roads, available drinking water sources, etc. These platforms can be linked to the central
disaster information page. Some platforms and social media require less bandwidth than others, and
this caveat should be considered when choosing or retrofitting an existing central communication
platform or service.

V.

Breakout Session I

The first breakout session took place following the plenary presentations on Day 1. The plenary
discussion covered federal, state/commonwealth and local government challenges and lessons learned
through hurricane response. The participants were divided into four groups (i.e., Groups A, B, C and D).
Each group was tasked with identifying response challenges and subsequent lessons/skills/practices
learned as highlighted from plenary presentations. For each identified response challenge and
associated lessons learned, the participants compiled information on: type of event, timeframe of
occurrence, safety of staff or staff families, cross jurisdictional issues, and shared trust resources. The
summaries of the breakout group discussions capture major discussion points. See Appendix D for exact
wording and all of the identified challenges and lessons learned.

Group A
Group A explored eight response challenges, and divided them into: communication, resources,
preparation and leadership (Table 1). For example, one response challenge was that as a hurricane
approaches, community members do not take forecasts seriously because there are too many unofficial
sources of information. The lesson learned coming from that discussion was the need to socialize which
media outlets are reliable, existing official sources of information and unofficial, misleading sources.
This challenge occurs throughout mission response, and it threatens the safety of staff as well as their
families and is a cross jurisdictional concern (e.g., federal, commonwealth, municipal). One solution is to
conduct ongoing education in schools and at community meetings to inform the public where they can
find credible sources of information and socialize official information sources such as NWS.

Coastal Response Research Center

Page 14

NRPT: Learning from the Past and Moving Forward:
Response Challenges from Severe Weather or Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources & Mission Responsibilities

Table 1: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group A's breakout group discussions.
Identified Response Challenge

Lessons/Practices/Skills Learned

Desensitizing of alarms
Not taking forecast seriously
Sources of information
Lack of maintenance of
resources

Take culture into account when designing communication
Information needs to put everyone on same page (official source)
Educate public to follow official source(s) of weather information
Prepared before event, need maintenance logs and funding
necessary

Not enough resources

Cannot properly respond causing “snowball” effect, improvisation
insufficient, must plan ahead, stockpile supplies beforehand,
(access and distribution) *More efficient distribution system that is
equitable, prior plans (&funding?) of impartial parties responsible
for distribution of resources to communities (NGO, Red Cross,
churches)
Redundancy with options, total loss of communication can happen,
ham radio can work

Communication infrastructure
Lack of plans for an event of
this magnitude
Leadership

Need to plan, practice, train for worst case scenarios
Empower (training, organizing, informing) communities is crucial,
developing volunteering structure (cultural shift); in response to
communities not relying on government, training of leadership,

Group B
Group B identified 16 response challenges; priority challenges are bolded (Table 2). Examples of
response challenge categories included rapid assessments of damage/debris, consideration of policy
changes to include green technologies when applying for funding, and the need for pre-scripted mission
assignments. One response challenge identified by Group B was to avoid restructuring organizations
during a response, (e.g., do not introduce new sectors or grant managers part way through a disaster
response). The lesson learned were: that building a new type of structure during a disaster creates
added pressure, lack of experience and unclear goals. While this is a concern throughout mission
response and recovery activities, it specifically focused on federal jurisdiction and FEMA. There is an
added concern for the safety of staff/staff families both mentally and for field safety.
Table 2: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group B's breakout group discussions.
Identified Response Challenge

Lessons/Practices/Skills Learned

Response plans exist
Land Use Plan

Lack of ownership, accountability, dissemination, actualization
Enforcement of sensible use of land use plan and zoning; assess on
paper, but not in reality (i.e., zoning)
Because of the size of the island, confidence in the
forecast/warning; people get desensitized with many hurricanes
missing Puerto Rico; so many warnings with nothing happening,
people choose not to respond

Communicate the severity
danger/risk
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Simultaneous hazard events may
require unknown flexibility

Tabletop exercises that are more complex, multi-scenario, some
scenarios require staff safety ahead of protocols, need redundancy

Capacity for multiple,
simultaneous disasters

Climate change could lead to stressors to staff/resources/retention.

Marine/land debris hindered by
lack of staging areas and logistics

Pre-identified staging areas needed

Rapid assessments of
damage/debris are critical

Areas that had quick assessments made it easier to scope federal
funding

No restructuring of organization
during a disaster*

Building a new type of structure during a disaster leads to added
pressure, lack of experience, unclear goals

Policy guidelines need to be
revisited due to new technology
and climate change*

Policies need to be revised before an incident

Police evacuation of people in
danger zones when cell service
down
Deadlines need to be flexible,
but…

Pre-emergency coordination with municipalities (door knocking,
whatsapp) repeat weather messages

Broad and bold on initial
assessments

Baseline for FEMA to consider funding opportunities (e.g., repair,
restoration)

Lack of Pre-Scripted Mission
Assignments (PSMA)/Duplicity
of efforts*

The more pre-scripted mission assignments, the quicker response
activities can commence and provides training opportunities
within agencies

Other Federal Agencies (OFAs)
need to be assertive in their
supplemental funding request*

You snooze, you lose (i.e., there is often a very limited window for
supplemental funding requests. Identifying the needs and
collecting the appropriate information must be conducted prior to
the funding request, making a timely, speedy response more
difficult.
Community members segregating debris; reaching out to the
elderly; local communities will engage if given the opportunity, they
take ownership, sense of community (helping your neighbors)

Community response efforts.
Develop a community plan.
*Bolding indicates priority items

FEMA extends deadlines. Is this good or bad? False expectations.
Inefficient timeframe

Group C
Group C captured nine response challenges within their discussion (Table 3); ranging from logistics e.g.,
getting resources to the island, and distribution of resources once received), to high turnover rates of
emergency response positions at the local and commonwealth levels. One response challenge identified
by this group was not pre-emptively involving the private sector when developing emergency response
plans. A lesson learned was that the private sector be involved during contingency planning in
coordination with PREMA. Connecting the private sector to municipalities could improve distribution of
goods after a disaster, and allow private businesses to contribute to response efforts using their
connections and assets at all levels (e.g., community, regional). This is a cross jurisdictional problem (i.e.,
federal, regional, local) and spans throughout planning, response and recovery.
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Table 3: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group C's breakout group discussions.
Identified Response Challenge

Lessons/Practices/Skills Learned

Communications & interoperability
between organizations/groups
Communication

Requires a compatible system

Interpersonal- layers of bureaucracy
slowed progress
High turnover rate of response
positions
Pre-emptively involve private sector
Release of emergency supplies in
ports
Assets to people

Back to basics- simple solutions (e.g., radio, information
runners)
Need to identify an authority- previously only identified
problem
Need to maintain and document experiences, and put them
into practice. Done through education and more trainings
Involve private sector during contingency planning. Make the
link on how to support municipalities/local organizations
(e.g., transportation/ gas/food)
Circumvent barriers using emergency declarations to
streamline (e.g., turn off taxation during response)
Use multiple avenues to distribute resources (e.g., NGOs,
faith based & private)

Getting community to know and buy
into existing procedures/frameworks

Better communication of information & informing
communities at the grass roots level

Logistics

Pre-planning on how to get resources to the island, and
distribution in reasonable amount of time

Group D
Group D highlighted ten response challenges (Table D), ranging from access to clean water,
identification of vulnerable populations before a disaster, port accessibility during response and lack of
enforcement of residential building codes. An example of a response challenge was that vulnerable
populations (e.g., disabled, sick, elderly) were stranded following Hurricane Maria. The associated
lesson learned was not to wait until hospitals are actually impacted by a storm to make decisions, but to
have a contingency plan for back-up energy sources and access to other necessary resources. This falls
under the preparation timeframe including the safety of staff/staff families and is potentially a crossjurisdictional concern (e.g., federal, commonwealth).
Table 4: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group D's breakout group discussions.
Identified Response Challenge

Lessons/Practices/Skills Learned

Ability to communicate with small
communities

Post emergency communication needs to be simple and
tailored to community

People inadequately prepared for Category
4 or 5 hurricane

Should prepare regardless of category level

Communities relying on social media and not
official sources of information

More outreach about official sources of information
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Lack of emergency planning

Local level preparedness plan created with central point
of information

Contingency planning for emergency
communication

Need for more than every-day, standard
communication

Lack/enforcement of residential building
codes

More damage and loss of life due to unsafe structures

Vulnerable population

Hospital will be impacted. Need redundant or back up
energy sources

Access to clean water
Port accessibility limited because of Jones
Act

Anticipation that water shortages occur
Necessary aid could not be distributed/get to local
communities quickly

Current infrastructure was/is not hurricane
ready

Maintain/update infrastructure to withstand hurricanes

VI.

Breakout Session II

Breakout Session II took place on the second day of the workshop, following morning plenary
presentations. Participants were asked to expand upon challenges and lessons learned established
during Breakout Session I. The challenges and lessons learned were condensed and categorized into one
of eight categories: communication, infrastructure, leadership, logistics, policy, preparedness, response,
and logistics. Each group received the same template. The template had 23 response challenges and
lessons learned; the groups were tasked with identifying improvements (i.e., actionable tasks) and how
their approach would differ with respect to a tsunami or a hurricane. The number of items each group
discussed varied, but all 23 items were covered. The summaries below do not detail every topic
discussed by the groups, but focus on critical points. See Appendix D for exact language and completed
templates from each group. The condensed and categorized response challenges included:
1. Communication
a. Communication with small communities
b. Communities relying on social media and not official sources of information
c. Contingency planning for emergency communication
d. Communication of the severity of danger/potential risks
2. Infrastructure
a. Lack of and enforcement of residential building codes
b. Lack of access to clean water
c. Current infrastructure was/is not hurricane ready
d. Poorly maintained infrastructure
3. Leadership
a. High turnover within leadership positions and trained personnel; limited capacity for
multiple, simultaneous disasters.
4. Logistics
a. Port accessibility is limited during response because of existing laws (e.g., Jones Act)
b. Marine/land debris clean-up hindered by lack of staging areas and removal logistics
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5. Policy
a.
b.
c.
d.

Land use policy (e.g., rebuilding in high-hazard zone)
Policy guidelines need to be revisited due to change in technology, climate, etc.
Other federal agencies (OFA) need to be assertive in their supplemental funding request
Interpersonal layers of bureaucracy slowed progress (i.e., politics getting in the way of
progress)
6. Preparedness
a. People inadequately prepared for Categories 4 or 5 hurricanes
b. Lack of emergency planning at family, local and regional levels
c. Simultaneous hazard events may require unknown flexibility
d. Lack of Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMA) led to duplicity in efforts
e. Private sector not pre-emptively involved
7. Response
a. Rapid assessments of damage/debris were critical; FEMA needs a baseline to consider
funding opportunities
8. Inequity
a. Vulnerable populations left stranded during/after disasters

Group A
Group A discussed 10 of the response challenges, the categories they focused on included:
communication, infrastructure, leadership, logistics, policy, and preparedness. Within the
communication category (1b), the group focused on actionable tasks such as certifying official
information sources so that community members can trust those sites. This would require community
outreach, socialization of official sources of information, and learning how to read forecast maps.
Within the infrastructure category (2b), this group focused on improving access to clean drinking water.
The actionable tasks included: promoting/educating communities on how to install and fix rainwater
collection systems, requiring new residential construction to include cisterns or rain collection systems,
and community workshops to teach members about potential risks associated with drinking untreated
water. Under the logistics category, port accessibility in the event of a disaster (4a), and the need for
establishing a protocol which automatically waives laws such as the Jones Act for a reasonable time
frame were key. Another topic of discussion was policy changes with respect to land use (5a), and
rebuilding in high-hazard areas following a disaster. The action items include enforcement of existing
codes, consistency in codes, and implementation of new codes to consider zoned and future land
planning. The final category covered was preparedness, lack of emergency planning (6b); this group
recommended educating/outreach to remind people of the possible devastation following a disaster.
Keeping the memories fresh in their mind, but also providing avenues to educate communities on how
to plan and prepare their families. This could be done in coordination with existing organizations (e.g.,
faith based groups, schools, NGOs), as well as practicing evacuations through exercises.

Group B
Group B covered five response challenges within the categories of: communication, policy, preparedness
and response. Action items under the communication (1a), included the ability to communicate with
small communities, and recommendations that responders be aware of language and cultural needs
when working with various communities. Following a disaster, there should be multiple, central
locations where information can be posted regarding weather forecasts and other critical information.
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Pre-training at the community level would help families understand the necessary resources to survive
many days following a disaster (e.g., food, water, radio). Additionally, under the policy category (5b)
policy guidelines (e.g., PAPPG) should be revisited to include new technology and climate change.
Potential improvements would require high-level policy agreements on existing FEMA public assistance,
mitigation and recovery policies. Within the preparedness category (6a), this group recommended that
social scientists be active and engaged in community outreach to educate the public and local leaders
regarding family planning for disasters. Exercises should be completed at the community level to test
storm-readiness, and develop a checklist of necessary items families should have in the case of a
disaster. Another facet of preparedness includes PSMA (6d) to avoid duplicity of efforts. This could be
done by reviewing existing mission assignments, developing new ones and integrating federal mission
assignments with local response organizations. Fast-tracking mission assignments could be completed
with automating approval documents by obtaining signatures ahead of time, and responders could
prepare for assignments through training and exercises. During the response and recovery activities,
communities that conducted quick assessments of damage made it easier to scope federal funding.
Building from this lesson learned would require a centralized application to collect assessment
information from multiple sectors. This would ultimately allow the public to report on their
municipalities.

Group C
Group C covered response challenges under the categories of: communication, preparedness, response,
and inequity. With respect to communication challenges, this group provided actionable tasks to
improve communication with small communities (1a) and contingency planning for emergency
communication (1c). These improvements entail using short wave radios for response, satellite phones
and back-up power sources such as generators, installation of PA systems, low-wattage phones, satellite
computers and solar powered hard-drives accessible by community members to communicate with
exterior networks. Additionally, it is important to educate the community at large on how to use these
technologies and practice using equipment during planned exercises. Providing training for
communities is important to instill emergency readiness at the individual level, because individual
preparedness leads to a stronger central response. In addition to communication improvements, there
was a lack of emergency planning and preparedness (6b) at the local and family level with respect to
necessary supplies. This group recommended that aggressive pre-planning would help allow individuals
to be self-sufficient for a longer period; this would include having appropriate quantities of food and
water, redundant energy sources, and first-aid/logistical resources (e.g., maps, flash lights). These tools
and readiness checklists could be socialized through existing outreach programs (e.g., CERT) and
practiced in schools and at community centers. During the response phase (7a), rapid assessment of
damages resulted in a higher likelihood for funding through FEMA. Therefore, establishing a pre-storm
baseline would streamline the assessment process and clarify what damage was caused by the recent
disaster. Documentation of the current state of infrastructure establishes who is responsible for
rebuilding after the disaster. This group discussed the challenge of vulnerable populations being stuck in
place/stranded following a disaster (8a) and the need for pre-identification of vulnerable populations to
determine who is at risk, where they are located and how people/community members are accounted
for during and after a disaster.
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Group D
Group D covered five of the eight categories: communication, infrastructure, logistics, preparedness,
and inequity. A major topic of discussion was identification of vulnerable populations (8a), through
preplanning and existing contingency plans. Assessment of vulnerable populations allows emergency
responders to preemptively determine the communities’ strengths and weaknesses, who is capable of
evacuation, and how responders get to those people faster. The action items included: (1) using census
and demographic data to identify vulnerable populations during emergency preparedness planning in
order to focus response efforts during an emergency event; (2) creating compliance checks within lowincome communities to identify any obvious hazards in homes; (3) providing recommendations for
improvements rather than punitive penalties. Within the infrastructure category, (2a) enforcement of
building codes would ensure a safe structure in the event of a disaster; if not possible for all residences,
there should be a safe structure where the community members can go. Additionally, community
outreach efforts should provide training on how to harvest rainwater, install tanks appropriately, the
importance of treating water prior to drinking it, and solutions such as sand filters or camp filters to
increase individual self-sufficiency following a disaster.

VII. Breakout Session III
The final breakout session took place on the afternoon of Day 2. Building upon Breakout Session II,
each group was asked to: (1) recommend steps for implementation, (2) rate the ease of
implementation, and (3) document any potential coordinating partners. The summaries below focus on
high level ease of implementation outlined by each group and/or topics unique to that group discussion.
For completed templates and exact language, see Appendix D.

Group A
Group A highlighted two lessons learned that have the potential to be easily implemented. They
focused on improving the maintenance of infrastructure and avoiding rebuilding critical infrastructure in
high-hazard areas. In order to improve the maintenance of infrastructure, this group recommended
that courses and certification programs be developed to authenticate contractors. This would mandate
specific training, and teach contractors best management practices when preparing for hurricanes.
Additionally, Category 4 and 5 rated buildings should be built in centralized locations to provide shelter
and protection for evacuated families. This would require coordination between governments and
engineering organizations, insurance industries and the community. The second area of improvement
falls under land-use planning. This would require identification of risk-prone areas, and development of
new land use regulations to prohibit new construction within high-hazard areas. If buildings need to be
reconstructed in those areas, then they should follow special codes and best practices to ensure
buildings are structurally sound. Coordinating partners include local and state governments, permitting
agencies, municipalities and community members.

Group B
This group did not have any lessons learned with a high ease of implementation, but rather prioritized a
challenging lesson learned. The lesson learned is that OFAs need to be more assertive in their
supplemental funding requests. Some items FEMA cannot fund, but delays in OFA submission requests
mean they are less likely to be funded. Action items to accomplish this would be identifying and
establishing consistent language across agencies; each agency should be responsible for educating their
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employees. Agencies should be aware of supplemental funding opportunities (i.e., grants, special
project funding) and responsible for requests relative to their particular mandates. Socialization of
coverage/vocabulary could be completed through workshops on how to find funding opportunities, how
to write grants, petitions, and procurements and how to submit federal grants. Annual meetings
needed between local emergency coordinators along with state officials to start knowledge sharing from
the federal level to the municipal level. Recommendations for implementation include: (1) interagency
training on procedures of funding opportunities, (2) a survey for commonwealth agencies to take in
order to gather post-event lessons learned on the supplemental grant process, (3) awareness raising for
federal agencies on supplemental funding opportunities (e.g., grant, special project funding) for
requests relative to their mandates, and (4) federal agencies preparedness with requests to Congress of
supplemental funding according to their mandates.

Group C
Group C focused heavily on local level preparedness, creating contingency and emergency plans that
direct community members to a central or multiple information source(s) around a community. Preemergency planning would include local law enforcement, impartial parties (e.g., faith based
organizations, NGOs) and local emergency managers. Recommendations for implementation include
education as a priority. This would require planning and executing workshops to build knowledge for
local leaders, parents and/or children to teach families about preparedness planning. The workshops
could be broken into regions to allow more people to attend from multiple communities. They would
encourage community members to take ownership in emergency planning and promote self-sufficiency.
This could potentially be done in coordination with NOAA’s Office of Coastal Management and Sea
Grant. The second recommendation is focused on outreach efforts (e.g., media blitz). This would
include ads at movies, TV commercials, radio announcements, advertisements at stores, etc. to raise
awareness about how to prepare and develop individual emergency plans and where to find official
sources of information. Outreach/education could also take place at public or private classes (e.g.,
home improvement stores), youth organizations (e.g., boy scouts, girl scouts), or faith based
organizations. The goal of this is to create self-sufficient communities through empowerment of
individuals. Start with a pilot project, in one or two communities, to show that training exercises and
education can improve preparedness, and would share results at a regional scale to encourage buy-in.
This would require coordination between communities, NGOs, universities, media outlets, photo
journalists and emergency management entities.

Group D
Group D highlighted two lessons learned that had a high ease of implementation. The first centered on
removal of marine/land debris and the other on lack of emergency planning at the family and local level.
In order to improve removal of debris, Florida’s emergency management plans should be referenced as
a best management practice document. Current contingency plans would then be updated to include
pre-identified staging areas for marine debris, construction/demolition debris, and a final location for
debris (e.g., landfill on the island vs. shipping off the island). This would require coordination between
FEMA, USCG, local emergency managers, NOAA Marine Debris and local public works divisions. The
second lesson learned is improving local level preparedness through: (1) re-instituting the CERT program
in schools, churches, communities, etc., (2) its use in coordination with neighborhood watch programs,
and (3) use of existing web-apps/phone apps to share information (e.g., “next-door” app). VITEMA
models are good and could and potentially be replicated as best management practices. Consistent
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messages/information should be socialized at community events. The final recommendation is
improving consistency of delivery of information, and institutionalizing self-reliance. Coordination
partners include local agencies, emergency management agencies, FEMA, school systems/universities,
and community members.

VIII. NRPT Training
The design of the NRPT format includes a day of training. For this workshop held in Puerto Rico, the
decision was made to conduct two table top exercises: (1) a tsunami scenario and (2) a coastal
flooding/hurricane scenario. The exercises not only allowed for discussion as to good practices and not
so effective practices, but how to properly interpret and communicate the meaning of watches,
warnings, and specific NOAA products for decision making. The participants were divided into four
groups to discuss and develop messaging products for different phases of these events. The exercises
focused on effective communication, specifically:
What to say and how to say it effectively: fundamentals of risk communication and the use of social and
traditional media to enhance communications and messaging before, during and after a major coastal
event.

Tsunami Scenario
Prior to the exercise, Christa von Hillebrandt-Andrade and Carolina Hincapié from the NOAA NWS
Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program, gave an overview about the U.S. Tsunami Warning System. Realtime seismic and sea level data are collected and sent through satellites to Tsunami Warning Centers
(TWCs); the Pacific TWC (PTWC) covers the Caribbean region. If data shows anything out of the
ordinary, it is reviewed and if necessary, a warning is sent from the PTWC through satellites to the NWS
Gateway, State Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and the USCG (Figure 1). From there, each of
those groups is responsible for distributing the warning message. The NWS Gateway sends out a
wireless emergency alert (WEA) to those in coastal zones and in locations under threat. Additionally,
the NWS Gateway distributes the message to the NWS San Juan Forecast Office (SJFO) activating (1)
NOAA Weather Radio, and (2) Emergency Alert System (EAS) (e.g., TV, radio, fax). The State EOCs send
warning messages to the local EOCs, and from there the local EOCs alert TV stations and local
alarms/sirens. The USCG is responsible for notifying mariners, harbor and port masters, and releases a
PanPan message (i.e., critical message for mariners). There are multiple routes of communication, some
methods include: voice, text (satellite based), internet, phone and mobile technology (Figure 2). Each
tsunami ready center has an office, and receives warning messages through multiple mechanisms (e.g.,
fax, NOAA weather radio, internet).
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Figure 1: Communication diagram used by the United States Tsunami Warning System

Figure 2: Routes of communication used by the United States Tsunami Warning Centers in the case of an
emergency.
The official roles for the tsunami warning process start with the TWC, which is responsible for
determining alert level and issuing the message (e.g., PTWC). The tsunami warning focuses, those
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responsible for disseminating official alerts to authorities and the public including: (1) Puerto Rico State
Emergency Bureau; (2) WEA; (3) VHF radio; (4) U.S. Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency
(VITEMA); (5) NWS SJFO to activate the NOAA weather radio, EAS and social media; and, (6) PRSN as an
alternated tsunami warning focal point for PR and USVI, RSS, website, social media, VHF radio and ham
radio.
The overview included a step-by-step discussion of the messages sent by the PTWC. Messages are
issued in both English and Spanish and can be found at tsunami.gov, and in the case of a tsunami threat,
include critical information such as: (1) message number, (2) who is sending the message, (3) time and
date of message, (4) alert level, (5) parameters including location, magnitude and depth,, (6) earliest
estimated time for tsunami arrival in coastal regions, (7) recommended actions to protect human life
(e.g., evacuation, move to 4th story) (8) specific information about what NOT to do, (9) forecasts of
tsunami activity, (10) anticipation of flooding/inundation, and (11) information about the next update.
As time passes, more messages are sent to update information. For example, Message 2 includes
information such as: updated estimated time of arrivals, height and duration of tsunami, and revision of
earthquake magnitude, if necessary. Message 3 contains updates and confirmation of wave heights.
The final cancellation message directs the public listen to local, public authorities for the official “all
clear”.
The short version of the message which is sent through WEAs to individual cell phones, currently reads:
Tsunami danger on the coast. Go to high ground or move inland. Listen to local news. -NWS
As part of WEA modernization, after much discussion the NWS has recommended a new message and
send alerts in both Spanish and English depending upon the individual’s preference. After review of
messaging, it was determined that the order of message content is important. In addition to the shorter
message (90 character), a longer message (360 character) has also been agreed upon and is awaiting
FEMA for implementation. For shorter messages, the order of content is as follows: source, guidance,
hazard, location, time. The newly proposed English message reads:
NWS: Tsunami danger on the coast. Move to high ground or inland now.
The order of content for the larger messages is slightly different. It includes: source, hazard, location,
time and guidance. Participants quickly learned that there is very little time for action once the warning
is provided; it was stressed that they need to know what to do and act quickly. The proposed longer
message, in English reads:
The National Weather Service has issued a tsunami warning. A series of powerful waves and strong
currents may impact coasts near you. You are in danger. Get away from coastal waters. Move to high
ground or inland now. Keep away for the coast until local officials say it is safe to return. Check local
media for more information after you are safe.
The Tsunami Scenario learning objectives were:
1. Familiarization with TWC products and timelines
2. Improvement of communication of the threat message in PR/USVI by official Tsunami Warning
Focal Point (TWFP) and social influencers.
3. Focus on four stages of warning:
• Response to earthquake shaking
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•
•
•
•

Tsunami warning
Tsunami confirmation
Warning cancellation
All clear

The participants were divided into four groups, groups included members with critical messaging roles,
other members who acted as social influencers during the warning, and those who would normally be
located outside of the Caribbean region. There were five activities. The first activity was done
individually, but all others were conducted as a group. The five activities mimicked time as it would
occur during a real event; members were to document their individual response as well as group
discussion and messaging.
The activities included:
•
•
•
•
•

Activity 1: Communications based on natural signs
Activity 2: Communications with Message #1
Activity 3: Communications with Message #3
Activity 4: Communications with Message #8
Activity 5: Communications for Response and All Clear

Tsunami Scenario Overview:
A magnitude 7.9 earthquake NE of Puerto Rico occurred at 11:00 PM. The earthquake occurred in the
Puerto Rico Trench, where the North American Plate subducts under the Caribbean Plate.
This training included discussing the impact of a local tsunami to at-risk communities along the coast,
examined the types of TWC messages in the scenario, and considered type, timing, audience and
mechanisms for communications.
Activity 1: The earthquake is strong and is felt at 11:00 PM. Some buildings collapse; phone lines are
immediately jammed as everyone tries to find out what happened. No TWC messages have been issued
yet. The earthquake shaking occurred for 1 minute, during which time folk would likely be protecting
themselves. The first scenario asked participants what they would do in the first three minutes
(including the 1 minute of shaking). The following questions were answered by each individual: (1) How
do you respond to the earthquake? (2) What do you think is going to happen (list the risks). (3) What
can you do to communicate, to whom and how are you going to do it?
One member from Group B, who works at the Seismic Network of Puerto Rico (PRSN) pretended as
though he was working on shift and saw information about the earthquake. Once the shaking began, he
protected himself, waited until it was over and then watched his monitor to see if there was going to be
another earthquake. Upon determining there was not another earthquake threat, he proceeded to try
and send a rapid earthquake alert and establish that his partner was safe. If the partner was safe, then
that person would try and establish communication with the PTWC. If no communication was available,
there might be an issue with communication lines. If no information was received from PTWC then it is
anticipated that all routes of communication are down; if no message from the PTWC comes within 5
minutes, then they radio to PREMA the magnitude and depth of the quake. If it is 100 km or shallower,
PREMA must be provided with tsunami warning or watch information.
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The participant representing PREMA assumed from the intensity and length of the earthquake that a
tsunami was a high possibility. Therefore, he contacted local offices/regions to start evacuations
immediately. Most other participants were either social influencers or out of the Caribbean region at
the time of the event. Social influencers were focused on protecting themselves and establishing if their
families were safe; some people were shocked by what happened and froze for a minute or two. Some
said they attempted to contact community members, but did not want to clog-up lines of
communication.
Activity 2: The time is now 11:03 PM, PTWC has issued its first message. Telephones are jammed, social
media is viral, and the earthquake impact has been significant. Groups were then given 5 minutes to
determine individual action, and 15 minutes for group discussion. Participants were asked to answer:
(1) What and how did you receive the official product? (2) What is the alert level? (3) What is the
expected time of arrival of the tsunami? (4) What, to whom, how and when are you going to
communicate?
In terms of receiving official products, the answer would be through aWEBs (tsunami.gov) and WEAs.
The next step is relaying NWS messaging. This would be via NOAA weather radio, fax, and phone calls; if
normal lines of communication are down then satellite phones or radio would be necessary. The alert
level is a warning and would be included in the message. The entire island must be included when
issuing directions; messaging would be the same for all regions. Areas highlighted in yellow on the
provided tsunami evacuation areas were designated as priority evacuation regions. Information would
be shared with local EOCs and sirens sounded to alert areas under threat. Messaging should focus on
the need for community members to get to higher ground (e.g., parking garage is a great option) or to
the 4th story of a building and to remain there until local emergency response gives the “all clear”.
Social influencers said they would re-tweet information put out by official sources (e.g., NWS, SJFO),
contact neighborhood watch programs to see if community members are safe, and continue moving
themselves and families to higher ground if they were in a threatened area. Some discussion focused on
confusion about official sources’ language in messaging; making sure it is clear to the public, avoiding
use of acronyms and providing specific directions (e.g., imminent danger- get to higher ground).
Activity 3: It is now 11:55 PM, and the PTWC Message #3 has been issued. Media is reporting the
tsunami is inundating the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico; additionally, reports are showing that
people are flocking to beaches to watch the arrival of the tsunami. This is causing coastal evacuation
problems. The groups were tasked with identifying their actions over the next five minutes, followed by
a 15-minute group discussion answering the questions: (1) What important new information does the
message include, and (2) What, to whom, how and when are you going to communicate?
USCG participants mentioned that the communication center is in a tsunami risk area, and therefore,
the center may not be functional if they are in the middle of evacuating. There are alternative
operations centers, but the ultimate conclusion was that there would be limited capabilities in them. A
take-away from this discussion was that in the case of a tsunami, it is unclear how USCG would issue
warnings to mariners if the operations center is evacuating.
PREMA has sent their evacuation messages and continues to send out alerts with the time of wave
arrival as it was described in the third message from the PTWC. After hearing media reports of people
swarming beaches, PREMA contacted local media to encourage people to evacuate and keep away from
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coastal zones. If people continue to swarm beaches, then the National Guard will be activated to move
people inland. At the same time, PREMA is dealing with problems that arose as a result of the
earthquake, such as power outages, road blocks and hospital damages.
A VITEMA spokesperson said that because it is a small island, information gets distributed quickly and
emergency response is mobilized at a fast pace. When relaying important information to the public,
specific estimated time of wave arrival should be avoided because if it does not hit at that time then
people assume the threat is over and they are safe. Communicate after that the public must continue to
evacuate threated areas and remain evacuated until further notice from local authorities. Due to
limited resources, VITEMA focused their efforts in locations where the wave is expected to arrive first,
especially on evacuating vulnerable populations (e.g., hospitals, schools).
The PRSN receives an alert within five minutes after the earthquake, indicating that lines of
communication are open ultimately allowing for information updates (e.g., magnitude of quake,
estimated time of wave arrival). Messages from the Seismic Network continue to encourage evacuation.
Even after the first wave makes landfall, there is still a high risk of larger waves following. The next step
would be to update/change which municipalities are flooded, the tsunami height, arrival time and
duration. Continuous monitoring of tide gauges and UNESCO IOC water monitoring stations to see
water level changes in real time is on-going.
Social influencers would try to share official sources of information, and warn people not to go into the
streets after the first wave because more could be coming.
Activity 4: It is now 0225 AM, and the PTWC Message #8 is released; media reports the tsunami has
inundated Puerto Rico coasts, and people are wanting to enter the evacuated areas. The groups have
five minutes for action and five minutes of group discussion about: (1) what important new information
should the message include, and (2) what, to whom, how and when to communicate?
There is a lot of controversy regarding Message #8 from the PTWC. The word “cancellation”, for most
people, means that evacuation zones are safe, and people can return. However, in this case, it means
there is no more threat of a tsunami, and that the public should seek information from their local
authorities about returning to evacuation zones. The threat of a tsunami is over, but the resulting
damages from waves/flooding is mostly unknown and could pose life-threatening scenarios in coastal
zones. PRSN recommends communities wait for further information from PREMA regarding when it is
safe to return to their evacuated/affected areas. Concerns of how the media would interpret this
message was discussed, and the PRSN representative said that they do outreach with local media to
educate them about language used in warning messages. The warning messages are a public document,
therefore, upfront education helps to eliminate the spread of misinformation. An action item that came
out of this discussion was, rather than using the word ‘cancellation’; the term ‘end of tsunami threat’
should replace it because that phrase is clear and concise.
A second action item was that other media outlets such as news broadcasters, and radio announcers
should be trained about how to interpret PRSN messages and how the media should relay information.
The media should keep messages simple, and avoid talking about the earthquake magnitude until after
the event is over. Additionally, more outreach in schools would hopefully help educate people about
terminology surrounding physical sciences to help prevent false information.
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Activity 5: It is now 7 AM and the Puerto Rican Governor’s press conference is taking place. Topics
covered in the press conference include: (1) an initial report of the event and its effects, (2) an
announcement that emergency management officials are in the field performing evaluations and will be
the ones to issue the “all clear” when evacuated areas are safe, and (3) the fact that a curfew for citizens
not participating in emergency response will be enforced. At this point, all participants have assumed
their agency roles, and have 10-minutes to discuss: (1) what is the government guidance? (2) What are
additional information sources? (3) What, to whom, how and when are you going to communicate? (4)
What will be the roles in response?
At this point, participants said they would re-tweet official sources of information if there was access to
the internet. WhatsApp is a great avenue for communication because it generally requires less
data/bandwidth than social media outlets. When communicating to the public, social influencers would
post messages such as: i) stay clear of activities, ii) it is important to let authority do their job, iii) be
cautious of earthquake associated risks (e.g., collapse of structures), iv) go to the closest shelter, or v) do
not return to evacuated areas until the official agency says it is safe to do so. An important take-away is
the need for pre-emptive action to educate the public about emergency preparedness, and encourage
self-sufficiency (i.e., what are you going to do to improve your situation?).
From the perspective of NOAA DPP in Mobile, AL; part of the role for DPP is supporting response
coordination and information flow up through senior leadership. The first action would be to account
for all NOS personnel in affected areas. Coordination of incident management and response such as
mobilizing the National Geodetic Survey for an aerial survey and getting teams to support the USCG and
EPA associated with hazmat and opening ports/navigational channels. The Office of Coastal Zone
Management would be used to assist in anyway necessary; most importantly to get confirmation that
folks in affected areas are safe (i.e., encourage a communications list or phone tree).

Hurricane & Coastal Flooding Scenario
The second scenario was led by Ernesto Rodriguez and Odalys Martinez, WFOSJ, regarding
communications for a hurricane and coastal flooding scenario. There was an initial presentation
reminding participants how to read forecasts, which forecasts to use as the hurricane approaches and
how the WFO knowledge changes as a storm approaches (Figure 3). Providing responders with as much
information as possible is important when preparing for a hurricane. When the hurricane is many days
out (e.g., 7 days), guidance is general and there is minimal knowledge of the potentially impacted area,
but as the hurricane approaches land, forecasts become more precise and information is provided for
pre-staging operations.
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Figure 3: The timeline showing how WFO knowledge changes as a storm approaches, and forecast
graphics that should be used with respect to hours until peak impact.
Five-day outlooks can be used to monitor a potential cyclone. Figure 4 shows an orange track, which is
the area of tropical storm formation potential; the chance of formation is illustrated by the color (i.e.,
yellow=low risk, orange=moderate, red=high). The hatched (orange shaded) area does not represent
trajectory, it is the area where conditions are favorable for development. The graphic has an associated
text-box which outlines the potential formation chances through a 48-hour and 5-day timeframe. It
discusses which direction the storm is approaching from, the direction it is moving, and how quickly it is
moving. As the storm gets closer to landfall, forecasters can more accurately predict the formation
chance, time to landfall and the subsequent impacts (e.g., heavy rainfall).
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Figure 4: An example of a five-day graphical tropical weather outlook showing one disturbance (orange).
In general, the media does not cover hurricanes until there is a cone of uncertainty. NWS forecasters
are monitoring its movement, development and track, but the model accuracy is not good enough to
capture the attention of media outlets. The goal is to get information out to emergency managers as
early as possible in order for them to start planning evacuation routes, staging equipment, etc. Due to
associated costs with emergency planning (e.g., shipping equipment), the NWS does not tell partners
about a potential storm event until they are confident in their predictions. The warnings of a storm can
begin as early as 7-days; these will consist of email briefings, but will not give the exact location or
impacts.
Module 1: Pre-Storm
1. What should be considered when interpreting the Potential Tropical Cyclone Forecasts?
Potential Tropical Cyclone Forecasts are issued only for systems threatening land within the watch or
warning time period. Forecasts are likely to have greater uncertainty the further out they are. The NHC
issues early advisories for weather systems that pose a long-range threat to the U.S. or other land areas.
An internal Model Guidance forecast track was shown to participants to illustrate the complexity of
forecast models. Different models have different tracks; they are called “members”. All models have a
purpose and limitations, some of the model types are: climatological, historic, and deterministic or
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ensemble. Comparing the outputs of multiple models provides forecasters and decision makers with
more data to make an informed decision. Forecasts are generally accurate 48-72 hours prior to an
event, further out than 72 hours the uncertainty increases exponentially and model outputs vary
dramatically (Figure 5). Typical NHC track errors are: i) 2-day error ~ 75 nautical miles (n mi), ii) 3-day
error ~ 110 n mi, iii) 4-day error ~160 n mi, and iv) 5-day error ~ 220 n mi.

Figure 5: An example of internal Model Guidance of intensity forecasts, illustrating that model
uncertainties increases with respect to forecast hour.
Models with cones of uncertainty explain two things, the timing of the cyclone and the related
uncertainty. Error is not storm dependent. It is based on the 5-year historic averages and is included in
every forecast track. Figure 6 is an example of a forecast with a cone of uncertainty. The hatched area
is the 4 to 5-day outlook, and the solid white area is a 1 to 3-day outlook. The letters in the middle of
the track represent different wind speeds. The cone itself contains the probable path of the storm
center, but does not show its size. Hazardous conditions can occur outside of the cone. Additionally, the
orange circle with the black dot, shows the current known information such as sustained winds and
direction of movement. The goal is to send out an updated forecast every 6 hours; as computers get
faster the ability to run models more often increases. It is generally hard to identify the center of a
hurricane as it is developing, but as it intensifies the center is more obvious to forecasters.

Coastal Response Research Center

Page 32

NRPT: Learning from the Past and Moving Forward:
Response Challenges from Severe Weather or Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources & Mission Responsibilities

Figure 6: Example of a forecast graphic showing the cone of uncertainty (white area); showing the timing
of the cyclone and the related uncertainty.
The graphic, Most Likely Arrival Time of Tropical-Storm-Force Winds, is more recently developed and can
be used by decision makers to decide when business, schools, etc. should be closed because of high
winds (Figure 7). The figure uses a color map to show the five-day chance of receiving sustained winds
of 34 knots or greater; dark green indicates ~5-10% chance, whereas the purple represents a 100%
chance. The storm location and wind speed are indicated by a small symbol. This graphic shows that
winds will likely be expected in that location at the specified time.

Figure 7: A forecast graphic that can be used for emergency preparedness to show the “Most Likely
Arrival Time of Tropical-Storm-Force Winds”.
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2. What storm surge product should be used for planning purposes?
National Storm Surge Hazard Maps include the Maximum Envelop of Water (MEOW) and Maximum of
MEOWs (MOMs). MEOWs are used operationally when narrowing decisions to a specific location,
whereas MOMs are used in planning to design evacuation zones and operationally when uncertainty is
high. Additionally, MOMs are used for mapping steep boundaries, when inundation is close to shore,
and coastal damage is not extended inland.
Module 2: Close to Landfall
1. How can you determine when preparation should be rushed to finish based on the arrival of
tropical storm force winds?
The graphic, “earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm force winds”, should be used to
determine when preparation should be completed. By that time, individuals can safely assume that
they can prepare for tropical-storm force winds. When winds are 35 knots or greater people should
hunker down. Information that can be obtained from this graphic includes: (1) the expected, or mostlikely time for the onset of tropical-storm force winds, and (2) that individuals may have this much time,
but should not plan on using it.
2. What is the difference between a hurricane watch and a warning?
A hurricane warning means that conditions are expected, whereas a hurricane watch is used when
conditions are possible in a specified area (e.g., sustained winds of 74 mph or higher). Hurricane
warnings indicate that hurricane conditions (i.e., sustained winds of 74 mph or higher) are expected
somewhere within the specified area. The hurricane warning is issued 36 hours in advance of the
anticipated onset of tropical storm-force winds to allow for important preparation. A watch is issued 48
hours in advance of the anticipated onset of tropical storm-force winds in an area.
3. What is the difference between extreme and severe WEA emergency alerts?
Hurricanes use the word extreme and flash floods use the word severe.
4. Which product provides a good overview of the overall tropical impacts situation?
A Hurricane Local Statement (HLS) is a good overview of the overall tropical situation in a given CWA. It
provides a summary of the worst impacts to plan for with aerial descriptions. It does NOT contain
specific meteorological or threat information. It is NOT detailed for decision makers. The HLS contains a
header, followed by any new information that has been issued (e.g., changes to watches and warnings),
potential hazards (e.g., winds), potential impacts (e.g., structural damage), precautionary/preparedness
actions or statements (e.g., evacuations) and the time that the next update will be sent out (e.g., issued
by NWS for San Juan, PR around 8 PM Atlantic Standard Time (AST), or sooner, if conditions warrant).
The hurricane’s threat and impacts can be found in the form of a graphic, possible threats include wind,
storm surge, flooding rain, and tornados. The type of threat can be selected for a specific location using
the National Digital Forecast Database Graphical Forecasts at weather.gov. After choosing the threat,
the level will be color coded (e.g., yellow = elevated, pink = extreme). The map provides the reasonable
worst-case scenario, taking into account the forecast magnitude of the hazard, along with the associated
uncertainty of the forecast. Grids are available at: https://digital.weather.gov/.
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Module 3: Landfall
1. When is an Extreme Wind Warning (EWW) issued?
It is only issued in association with major hurricanes. The criteria for an EWW is sustained surface winds
of 115 mph or greater. The EWW is intended to alert the public to prepare for potentially lifethreatening conditions. In the instance of Hurricane Irma, three EWW were issued by WFOSJ.
2. What is the difference between a flash flood warning and flash flood emergency?
A flash flood warning informs individuals that flash flooding is in progress, imminent, or highly likely.
Flash flood warnings are urgent messages that dangerous flooding can develop very rapidly, with a
serious threat to life and/or property (i.e., warnings issued for areas usually expect flooding). A flash
flood emergency is an exceptionally rare life-threating situation (i.e., people are unaware that flooding is
going to take place in that location). Examples of flash flood situations include: (1) a total failure of a
major dam, (2) multiple swift water rescue teams have been or are being deployed in response to flash
flooding of an exceptional magnitude, and (3) water has rapidly risen or will rapidly rise to levels where
people who are ordinarily in safe locations during previous flash flood events are no longer safe.
Module 4: Post-Storm
1. After warnings and watches have expired, what products are issued?
WFOSJ returns to normal operations. Any weather hazard is then treated on a case-by-case scenario
(e.g., flash flood warning, severe thunderstorm warning, hazard weather outlook). If required, WFOSJ
will provide IDSS briefings in order to assist in the recovery process.
Scenario Overview
Using information discussed in Modules 1-4, groups were asked a series of questions when provided the
necessary tools (e.g., graphics, text). All participants assumed the role of state emergency managers
and were required to provide the Tropical Cyclone Formation Chance to regional emergency managers.
The activity was divided into four parts: 1) Preparation, 2) Preparation and Threats-Tropical Cyclone
Watches and Warnings in Effect, 3) Risk Communication, and 4) Ongoing Threats-Tropical Cyclone
Watches and Warnings in Effect. Most of the questions asked during training can be found in
descriptions of Modules 1-4. For the specific questions asked during this exercise, see Appendix E.
Following the exercise, the group discussed important lessons learned from the exercise or prior
experience. A lesson learned from St. Croix’s hurricane preparation was that school and work were
cancelled the day before a major hurricane in order to encourage families to prepare. A curfew was also
enforced. A major take-away from this exercise was that the HLS covers various potential hazards and
threats associated with the hurricane. Prior to the storm hitting, the NWS sends out an overview of the
situation, assuming that people will not have access to information updates during the storm event. For
some of the potential threats; the phrase “unfolding” was used; this raised concern because it did not
have a word associated with it to describe the threat level (e.g., elevated, extreme). “Unfolding”
explains that the hazard is already occurring, but does not specifically describe how detrimental it will be
or how conditions will change over time. Feedback from the group was that a precautionary statement
should be included regarding the threat level, and that the maximum expected threat level and the
expected time frame of the threat be included (i.e., “potential, elevated” or “unfolding, catastrophic”).
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IX.

Conclusion and Outcomes

Common themes throughout the workshop’s plenary presentations and breakout group discussions
were compiled and distilled into 19 lessons learned (Appendix F). Three major outcomes were identified
as high priority items: 1) the need to identify vulnerable populations, 2) updating PSMAs, and 3)
improving local level preparedness. Items one and two have specific end-goals and action items
associated with the lessons learned, whereas, item three was broken into multiple parts, and requires
extensive local, state and federal coordination.
An outcome highlighted by participants was the need to identify vulnerable populations prior to a
disaster, and ensure that all hospitals have back-up power sources, multiple lines of communication
(e.g., 100 Watt radios), and conduct employee training and exercises. If municipalities have not already
identified vulnerable populations within their communities, then they should be identified and
information should be added to contingency plans and updated regularly.
An action item included the need for more PSMAs; this would enable faster response activities and
minimize duplicity of efforts at the federal and state level. Federal organizations (e.g., FEMA, NOAA)
need to review existing PSMAs and potentially develop new ones in coordination with local emergency
managers. Outreach to state and local level is necessary to establish what local needs are to
appropriately determine mission assignments. Pre-emptively determining PSMAs would allow
responders to train and prepare for assignments, ultimately resulting in a rapid response time and more
damage assessment. A major lesson learned from Hurricane Maria was that areas/communities who
boldly and promptly performed initial damage assessments made it easier to scope federal funding. An
outcome from this workshop was therefore a need to a set a baseline for areas without one, to enable a
rapid damage assessment and begin the restoration process. This could be stream lined by a
standardized application used to collect assessment information for multiple sectors, establishing a
centralized communication center during the assessment process, educate employees on external
funding opportunities and training on grant writing and submissions.
A reoccurring theme was the need to focus disaster preparedness and planning at the community and
individual level. This would include outreach programs educating community members regarding
official sources of information (e.g., NWS, emergency managers), where to find information before,
during and after a disaster. Setting up contacts within the community and establishing central
information locations. Trainings would help community members prepare resources necessary to
encourage self-sufficiency after a disaster, and educational opportunities to improve individual
preparedness (e.g., rainwater harvesting). Through these outreach events and trainings, the concept of
disaster readiness would remain current and at the forefront of community planning. Additionally, it
would professionalize emergency management and response positions, and raise awareness around the
need for emergency management curriculum at the grade school and university levels. Participants
agreed these tasks will be challenging to develop, and coordination among local, state and federal levels
will be necessary.
Local, state and federal disaster readiness and decision making can be enhanced by applying these
lessons learned. The action items outlined by this report will help facilitate a strong emergency
response network in the Caribbean region, enhance effective mission response and recovery activities,
and build resilient local communities.
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NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND MOVING FORWARD:
RESPONSE* CHALLENGES FROM SEVERE WEATHER OR
TSUNAMIS TO SHARED TRUST RESOURCES AND MISSION
RESPONSIBILITIES
APRIL 23 – 24 – 25, 2019
U.S. EPA FACILITY, GUAYNABO, PUERTO RICO
AGENDA
DAY 1 – APRIL 23
8:00

Registration

8:30

Welcome, Background, Goals




Carmen R. Guerrero‐Pérez, Caribbean Environmental Protection
Division
Charlie Henry, NOAA
Nancy Kinner, Coastal Response Research Center

9:00

Participant Introductions

9:30

Plenary Presentation: Learning from the Past – Improvements for the
Future (e.g., Hurricane Maria/Coastal Flooding)








NOAA National Weather Service ‐ Ernesto Rodriguez
USCG Mission Response ‐ CAPT Ricardo Alonso
NOAA Mission Response – Charlie Henry and Jennifer Koss
FEMA – José Marchand Parnell
DOI – Debra Payton
US EPA – Carlos Huertes‐Hernandez, On‐Scene Coordinator
Local Mission Response:
o DNER – Ernesto Diaz
o PREMA – Carlos Irigoyen González

*For the purposes of this workshop, response is a continuum from emergency response activities to
recovery activities.

This workshop provided in partnership with NOAA’s Disaster Preparedness
Program and the Coastal Response Research Center

11:45

LUNCH

1:00

Overview of Scenario: Tsunami Mission and Products/Protocols –
Christa von Hillebrandt‐Andrade

2:00

Overview of Breakout Group Charge

2:15

Breakout Group ‐ Session I
Discussion Questions: Per the plenary sessions what
lessons/practices/skills have been learned from the past?

4:00

Group Reports

4:30

ADJOURN

**********************************
DAY 2 – APRIL 24
8:30

Plenary Presentation ‐ NOAA/NWS‐Weather and Forecast Products
For Decision Makers – Ernesto Morales, NOAA NWS

9:30

Plenary Presentation – Risk Communication – Carlos Irigoyen
González, NMEAD

9:45 Plenary Presentation – Social Media Tips ‐ Mirelsa Modestti González,
PhD, Sagrado Corazón University
10:00 BREAK
10:30 Breakout Group ‐ Session II
Discussion Questions: What needs to be done to improve/put into
practice the previously noted ‘lessons learned’? How do we improve
for the future (with possible threat of Tsunami, big hurricane, big
Tsunami, catastrophic event, earthquake, major oil spill, tornado)?
11:45

LUNCH

12:45 Group Reports
1:45

Breakout Group ‐ Session III: The Path Forward
Discussion Questions: What recommendations for improvement, or
exercised, communications, implementation, coordination with
partners, etc.
Break

2

3:00

Group Reports

4:00

Closing comments including points of agreement & moving forward

4:30

ADJOURN

*************************************
Workshop Objectives:
1. Participants gain additional knowledge and skills to enhance risk
communications before and after a damaging or disastrous tropical
cyclone (hurricane) or tsunami event.
2. NOAA staff and regional partners apply lessons learned from past events
to future preparedness planning creating “disaster readiness” for the
safety of staff, staff families, and shared trust resources and effective
mission response and recovery activities. The goal of preparedness
planning is to build resilient local coastal communities on islands through
gained knowledge, cross‐agency and cross‐regional coordination, and
response/recovery planning and informed actions.
Outcomes of the NRPT Workshop:
1. With adequate information and communicated knowledge, the public and
the response community will make informed decisions relative to
personal protection and safety.
2. With adequate information and effective communications, responders
and natural resource managers are prepared for and respond effectively
to mitigate disaster impacts.

*************************************
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DAY 3 ‐ APRIL 25, 2019
NRPT ‐ TRAINING THEME:
What to Say and How to Say it Effectively: Fundamentals of Risk
Communication and the Use of Social and Traditional Media to Enhance
Communications and Messaging Before, During and After a Major
Coastal Event
8:30 – 11:30

Tsunami Scenario – A Communications Exercise
Christa von Hillebrandt‐Andrade

Breakout Groups to discuss and develop messaging products:





Initial Messaging
Intermediate Messages
End Messages
Recovery Message (several days post‐event)

11:30 – 12:30 Lunch provided
12:30 – 3:30

Coastal Flooding Scenario – A Communications Exercise
Ernesto Rodriguez and Odalys Martinez

Breakout Groups to discuss and develop messaging products:





4:00

Initial Messaging ‐ Watch
Intermediate Messages ‐ Warning
End Messages – All Clear
IDSS ‐ Recovery Message (several days post‐event); Search &
Rescue, Weather

Adjourn
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NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND MOVING FORWARD:
RESPONSE CHALLENGES FROM SEVERE WEATHER OR
TSUNAMIS TO SHARED TRUST RESOURCES AND MISSION
RESPONSIBILITIES
APRIL 23 – 24 – 25, 2019
U.S. EPA FACILITY, GUAYNABO, PUERTO RICO

PARTICIPANTS

CAPT Ricardo Alonso
U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Marine
Environmental Response
ricardo.m.alonso@uscg.mil

Patricia Chardon‐Maldonado
CARICOOS (Caribbean Integrated Coastal
Ocean Observing System)
patricia.chardon@upr.edu

Belita Bass
FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Specialist
belita.bass@fema.dhs.gov

Benjamín Colón Rodríguez
Seismic Network of Puerto Rico
bcolon@prsnmail.uprm.edu

Sergio Bosques
U.S. EPA, Caribbean Environmental
Protection Division
bosques.sergio@epa.gov

Ernesto Diaz
Puerto Rico DRNA, Department of
Natural and Environmental Resources,
Coastal Zone Management Program
ediaz@drna.pr.gov

*Lisamarie Carrubba
NOAA
lisamarie.carrubba@noaa.gov
(unable to attend workshop)
Rupert Chaparro
Sea Grant, University of Puerto Rico
ruperto.chaparro@upr.edu

Paul Fericelli
U.S. EPA, Water Sector Co‐Lead
fericelli.paul@epa.gov
*Roberto Garcia‐Hiraldo
NOAA
roberto.garcia@noaa.gov
(unable to attend workshop)

*Indicates Steering Committee Member

This workshop provided in partnership with NOAA’s Disaster Preparedness
Program and the Coastal Response Research Center

Soledad Gaztambide‐Arandes
Para la Naturaleza, Public Policy and
Government Relations
soledad@paralanaturaleza.org

*Nancy Kinner
Coastal Response Research Center
(CRRC)/ UNH
nancy.kinner@unh.edu

Melissa Gloeker
Coastal Response Research Center
(CRRC)/UNH
mdx52@wildcats.unh.edu

*Jennifer Koss
NOAA Coral Reef Program
jennifer.koss@noaa.gov
Louis Licate
NOAA, Navigation Manager
louis.licate@noaa.gov

Barbara Glynn
FEMA
barbara.glynn@fema.dhs.gov

*Kathy Mandsager
Coastal Response Research Center
(CRRC)/ UNH
kathy.mandsager@unh.edu

*Sean Griffin
NOAA Restoration Center
sean.griffin@noaa.gov
Charles Grisafi
NOAA Marine Debris Program, Florida &
Caribbean Regional Coordinator
charles.grisafi@noaa.gov

Zachary Mandsager
Coastal Response Research Center
(CRRC)/UNH
José Marchand Parnell
FEMA
jose.marchandparnell@fema.dhs.gov

*Charlie Henry
NOAA, Disaster Preparedness Program
charlie.henry@noaa.gov

Vanessa Marrero Santiago
Puerto Rico DNER, Coastal Zone
Management
vimarrero@drna.pr.gov

Marlon Hibbert
NOAA, Office of Coastal Management
marlon.hibbert@noaa.gov
Carlos Huertes‐Hernandez
U.S. EPA, Region II, On‐Scene Coordinator
huertas‐hernandez.carlos@epa.gov

Odalys Martinez
NOAA NWS, Caribbean Tsunami Warning
Program
odalys.martinez@noaa.gov

Carlos Irigoyen González
NMEAD, Tsunami Coordinator for Bureau
of Emergency Management
cirigoyen@prema.pr.gov

Socorro Martinez
U.S. EPA
martinez.socorro@epa.gov

Lorna Jaramillo Nieves
University of Puerto Rico, Dept. of
Physical Sciences
lorna.jaramillo@upr.edu

Manuel Mercado
Para la Naturaleza, Safety & Security
Coordinator
manuel.m@paralanaturaleza.org

Nilda Jimenez
Puerto Rico Dept of Natural & Env Res
oceanopr@yahoo.com
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Mirelsa Modestti‐Gonzalez
Sagrado Corazón University, School of
Communication
mirelsa.modestti@sagrado.edu

Mark Wolff
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Infrastructure Systems RSF Field
Coordinator
mark.e.wolff@usace.army.mil

Ernesto Morales
NOAA NWS, Warning Coordination
Meterologist
ernesto.morales@noaa.gov

MSTC Mark Worral
U.S. Coast Guard, Sector San Juan,
Incident Management
mark.s.worral@uscg.mil

Percy Pacheco
NOAA, Office of Coast Survey
percy.pacheco@noaa.gov
Debbie Payton
U.S. Department of the Interior
NCR‐RSF Field Coordinator
debra_payton@ios.doi.gov
Ernesto Rodriguez
NOAA, NWS Forecast Office
ernesto.rodriguez@noaa.gov
Jesse Ross
Coastal Response Research Center
(CRRC)/UNH
jjo94@wildcats.unh.edu
Melanie Sánchez‐Vera
Foundation for Puerto Rico
Social Capital Coordinator
melanie.sanchez@foundationpr.org
Miguel Santini
American University of Puerto Rico,
Emergency and Disaster Program
Coordinator
maspiano1958@gmail.com
Luis Villanueva‐Cubero
FEMA NDRS, Community Planning Lead
luis.villanueva‐cubero@fema.dhs.gov
*Christa von Hillebrandt‐Andrade
NOAA NWS, Caribbean Tsunami Warning
Program
christa.vonh@noaa.gov
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NOAA REGIONAL PREPAREDNESS TRAINING
1. Recognize Charlie Henry from NOAA’s Disaster Preparedness Program and Nancy Kinner Director of
the Coastal Response Research Center
2. Learning from the Past and Moving Forward: Challenges from Severe Natural Events to Shared Trust
Resources and Mission Responsibilities
o Lessons Learned (ESF-10 – Chemical and Oil Spills):
 19 Superfund (NPL) and 177 regulated facilities
 Sunken and grounded vessels (377 in PR and 477 in USVI), oil, fuel, and hazardous waste
removal / marine debris impacts to coral reefs (Mona case)
 Disaster debris management and household hazardous wastes (12 million cubic yards of
debris, 52% construction debris and 44% of vegetative debris) (322,148 HHW containers in
PR and 145,575 containers in USVI)
 Wastewater treatment plants and pump stations (22 WWTP of 51 out of service, 3 facilities
completely flooded (Dorado, Toa Alta, and San Sebastian) and 222 pump stations out of 714
out of service / largest WW pump station in Torrecillas - Loiza had major damages with 25
MGD = sewage overflows, collapsed trunk sewers or main pump station with problems)
 Stormwater system management (municipalities mapping and ownership, coastal flooding)
 Restoration of water quality monitoring network / Air quality monitoring network (how safe
to use surface and coastal waters (river, streams, beaches)?)
 Sargassum accumulation
o

Recognize our challenges and vulnerabilities:
 Pre-existing conditions exacerbated by the hurricanes (fiscal situation, deterioration of
infrastructure, lack of maintenance, lack of resources (staff and equipment), history of noncompliance, threats from extreme weather and natural disaster events – hurricanes,
drought, precipitation, sea level rise, salinity intrusion to aquifers, etc.)

o

Moving Forward in Preparedness Planning:
A. Multisectoral and multidisciplinary engagement for emergency preparedness, role
clarification, “Being prepared is not a one time effort” – continuous improvement:
• Local Government (DNER, PREMA,)
• Federal Government (NOAA, DOI, USCG, FEMA, USACE, EPA)
• Academia (UPR, Sea Grant, CARICOOS, PR Seismic Network, American University, Sacred
Heart University)
• NGOs (Para la Naturaleza, Foundation for Puerto Rico, ISER-Caribe)
• Private Sector (Crespo Advisors)
B. Emergency management plans: pre-selected locations for temporary staging areas, preagreements with municipalities, waivers and permit pre-approvals with local and federal
agencies
C. Leveraging resources: Disaster recovery plan for PR = more than $139 billion / USVI = $7.5
billion (Federal Govt allocated approximately $45 billion)
D. Watershed approach - Role of green infrastructure in disaster recovery (wetlands, coral
reefs) as our shared Trust resources
E. Risk communications – before, during, and after an event

o

Thank you!
 Recognize EPA Staff (Sergio Bosques, Paul Fericelli and Carlos Huertas) – Thank you Sergio
 Recognize NOAA (Charlie, Nancy and Kathy) – potential funding towards the future

4/24/2019

WELCOME
NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training
Learning from the Past and Moving Forward:
Response Challenges from Severe Weather or
Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources and Mission
Responsibilities
U.S. EPA FACILITY, GUAYNABO, PUERTO RICO
THIS WORKSHOP PROVIDED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH:
NOAA’S DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM AND UNH COASTAL RESPONSE RESEARCH CENTER.
1

Carmen Guerrero‐Pérez
Caribbean Environmental Protection
Division

2
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4/24/2019

Logistics








Fire Exits
Restrooms
Cell Phones/Email: “Let It Go”
Breaks (coffee, tea, soda, water, snacks)
Meals: on your own: local cafeterias
Packet contents
Logistical Questions – See Kathy Mandsager or me
3

Coastal Response Research Center
 Partnership between NOAA’s Office of Response and
Restoration and University of New Hampshire (UNH)
 Since 2004
 UNH Co‐Director – Nancy Kinner
 NOAA Co‐Director – Benjamin Shorr

4

2

4/24/2019

Overall CRRC Mission
 Conduct and oversee basic and applied research and
outreach on response and restoration
 Transform research results into practice
 Serve as hub for response R&D
 Facilitate workshops bringing together ALL
STAKEHOLDERS to discuss spill and disaster response
issues and concerns
5

NOAA Regional Preparedness Trainings (NRPT)
• History/Background

6
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NRPT Workshop
THANK YOU
Participants, Group Leaders,
Recorders, Organizing Committee,
EPA Facilities, and Speakers!
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Clarifications
• For this workshop, response is continuum
from emergency response activities to
recovery activities.
• Response = Response + Recovery

8
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Workshop Objectives
• Improve knowledge and skills to enhance risk
communications before and after a hurricane or
tsunami
• Apply lessons learned to “disaster readiness” for:
• safety of staff and staff families
• shared trust resources

• Enhance effective mission response and recovery
activities
9

Workshop Objectives
•Preparedness planning builds resilient
local coastal communities on islands
through:

• gained knowledge
• cross‐agency and cross‐regional
coordination
• response/recovery planning and informed
actions
10
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Workshop Outcomes
• With adequate information and communicated
knowledge, public and response community
make informed decisions relative to personal
protection and safety.
• With adequate information and effective
communications, responders and natural
resource managers prepared for and respond
effectively to mitigate disaster impacts.
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Meeting Products
• Copies of All Slide Presentations
• Workshop Report
• All Posted on CRRC Website
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6
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Workshop Agenda ‐ today

13

Workshop Agenda

14

7
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Workshop Agenda
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Workshop Agenda

16

8
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Risk Communications Training
What to Say and How to Say it Effectively:
Fundamentals of Risk Communication and
the Use of Social and Traditional Media to
Enhance Communications and Messaging
Before, During and After a Major Coastal
Event

17

Training Agenda

18

9

4/24/2019

Training Agenda

19

Facilitation Pledge
 I will recognize and encourage everyone to
speak
 I will discourage side conversations
 I commit to:
 Being engaged in meeting
 Keeping us on task and time

 Stop me if I am not doing this!
20

10

4/24/2019

Participation Pledge
 Be Engaged
 Turn off cell phones and computers, except at breaks
 Listen to Others
 Contribute
 Use microphones
 Speak Clearly: We will need to repeat questions for those
on WebEx
 Learn from Others
 Avoid Side Conversations
21

Participant Introductions
Name
Affiliation
Job
Reason for Participating in Workshop

22

11

4/24/2019

Breakout Session 1
•Per the plenary sessions what
lessons/practices/skills have been
learned from the past?

23

Breakout Session 2
•What needs to be done to improve/put
into practice the previously noted
‘lessons learned’? How do we improve
for the future (with possible threat of
Tsunami, big hurricane, big Tsunami,
catastrophic event, earthquake, major
oil spill, tornado)?
24
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Breakout Session 3
•What recommendations for
improvement, or exercises,
communications, implementation,
coordination with partners, etc.

25

Workshop Website
https://crrc.unh.edu/NRPT_PuertoRico

26
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4/24/2019

Thank you
Nancy Kinner
UNH Coastal Response Research Center

27
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Learning from the Past,
Improvement for the Future
NOAA National Weather Service
WFO San Juan
Ernesto Rodriguez
Science and Operation Officer

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Outline
Mission and Vision
National Weather Service

Hurricane Maria
From the National Weather Service’s Perspective

Lessons learned after Hurricane Maria
Major Hurricane Maria

Improvement for the Future
Tailored forecast through Impact Decision Support Services

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

National Weather Service
MIssion and Vision

Mission:

Vision:

Provide weather, water,
and climate data, forecasts
and warnings for the
protection of life and
property and enhancement
of the national economy.

A Weather-Ready Nation
Society is prepared for
and responds to weather,
water, and climatedependent events.

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Hurricane Maria from the National Weather Service’s San Juan Perspective

PREPARATION
for the Hurricane Season

Hurricane Maria
made LANDFALL

Jan-May 2017

September 20

Service BACKUP
Sep 20 - Oct 23

Hurricane Maria
COORDINATION

Communications
FAILED

September 14 - 19

September 20

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Building TRUST
NWS San Juan build trust with decision makers of U.S.
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico through table top, full-scale
exercises and outreach activities before the Hurricane
Season.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Pre-event
COORDINATION
Briefings with the Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands state
and federal agencies.
Core Partners use the
information provided by the
National Weather Service San
Juan to make critical decisions.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

NWS Internal
COORDINATION

● Numerous coordination calls with the
National Hurricane Center, Weather
Prediction Center and the Southeast River
Forecast Center were made before the
hurricane affected the warning area.
● Conference calls and planning meetings
with Southern Region and WFO Miami.

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Lesson learned after Hurricane Maria

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Lesson learned after Hurricane Maria

Imagine Irma with sustained winds of 185 MPH moving over Puerto Rico

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

GOES-16 meso-sector
● 16 channels
● 1-min imagery

AFTER
Communications Failed
Utilized two way radio and satellite phones
to get information on the flooding situation.

Forecasters at the Emergency Operation
Center kept updating our core partners.
After failed attempts to reach out the public,
the office contacted the only radio station
working at that time to brief the public on
current situation and forecast.

Improvement for the Future
Tailored forecast through Impact Decision Support Services (IDSS)

IDSS are forecast advice and
interpretative services the NWS provides
to help core partners, such as
emergency personnel and public safety
officials, make decisions when weather,
water and climate impacts the lives and
property.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Improvement for the Future
Tailored forecast through Impact Decision Support Services (IDSS)

This support may be needed in response to a particular event
or routinely to support high-value decision making.
USCG Sector San Juan

NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)

Enhance climate services to help communities, businesses, and
governments understand and adapt to climate-related risks

@JANET DONES

@Yarim
Correa

@Jose Soto Anglero

@wilfredodiazPR

@waltersotoleon

@NadeshaWAPA

@Ektor79

@Edgar Rodriguez

@Nael Fontán

U.S. Coast Guard
NOAA Regional Preparedness
and Training Workshop
Response Challenges from
Severe Weather and/or Tsunamis

Office of Marine Environmental
Response Policy (CG-MER)
CAPT Ricardo Alonso
Apr FOR
23, OFFICIAL
2019 USE ONLY

Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552

Authorities
Statutory Authorities
• Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) as amended by
CWA (1972)
– Oil Pollution Act (OPA90)
– Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
• Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
Liabilities Act (CERCLA)
Regulatory Authority
• 40 CFR 300 National Contingency Plan

1

MEP & MER Missions
Marine Environmental Protection
• Regulate the discharge of oil, HAZSUB, and other
shipboard wastes into U.S. and international waterways
• Protect marine life and ecosystems
• Regulate invasive species into U.S. waterways
Marine Environmental Response
• Respond to oil and hazardous substance incidents
• Develop environmental regulations and standards

Federal On Scene Coordinator
FOSC Roles & Responsibilities IAW NCP:
• Provides access to federal resources and technical
assistance
• Coordinates all federal containment, removal, and disposal
efforts and resources during an oil spill or hazardous
material release
• Coordinates, monitors, and directs response efforts

2

On-Scene Coordinator
• Predesignated official
responsible to coordinate and
direct responses to oil
discharges and hazardous
substance releases
• Provides access to federal
resources and technical
assistance

• Coordinates all federal
containment, removal, and
disposal efforts and resources
during an oil spill or hazardous
material release
• Coordinates, monitors, and
directs response efforts,
including responsible party

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552

MISSIONS DURING DISASTER RESPONSE

Saving lives in distress
and ensuring the safety
and sur vivability of USCG
forces and assets

Security and
reconstitution of ports,
waterways, and critical
maritime infrastructure

Environmental response
operations (oil, chemical
a nd H A Z MAT)

Support to other
agencies in a whole of
government response
effort

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552

3

Preparedness
Internal
•
•
•
•

Heavy Weather/Disaster Plans
Exercises (local and District)
Personnel and equipment preps
Pre-stage

External
• Area Contingency Plan
• Exercises (critical to meet/know players early for familiarity,
resources, needs, vulnerabilities)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552

National Contingency Plan

40 CFR § 300.205(g)

4

National Response System

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552

NRF & NCP

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552
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NRS Assets
On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs)
Coordinate all containment, removal, and disposal
efforts/resources.
Other NRS components
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

National Response Center
USCG Strike Teams
Area Committees
State/Local Governments
Special Teams
Private Sector
Joint Response Teams with neighboring countries
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552

Responsibilities and Organization
National Response Team (NRT)
The NRT is responsible for national response and preparedness
planning, for coordinating regional planning, and for providing
policy guidance and support to the RRTs
40CFR300.105 (c) (1)
13 Regional Response Teams (RRTs)
The RRTs are responsible for regional planning and preparedness
activities before response actions, and for providing advice and
support to the OSC or RPM when activated during a response.
40CFR300.105 (c) (2)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552
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NRT Mission
To provide technical assistance, resources and
coordination on preparedness, planning, response and
recovery activities for emergencies involving hazardous
substances, pollutants and contaminants, hazmat, oil,
weapons of mass destruction in natural and technological
disasters and other environmental nationally significant
incidents.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Activating the National Response Team
• The NRT should be activated as an emergency
response team when:
– Oil or HAZMAT discharge exceeds the capability of
the Region in which it occurs;
– Transects National Boundaries;
– The threat to public health, property, or natural
resources is substantial
[Reference: 40CFR300.110 (j)]

**The NRT may also be activated to support an ESF-10
response, even if the three previous criteria have not
been met
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INCIDENT TIMELINE
Pre-stage resources through SURGE ACCOUNT

NATIONAL/REGIONAL RESPONSE COORDINATION CENTER activated
PRE-INCIDENT

[NATIONAL/REGIONAL] INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ASSIST TEAM
arrives on scene

POTUS approves EMERGENCY DECLARATION

RESPONSE

INCIDENT

POTUS approves MAJOR DISASTER DECLARATION

MISSION ASSIGNMENTS issued to/executed by Federal Agencies

RECOVERY

JOINT FIELD OFFICE established and assumes on scene
Incident Management and Support

NATIONAL/REGIONAL RESPONSE COORDINATION CENTER deactivated

15
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EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

SUPPORTING AGENCY

ESF 1

TRANSPORTATION

ESF 2

COMMUNICATIONS

ESF 3

PUBLIC WORKS AND ENGINEERING

SUPPORTING AGENCY

ESF 4

FIREFIGHTING

SUPPORTING AGENCY

ESF 5

INFORMATION AND PLANNING

ESF 6

MASS CARE, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE,
TEMPORARY HOUSING, AND HUMAN SERVICES

ESF 7

LOGISTICS

ESF 8

PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES

ESF 9

SEARCH AND RESCUE

PRIMARY AGENCY

ESF 10

OIL AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
RESPONSE

PRIMARY AGENCY

ESF 11

AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

ESF 12

ENERGY

ESF 13

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

ESF 15

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUPPORTING AGENCY

SUPPORTING AGENCY
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N R F C O O R D I N AT I N G S T R U C T U R E S

NATIONAL COMMAND
CENTER (NCC)

NOC WATCH

INTELLIGENCE WATCH

CG LANTAREA

•
•
•
•
•

DHS NATIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER (NOC)

CGD ONE
CGD FIVE
CGD SEVEN
CGD EIGHT
CGD NINE

CG

ESF 1
ESF 9
NATIONAL
LNORESPONSE
COORDINATION CENTER (NRCC)

CGD ELEVEN
CGD FOURTEEN
CGD THIRTEEN
CGD SEVENTEEN

WATCH CENTER (NWC)

REGIONAL RESPONSE
COORDINATION CENTER (RRCC)

CG PACAREA

•
•
•
•

ESF 10FEMA NATIONAL

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
COORDINATION
CENTER (NICC)

STATE/TERRITORY EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)

Region I (Boston, MA)
Region II (New York, NY)
Region III (Philadelphia, PA)
Region IV (Atlanta, GA)
Region V (Chicago, IL)
Region VI (Denton, TX)
Region VII (Kansas City, MO)
Region VIII (Denver, CO)
Region IX (Oakland, CA)
Region X (Seattle, WA)

JOINT FIELD OFFICE (JFO)

17
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SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

CG LNO (NRCS)
COMDT (CG-CPE)

Coordinate with CGHQ
program offices

Manage overall CG NRCC
support

ESF 1 – TRANSPORTATION
COMDT (CG-FAC)

Coordinate Mission
Assignment process

ESF 9 – SEARCH AND
RESCUE
COMDT (CG-SAR)

Manage all CG situational
awareness and reporting
Coordinate CG participation
in meetings

ESF 10 – OIL/HAZMAT
RESPONSE OPERATIONS
COMDT (CG-MER)

Leverage internal network
to produce more detailed
situation reporting
Coordinate with NRCC
Logistics to determine (and
anticipate) resource needs
Facilitate requests for CG
resources
Coordinate closely with CG
LNO

Facilitate Requests For
Information

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Response Management
Key points:
• EPA and USCG coordinate and direct the response, EPA for inland areas,
USCG for the coastal zone.
• Other federal agencies with appropriate jurisdiction and expertise support the
lead agency.
• Activities are done in partnership with state and local officials.
• Industry is responsible for being prepared for, responding to, and paying for
cleanup and damages from pollution incidents when they are designated the
PRP. Additionally, industry may work with the government as an
OSRO/Contractor.
• The NRS uses the National Incident Management System/Incident Command
System to bring these parties together to manage response actions.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Coast Guard National Strike Force
• National Oil & Chemical Response Capability
• Support On-Scene Coordinators, Other Agency
Incident & Combatant Commanders
− National Strike Force Coordination Center
− Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf Strike Teams

• Reorganization:

2016 Budget:

$3.4M

FTE (IMAT & PIAT):

161

Yearly Responses:

~45

− CG Incident Management & Assist Team
− Public Information Assistance Team

AST

CG-IMAT
PIAT

PST
AST
GST
PST

NSFCC
GST
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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10

Response & Recovery Challenges
• Interagency Coordination – NRS, NRF and NRT
• Communications – Ability to rapidly setup comms
for interagency coordination
• Logistics – Response dependent on logistics, surge
forces and equipment
• Infrastructure – Critical for survivors & responders
“Critical Needs During a Response Always include
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)”
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

21

Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552

Recent Hurricane Lessons Learned
• MRO / Flood Response: CG flood response assets such as the Western River Flood
Punt teams were extensively utilized during Harvey and Irma. Several issues were
identified relating to the best platform to use, equipment, communications, logistics,
and qualifications. CG-731 (Boat Forces) convened a workgroup to examine these
issues.
• Satellite Phones: Due to limited range of VHF radios, 800 MHz radios, and
damaged cell phone towers, satellite phones capable of placing and receiving phone
calls should be utilized. Verify with the manufacturer that satellite phones are able to
place/receive phone calls. Provide IMT with user guide/training for satellite phones.
• IT Support: A lack of IT support hampered IMT interoperability at the ICP.
• NOAA SSC: Confusion arose regarding funding SSCs deployed to Sectors to
conduct hurricane flood modeling and imagery interpretation because Sectors were
unsure how to fund the SSC beyond the scope of a pollution response.
Recommendation: Review existing NOAA-USCG IAA and develop a funding and
deployment process exclusively for non-pollution-related weather events.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Recent Hurricane LL (continued)
Summary of Lessons Learned:
• Maximize the use of resources (such as ombudsmen and auxiliary) to enhanced
alignment with partner agencies’ goals and FEMA-District-Sector coordination
when deploying EPLOYs, LNOs and AREPs to EOCs.
• Documented a surge in the use of Flood Punt Teams to conduct urban SAR
• Provide ESF-10 and Mission Assignment training
• Provide training on use of UAS
• Plan for and execute exercises spanning across multiple Districts and AORs
• Ensure Personnel Support Teams (PSTs) are adequately staffed to manage call
volume for accountability of CG members and family. Best Practice: Test
phone numbers ahead of hurricane season. Recommendation: Create a PST
App for Smartphones.
• Leverage External Agencies: The inclusion of the National Hurricane Marine
Branch in the response yielded valuable tidal and wind information that
informed key decision-makers during the 2018 hurricane season. Continual
engagement pre and post hurricane season will benefit future responses.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Questions?

CAPT Ricardo Alonso
(202) 372-2232
Ricardo.M.Alonso@uscg.mil

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NOAA Caribbean
overview
April 23-25, 2019
NRPT Meeting

NOAA in the Caribbean


Mission




NOAA in the Caribbean (NOAA Carib) is a forum for
communication, partnership, and user engagement that
supports the delivery of the agency’s mission in the domestic
and international Caribbean.

Goal


Identify and respond to local and regional challenges, needs,
and opportunities in the Caribbean region by increasing
communication and providing a platform that connects
NOAA, its core partners, and key users in the region.

1

4/24/2019

NOAA in the Caribbean


Guiding Principles
 Share information within NOAA and with external partners regarding
engagement in the region and the products and services NOAA offers.
 Enhance stakeholder communication with NOAA personnel and access to
NOAA resources and capabilities.
 Serve as a connecting link between NOAA headquarters and line offices,
and NOAA activities in the Caribbean region.
 Improve collaboration among NOAA and its regional partners.
 Stress the application of “an integrated NOAA approach”, where NOAA
employees understand and are knowledgeable about NOAA activities in
the region, and look for opportunities to provide additional value to
efforts through integration.
 Facilitate implementation of the NOAA Caribbean Strategy via alignment
of NOAA Carib activities, protocols, and membership.

National Weather Service
The National Weather Service provides weather, hydrologic, and climate forecasts and
warnings for the United States, its territories, adjacent waters and ocean areas.


Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program (CTWP) – Tsunami and Seismic Data, Educator
Resources, Student Opportunities




The CTWP office supports an increased capability of the tsunami warning system for the
Caribbean and Adjacent Regions. This includes the observational system (sea level, seismic and
GPS) and the continued enhancement of tsunami outreach and education capacity, including the
implementation of the TsunamiReady® (US) and Tsunami Ready (International) Programs.
Located in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico

National Hurricane Center (NHC) – Educator and Student Resources, Tours, Hurricane
Information and Data


The mission of the NHC is to save lives, mitigate property loss, and improve economic efficiency
by issuing the best watches, warnings, forecasts, and analyses of hazardous tropical weather
and by increasing understanding of these hazards. Located in Miami, FL
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National Marine Fisheries Service
The NOAA Fisheries Service is dedicated to the stewardship of living marine resources
through science-based conservation and management, and the promotion of healthy
ecosystems. They have regional offices and several smaller field offices.


Northeast Marine Corridor and Culebra Island Habitat Focus Area


As part of the Habitat Blueprint administered by the NOAA Fisheries Office of Habitat
Conservation, NOAA has selected ten Habitat Focus Areas (HFAs), place-based locations
across the country to maximize the effectiveness of habitat conservation. In Puerto Rico,
NOAA developed an implementation plan and associated action plans for the The
Northeast Marine Corridor and Culebra Island Habitat Focus Area in Puerto Rico.



Primary activities are to restore threatened corals, implement watershed restoration
projects, research fishery and recreational impacts to fragile marine ecosystems, and
improve the predictions of real-time storm surge, to conserve this area’s coral reefs,
seagrass beds, mangroves, and the people and animals that depend on them.

National Ocean Service
The National Ocean Service provides data, tools, and services that support coastal
economies and their contribution to the national economy.


National Estuarine Research Reserve System – Field Trips, Professional
Development, Educator Resources




The National Estuarine Research Reserves System protects more than 1.3 million coastal
and estuarine acres in 28 reserves located in 22 states and Puerto Rico for purposes of
long-term research, environmental monitoring, education and stewardship. Jobos Bay
Reserve

Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) – Curriculum, Real World Data, and
Multimedia


The Caribbean Coastal Ocean Observing System (CariCOOS) operates a network of
observing assets including data buoys, coastal meteorological stations, vessels,
instruments and radars. Data from these assets and value-added data products such as
graphs and maps are provided free of charge to the general public on their website.
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National Environmental Satellite,
Data, and Information Service
NESDIS provides secure and timely access to global environmental data and
information from satellites and other sources to promote and protect the Nation's
security, environment, economy, and quality of life.


Caribbean Atmospheric Research Center (“Atmos Carib”) – Satellite Data,
Forecasts, Local Climatology


Atmos Carib is affiliated with the National Climate Data Center and aims to offer the
most comprehensive weather and climate information for the Caribbean Region.
Located in Mayagüez, PR

Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
NOAA Research provides the research foundation for understanding the complex
systems that support our planet.


Sea Grant is a nationwide network of 32 university-based programs that
conduct scientific research, education, training, and extension projects
designed to foster science-based decisions about the use and conservation of
our aquatic resources.
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NOAA Regional Preparedness
Training (NRPT) Workshop
San Juan, PR
23 April, 2019

Charlie Henry, Director
Disaster Response Center
Mobile, AL
*

1
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NOAA Primary Mission Assignments:
PMEF #1: Collect and provide the Nation with
critical intelligence data, imagery, and other
essential information for predictive
environmental and atmospheric modeling
systems and space‐based distress alert systems by
operating NOAA‐controlled satellites,
communications equipment, and associated
systems.
3

NOAA Primary Mission Assignments:
PMEF #2: Provide the Nation with environmental
forecasts, warnings, data, and expertise critical to
public safety, disaster preparedness, all‐hazards
response and recovery, the national
transportation system, safe navigation, and the
protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructure
and natural resources.

4

2

4/25/2019

NOS FEMA Pre‐Scripted Mission Assignments:

•Coastal science support coordinator (FOS)
•Geodetic surveys
•Aerial imagery/LIDAR
•Hydrographic surveys
•Scientific support for oil and chemical spills
•Marine debris assessment
NOS FEMA Pre‐Scripted Mission Assignments:
‐Could be just about anything from response
through recovery.

5

…each office in NOS provides some role in
disaster response.

6
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(my program office)

Office of Response and Restoration
Our Mission and Mandates
To provide world-class science and informationbased solutions to protect and restore the nation’s
resources and their uses from coastal
environmental hazards.

8
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A bit of history…
Origins of NOAA “HAZMAT” Program…
1970

NOAA Created

1976

Argo Merchant oil spill,
Nantucket, MA

1977 – Special Force in the NCP
Scientific Support to FOSC
Scientific Support Coordinators

NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R)
“We have been part of the science of oil and chemical spills for a very
long time.”

Annually, OR&R…

• provides 24/7 support for emergency response support.
• responds to 120-170 oil & chemical spills.
• trains more than 2000 emergency responders and
planners.
• supports over 40 spill drills with the U.S. Coast Guard and
other agencies.
• settles 4-7 natural resource damage assessment cases &
works on over 200 additional cases.
• supports removal of hundreds of tons of marine debris.
• develops new tools & conducts research to address hazards
on the water and prevent marine debris.
• …and respond to disasters.
(small program office, big job)
10
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Leveraging Science to Solve Problems
during Emergency Events

6
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Damage Assessment and Restoration
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The origins of the NOAA GOM Disaster Response Center
started with a storm in the Gulf of Mexico…

Disaster Response Program
DRC – A Hub for Gulf of Mexico Coordination

11
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NOAA
Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center (DRC)
All-Hazards Preparedness Mission
Disaster Preparedness Program
18,700 sq-ft hardened complex (up to cat. 5)

Dedicated on 15 Oct. 2012 – Supporting Hurricane Isaac the Next Day

MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS, TRAINING, EXERCISES

“Peace Time”
Activities

12
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https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/
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FEMA-4339-DR-PR
Capacity Building
Sector

CAPACITY BUILDING SECTOR
Mission
Provide the essential support, guidance,
and tools to the whole community,
including
Federal,
Commonwealth,
Municipal, Private Sectors, and NGO
partners to build upon, restore and
strengthen their capability and capacity
as entities and individuals to be prepared
and able to perform their essential
functions effectively, efficiently, and
sustainably in response and recovery
efforts.

1
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PARTNERS AND RESILIENCE PROGRAMS
Recovering on a different perspective. A Better preparedness will support a faster recovery
Recovery / Resilience Partners
COR3 - Partners in the Resilience:
•
•
•

Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency
Bureau
Puerto Rico Planning Board
78 Local Emergency Management Offices

•
•
•

Local Government Agencies
Other Federal Agencies
Non Governmental Organizations

•

Hazard Mitigation Community and Education
Outreach
Hazard Mitigation Community Planning
Community Planning Capacity Building - RSF

Units / Programs
•
•
•
•

Community Resiliency / Preparedness
Continuity of Operations
Training & Exercise
Mass Care

•
•

Innovations
INNOVATIONS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

PR-IMT National Qualification System (MOA).
Lifeline State Integration
Youth Preparedness Council.
Core Advisory Groups.
Multisectoral Disaster Feeding Plan
Business EOC.
Reverse Engineering on Soft Projects.
Technical Assistance for Partners.
Hazard Mitigation Planning
Municipal and Regional Baseline Assessments.
Preparedness & Mitigation Curriculum for Schools
Relaunch of CERT (Community Approach & Schools).
PR Agency COOP Plans and EOPs
Community Preparedness Outreach

2
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Questions & Discussion
Challenges, Innovation, the way forward

3
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Natural and Cultural Resources
(NCR) Recovery Support Function
(RSF)

Responsibilities, Efforts and
Lessons Learned
Learning from the Past and Moving Forward
23 April 2019
Debbie Payton/DOI
NCR RSF – Hurricane Maria

Background
• DOI/RSF new role for me
• Speaking ONLY from DOI/RSF perspective; no
explicit or implied FEMA representation
• Puerto Rico/USVI experience
• Lessons are evolving

1
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National Preparedness System

FROM FEMA NDRF, 20

Five frameworks:
Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, Recovery

Natural and Cultural Resources
Core Capability

• Objective: Protect natural and cultural resources and
historic properties through appropriate …….. actions to
preserve ……… and restore them consistent with post‐
disaster community priorities and best practices and in
compliance with applicable environmental and historic
…… laws and ……… orders.
• Delivered:
Natural and Cultural Resources
Recovery Support Function

4
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NCR RSF TEAM – Primary Agencies
Department of the Interior – Coordinating Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

5

Supporting Agencies
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA)
Corporation for National and Community
Service (CNCS)
• Heritage Emergency National Task Force
(HENTF) – Smithsonian Institute
•
•
•
•
•

6
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Other Supporting organizations

• Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
(ACHP)
• Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS)
• Library of Congress (LOC)
• National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA)
• National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)
• National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH)
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
7

Cultural Resources Definition
• Aspects of a cultural system that are valued
by or significantly representative of a culture
or that contain significant information about a
culture
• Cultural resources may be tangible entities or
intangible cultural practices

8
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Cultural Resources
Archeological/Archaeological Sites
Submerged Cultural Resources
Built Environment (Buildings & Structures)
Traditional Cultural Properties (TCPs)
Landscapes
Burial Sites/Cemeteries
Objects, Collections, and Records

9

Cultural Resources as Critical Facilities
• Critical Facilities definition in Stafford Act
includes Cultural resources
• Libraries, Museums, non‐profits
• May be eligible for FEMA Public Assistance

10
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Traditional Cultural Property
A traditional cultural property can be defined generally as one
that is eligible for inclusion in the National Register because of its
association with cultural practices or beliefs of a living community
that (a) are rooted in that community's history, and (b) are
important in maintaining the
continuing cultural identity of the community.

11

Objects, Collections, and Records
• An object is an item or artifact with artistic, educational, historic,
scientific, or social importance to a community.
• Collections are a group of objects with some unifying
characteristic, or that have been assembled from a variety of
sources.
• Records are documentary materials, regardless of physical form or
characteristics, that are preserved or appropriate for preservation
and used as an extension of human memory or to demonstrate
accountability.

12
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Archeological Sites
A location that contains the physical evidence of
past human behavior that allows for its
interpretation.

13

Natural Resources Definition
• Wildlife, fish, trees, and other biota
• Land
• Water
– salt and fresh
– surface or groundwater
– used for drinking, irrigation, aquaculture,
recreational purposes, and as fish and wildlife
habitat
14
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Wildlife & Fish & Habitat

15

Natural Resource Uses impacted
Recreation Sites

Boat
Launches

Hiking, biking,
and horse trails
Fishing/Hunting Areas

16
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Efforts

DR‐4339 NCR

Assessments

COA
Development

Potential
funding sources

Implementation
Plans

Plan
Resources

Sustainability

Recovery

9

NATURAL AND CULTURAL RESOURCES SOLUTION TEAMS

4/24/2019

Historic and Cultural
Resources
• NCR1 Historic & Cultural Properties
• NCR2 Arts
• NCR3 Archives Mitigation and
Modernization
• NCR4 Preservation, Research and
Safe Storage
• NCR29 Museums

Landfills
• NCR8 Increase Capacity
• NCR9 Landfill Repair and Closure
• NCR10 Illegal Dumps
• NCR11 Sustainable SWMP

Coastal Systems Recovery
• NCR15 Corals and Seagrass
• NCR16 Wetlands
• NCR17 Beaches/Dunes
• NCR18 San Juan MPA

Natural Resources
NCR5 Forest Recovery
• NCR12 Forest Products Industry
• NCR6 At‐Risk Species Recovery
• NCR7 Partner Networks for Species
• NCR13 Sediment Pollution/Landslides
• NCR14 Water Quality
• NCR21 Land Management Approaches
• NCR23 Alternative Tourism
• NCR20 Parks

10
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What can Solution Teams Do?
• Identify solutions to COAs
• Provide advice, recommendations and
expertise to the Commonwealth
• Provide Commonwealth assistance in
prioritizing projects
• Determine/suggest most appropriate sources
of funding
• Provide technical assistance in scoping
projects

Funding Recovery
FEMA 428 Public Assistance
FEMA 406 Hazard Mitigation
404 Hazard Mitigation (SHMO)
HUD CDBG‐DR
Other Federal Agency –
Supplemental
Federal Agency – Grants
NGOs
Philanthropic

11
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Lessons?

Archives & Collections
• Issue: Motion Picture Vault (MPV) follow‐up from 11/18
assessment, several other requests for assistance
• Team of four (three NARA, one Smithsonian; two with film
expertise)
• Activity: Assessed MPV, Luis Munoz Marin collection, ICP
building plans, ICP Archives object vault and Artes Plasticas
objects
• Lesson: Scope of potentially impacted resources difficult to
determine initially

PHOTOS COURTESY OF PRESTON HUFF, NARA
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Hardwoods
• Issue: Several piles of woody debris in 16 different
municipalities that need to be disposed of properly
• Lesson: In tropical areas downed wood IS NOT necessarily
debris
• Activity: Assessment of valuable woods in piles. USDA (IITF,
FPL) (March 12‐22, 2019)

25

Corals
• Issue: Will coral reef restoration be
considered eligible for PA?
• No decision yet, but questions re: constructed
changes to corals
• Lesson: Application of PAPPG for non‐
traditional natural features is complex

PHOTOS COURTESY OF NOAA

26

13

4/24/2019

Questions?

14

Response Challenges for
Severe Weather or
Tsunamis

Emergency Support Function #10
Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
 Provide EPA personnel to the FEMA RRCC and NRCC,
JFOs, the EPA REOC, PR and VI EOCs and other
coordination venues to support FEMA response
operations in PR and the USVI.
 Removal, cleanup and disposal of oil & hazmat; collect
and disposal of HHW; monitor immediate threats to
public H&S and the environment in both PR and VI.
 Coordinate/Execute
all
necessary
assessments,
evaluations, sampling and analytical services/support to
ensure the safety and quality of drinking water &
wastewater systems in PR.
 Conduct Drinking Water Sampling Across the USVI.
 Repair of Ambient Air Monitoring Stations in PR.
 Provide Emergency Power to Non‐PRASA Systems in PR.

1

Challenges / Lessons Learned
 Difficulties/delays in transporting personnel and equipment into PR and VI via flights
and barges.
 Spanish speaking personnel.
 Equipment being held up in the VI ports due to demands for tax payments.
 Administrative hurdles from FEMA in efforts to make non‐PRASA systems eligible for
temporary repairs and emergency power.
 All hazardous materials needed to be transported to the mainland.
 Contracting issues associated with the procurement of ambient air monitoring
equipment for PR.
 Use of DOI’s iPac system to conduct Endangered Species Act Section 7 consultations for
HHW staging areas worked well.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Puerto Rico Branches

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

2

Strategies for Collection

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Collection Pads

3

Puerto Rico Waste Data

Puerto Rico Waste Data

4

Contacts
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region II
Caribbean Environmental Protection Division (CEPD)
City View Plaza II, 48 Carr. 165 Suite 7000
Guaynabo, PR, 00968‐8073

• Carlos Huertas, On‐Scene Coordinator
Office: 787‐977‐5861

5
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Lessons learned from Hurricanes Irma and Maria:
FEMA NCR RSF (2017-2019)
Ernesto L. Díaz
NRPT 2019 · San Juan, PR

Overview …and first lessons

learned!
• Hurricanes Irma and María (Sep 2017) …Not prepared for Cat 4 or 5!
• Major Disaster declaration and response under FEMA ESF10Request for Mission Assignments:
-RRF Sunken vessels removal (USCG)
-RRF Coastal, Nearshore and Beach Debris Removal (USACE)
• DNER requests FEMA Natural and Cultural Resources Sector to
conduct
Damage Assessments and support to develop COA for Coral Reefs,
Seagrasses, Beaches, Dunes and Wetlands.
• DNER requests: Corals as eligible facility for Public Assistance:
Critical Maintained Natural Infrastructure (Our Ask and the Evidence)
22
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Puerto Rico’s coastal uses and assets
ECONOMICS

HOUSING

GDP: $105 billion/year (PRPB2016)
Tourism $2B/year
Built up Areas/Coastline 24%
Industrial Parks (81)
Commercial/Recreational Fisheries

Coastal population: 2.3 million (61%) at
44 coastal municipalities

Public Housing (15)
Individual Housing (xx)

Coastline: 799 mi / 1,225 beaches (60%
moderate to severe erosion)

Territorial waters: 9 nm (A=5,078.9 mi2)

PUBLIC BUILDINGS

PNPs, Public Buildings not under other sectors

TRANSPORTATION

Airports (11)
Ports (12)
Bridges, Culverts, Piers
Miles of Primary Roads (17,387mi/27,982km

NATURAL AND
CULTURAL
RESOURCES

Protected Areas (Land) DRNA 8.7% (2015) – CLCC 16% (2016)
Protected Areas (Marine) 27.2%
Shallow coral reefs and associated communities designated for
protection 49%
Historical Properties (22+)

3

Puerto Rico’s coastal uses and assets
HEALTH AND
SOCIAL SERVICES

Hospitals (3)
Treatment Centers (xx)

Coastal population: 2.3 million (61%) at 44
coastal municipalities
Territorial waters: 9 nm (A=5,078.9 mi2)

COMMUNICATIONS

Fiber Optic Cables (15)
Internet Infrastructure
Public comms systems

Coastline: 799 mi / 1,225 beaches (60%
moderate to severe erosion)

ENERGY

Power plant systems (7; 5 public, 2 private)
Substations
Distribution and transmission lines

WATER

PRASA infrastructure at coastal zone: 200km potable water
260km sanitary infrastructure
6 water systems
Pump stations
Waste Water Treatment Plants (28 coastal)

EDUCATION

Schools (36)
PNP (xx)

4
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…be ready to provide detailed maps of built up areas and
natural assets!

5
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Hurricane Irma 06 SEP 2017
Hurricane María 20 SEP 2017

7
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Puerto Rico Coastal Assets

9

Coral Reef as
Critical
Maintained
Natural
Infrastructure
Scrub Down 9/18/18
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
PRESENTED TO FEMA PA (2018)

10
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FEMA requests: System Definition and Investments Documentation

>220 papers on coral reefs wave attenuation reviewed

12
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13 Bane 2014
Brendan

San Juan metro coral reef system

14
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15

FEMA requests: Investment Documentation

DNER/FEMA Coral Reef Systems

16
Data repository for sharing

8
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Coral Reef Maintenance Takes Many Forms

PR Coral System Investments: Collaborators

18

More detailed provided in the Spreadsheet

9
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Investments estimates

$58,493,807
of investments in the
Northeast Coral Reef System
during the last 30 years

19

Eligible Facility
Applicant – DNER



Facility Is it the legal responsibility of an eligible applicant?
Is it located in a designated disaster area?





Is it not under the specific authority of another Federal agency? 
Was it in active use at the time of the disaster?



Was it damaged as the result of the declared disaster or emergency? 
Is it a designed and constructed improvement?



Does the constructed improvement enhances function?



Does the applicant maintain the improvement? 

20
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Eligible Facility
Work

Is work required as a result of the declared event? 
Is the work within the designated disaster area?



Was the work the legal responsibility of the applicant at the time of the disaster?
Does it fit into a FEMA category of work [Permanent work – Category G]
Cost

Is it reasonable and necessary to accomplish the eligible work?







Does it comply with Federal, State, local and tribal requirements for procurement?



Can the costs be reduced by all applicable credits, such as anticipated insurance proceeds and
salvage values?



21

22
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Lessons learned:
• Must prepare for the next one.
• Build back and retrofit stronger and resilient.
• Corals and natural infrastructure must also be restored to
protect coastal communities, critical infrastructure and
biodiversity.

12
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Puerto Rico Emergency Management
Bureau

Carlos A. Acevedo Caballero
Commissioner

PREMA - Mission
Coordinate all the resources of the government and the
private sector, to provide the fastest and most effective
services before, during and after emergency situations to
ensure the protection of life and property of citizens.

1
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Hurricane Maria – September 20th,
2017
• Was a category 4 hurricane and
could be reclassified to category 5.
• $ 3,919,899,824.36 - Total Public
Assistance Grants
• $ 1,226,870.001.79- Total in
Individuals and Household Program
• 463,752 applications approved for
the Individual Assistance Program
Foto: NOAA

Municipalities of Puerto Rico
• The 78 municipalities of Puerto
Rico were designated under the
Public Assistance and Individual
Assistance Programs.

2
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Hurricane Maria
• More than 70,000 houses lost their
roofs.
• Total collapse of essential services.
• 64 direct deaths caused by the
hurricane.
• 2,975 deaths related to the hurricane,
according to a study conducted by
the University of George Washington
Foto: NOAA

PREPA

Foto: El Nuevo Diario

3
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PRASA

Foto: Telemundo

Communications

Fotos: NMEAD

4
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Flood

Comerío

Toa Baja

Foto: Facebook

Guajataca Dam

5

4/24/2019

Structural Damages

Aibonito
Foto: NMEAD

Foto: El Nuevo Día

Structural Damages

Adjuntas
Foto: Facebook

Utuado
Foto: FEMA

6
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Commodities Distribution

Maricao
Fotos: NMEAD

Changes in Emergency
Operational Plans

7
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Changes in Emergency Operational
Plans
• The Emergency Operational Plans of the government agencies and
municipalities were worked from scratch to bring them to a catastrophic
level and temper them to the reality faced after the passage of Hurricane
Maria.
• Before the passage of the phenomenon by Puerto Rico, the plans were
prepared for the scenario of a category one hurricane (1).
• Uniform systems of plans, training and exercises are developed.
• The state and municipal emergency management structure is strengthened.

Warehouses

8
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Warehouses
• Important changes were made to the Supply Distribution Plan to ensure
that citizens receive them fast, safely and orderly.
• As part of these efforts, in conjunction with the Department of Housing,
over 20,000 cots were distributed to be located in the shelters of the
municipalities.
• One of the priorities of the Bureau has been to deliver supplies to the 78
municipalities so that, in the event of an emergency or disaster, they can
meet the needs of citizens.

Warehouses
• Historically, Puerto Rico has depended on the supplies provided by FEMA that
have warehouses located on the Island.
• To meet the need of Puerto Rico, the Bureau acquired two warehouses, located
in Guaynabo and Ponce where water and food supplies are maintained, as well
as emergency response equipment and basic necessities.
• The Bureau is preparing to locate more warehouses.

9
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Communications

Communications
• In order to guarantee communication between the response agencies
during emergencies, we are installing satellite communication systems in
all Police Commanders, Fire Stations, Ambulance Dispatches, Emergency
Management Bureau regions, as well as the Emergency Operations
Centers (COE) of the 78 municipalities.
• In addition, radios of 100 watts are being installed in the facilities, as well
as in more than 300 hospital institutions around the Island.
• These radios go from one antenna to another, without the need for a
repeater, which ensures a better response and communication in case of a
collapse.

10
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Alliance with the Private Sector

Alliance with the Private Sector
• For the first time, representatives of private companies have a space in the
Emergency Operations Center (COE), to work together with the
government and respond to the needs of citizens.
• Among the sectors that are present in the COE are: manufacturing, food,
hospitals, telecommunications, broadcasters, media, infrastructure,
transportation and gasoline.

11
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Questions or Comments
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Tsunami Mission and
Products
NOAA NRPT LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND MOVING FORWARD: RESPONSE
CHALLENGES FROM SEVERE WEATHER OR TSUNAMIS TO SHARED TRUST
RESOURCES AND MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES
San Juan, PR
April 23‐25, 2019
Christa von Hillebrandt‐Andrade
NOAA NWS Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program

Japan 2011
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Tsunami Warning Information
Natural Tsunami Warnings
• Strong coastal earthquake
shaking
• Rapid sea level changes
• Roaring sound
Official Information
• Federal, State, Local govt
• Important for distant tsunamis
Informal Information
• Friends, neighbors, relatives
• Media, SMS, social networks…
3‐3

Strong Earthquake

2010, Crescent City, USA

ACTION

Drop, Cover, and Hold.
Go Inland to High Ground Immediately.
DO NOT WAIT FOR OFFICIAL EVACUATION ORDERS
3‐4

2
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Noticeable Rise or Fall of Coastal Waters

1946, Hilo, USA

1995, Mexico

ACTION
Go Inland to High Ground Immediately
DO NOT WAIT FOR OFFICIAL EVACUATION ORDERS
3‐5

For Official Information:
Tsunami Warning Centers
• TWCs are reliable and dependable; 24x7
• Monitor seismicity for large earthquakes
• Monitor sea levels for tsunamis
• When alarms trigger, evaluate earthquake
for tsunami threat
• Issue official tsunami threat messages to
authorities and public
3‐6

3
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Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC)

NOAA Inouye Regional Center, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
NOAA Inouye Regional Center, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

Operations Center PTWC

4
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PTWC Services PR, USVI and BVI
and with international messages
the rest of the Caribbean
Director: Dr. Chip McCreery

TWC Communication Pathways
•TWC messages are:
- authoritative, coordinated among other TWCs
- issued simultaneously to many customers
(international, national, local, private sector,
public)
- reliable since they are working 24x7
- redundant since they are issued through many
communication pathways
- broadcast because of time urgency
3‐8
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U.S. Tsunami Warning System
Communications Diagram

Métodos de comunicación
AFTN/NADIN2/AISR
Coastal WFOs
FAA/Airports
Foreign National TWFPs

NWWS

State/Territory Emergency
Management
USCG

EMWIN

State/Territory/Local
Emergency Management
FEMA
Foreign National TWFPs

WMO/GTS

Foreign National TWFPs
Media

EAS

All U.S.
Audiences

NWR

All U.S.
Audiences

Coastal
WFOs

NAWAS/HAWAS/AKWAS
State/Territory Emergency
Management
FEMA
USCG

FAX

State/Territory/Local
Emergency Management
FEMA
USCG
Foreign National TWFPs

Telephone

U.S. Tsunami
Warning
Centers

State Department
Operations Center

SMS

Foreign National TWFPs
(RANET)
All Audiences

USGS EIDS/CISN*

State/Territory/Local
Emergency Management
USCG
Foreign National TWFPs

* Earthquake information only

IPAWS/WEA
Website, Email, RSS, Social
Media, CAP/XML, Atom

All Audiences

All Audiences

WWW.TSUNAMI.GOV

Para recibir mensajes del PTWC con productos del Caribe, enviar un Txt al 40404 y escribir en el
mensaje: Follow NWS_CTWP
AFTN: Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network | AISR: Aeronautical Information System Replacement (FAA) | AKWAS: Alaska Warning System | CAP: Common Alerting
Protocol | EAS: Emergency Alert System (FEMA) | EMWIN: Emergency Managers Weather Information Network (NWS) | FAA: Federal Aviation Administration | FEMA: Federal
Emergency Management Agency | HAWAS: Hawaii Warning System | IPAWS: Integrated Public Alert Warning System (FEMA) NADIN2: National Airspace Data Interchange
Network 2 (FAA) | NAWAS: National Warning System (FEMA) | NWR: NOAA Weather Radio (NWS) | NWS: National Weather Service | NWWS: NOAA Weather Wire Service
(NWS) | RANET: Radio and Internet for the Communication of Hydro‐Meteorological and Climate‐Related Information | SMS: Short Message Service | TWFP: Tsunami Warning
Focal Point | USCG: U.S. Coast Guard | USGS EIDS/CISN: U.S. Geological Survey Earthquake Information Distribution System/California Integrated Seismic Network WEA: Wireless
Emergency Alert | WFO: Weather Forecast Office (NWS) | WMO/GTS: World Meteorological Organization/Global Telecommunication System
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US Tsunami Alert
Levels

Tsunami Messages: Alert Levels
TWC Alert Level:

TWC‐determined
Threat:

Local Authority
Safety Action:

EXPECTED
FLOODING

STRONG CURRENTS
LIKELY

EVACUATION
RECOMMENDED

STAY AWAY FROM SHORE

3‐10

7
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Tsunami Messages: Alert Levels
TWC Alert Level:

TWC‐determined
Threat:

Local Authority
Safety Action:

DANGER LEVEL NOT
KNOWN

NONE or MINOR
WAVES AT MOST

PREPARE, STAY ALERT
FOR MORE
INFORMATION

NO ACTION
SUGGESTED

3‐11
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Ejemplos de productos de los TWC: Terremoto en
PR/VI o el Caribe, Peligro Potencial de Tsunami
Transcurrido

Producto

Descripción

00:00

Terremoto

Ocurre terremoto local, Mw ≥ 7.1

00:03

Observatory
Message*

00:04

Aviso PRVI

00:25

Parámetros del terremoto preliminares y revisados por
PTWC – Activa entrada en el CISN
Aviso de Tsunami para PRVI basado en los criterios
iniciales

Pronóstico de tsunami basado en el mecanismo del
Aviso,
terremoto y la data de nivel del mar. Mantiene,
Advertencia o
actualiza o degrada el nivel apropiado de Alerta o
cancelación PRVI
genera una cancelación.

* Usado principalmente por instituciones sismologicas y entidades tecnicas (RSPR,
CTWP)

Transcurrido

Producto

Descripción

00:55

Aviso,
Advertencia o
Cancelación
PRVI

Mensaje complementario con lecturas de nivel del mar de
mareógrafos costeros cercanos o DARTS. Cambio en nivel de
alerta es posible basado en las lecturas.

01:25

Aviso,
Advertencia o
Cancelación
PRVI

Mensaje complementario con lecturas del nivel del mar de
mareógrafos cercanos costeros o DARTS Cambio en nivel de
alerta es posible basado en las lecturas.

01:45

TWC Anuncio
llamada de
conferencia

Mensaje a PREMA, VITEMA, BVIDDM, WFOSJ, y PRSN
anunciando llamada de conferencia.

02:00

TWC Llamada
de conferencia

Llamada de conferencia del TWC con PREMA, VITEMA,
BVIDDM, WFOSJ, y PRSN para discutir situación.

03:00+

Aviso,
Advertencia o
Cancelación
PRVI

Cada media hora hasta que la alerta disminuya o se cancele.

9
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NOAA/NWS Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Users’ Guide Tsunami
Warning Products for Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands and British Virgin
Islands
• Product Description
• Timeline for issuance of products
• Product Identifiers and Dissemination
• Example of Products
Caribewave.info

Cancellation versus All‐Clear
• Cancellation Message issued by TWCs

• Officially cancels warning, watch, and advisory messages
• Means that destructive waves have stopped
• Does not mean it is safe to return to Tsunami Hazard Zone

• Official All‐Clear issued by local authority when it is safe to re‐enter
the Tsunami Hazard Zone

3‐15
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Warning Process: How it Reaches the “last mile”
on the coast
• Emergency Alert System: Radio and Television
• NOAA Weather Radio
• Sirens

3‐17

Wireless Emergency Alerts
• Current: Tsunami danger on the coast. Go to high ground or move inland. Listen
to local news. –NWS
• Proposed (English/Spanish):
NWS: Tsunami danger on the coast. Move to high ground or inland now.
SNM: Peligro de tsunami. Vaya a un lugar alto o tierra adentro ahora.
• Proposed (Longer Message English/Spanish)

The National Weather Service has issued a tsunami warning. A series of powerful waves and
strong currents may impact coasts near you. You are in danger. Get away from coastal waters.
Move to high ground or inland now. Keep away from the coast until local officials say it is safe to
return. Check local media for more information after you are safe.
El Servicio Nacional de Meteorología ha emitido un aviso de tsunami. Olas y corrientes fuertes
pueden afectar costas cercanas. Está en peligro. Aléjese de aguas costeras. Muévase ahora a un
lugar alto o tierra adentro. Manténgase alejado hasta que las autoridades locales indiquen que
es seguro regresar. Verifique información oficial una vez esté seguro.

11
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Tsunami.Gov – one stop for official tsunami
products (national and international)

How People Get Warnings:
Assumption
EVENT

GOVT

PUBLIC

• Official Information
• Information flow is linear from one
source
3‐18
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How People Get Warnings: Reality
• Official & Informal
(Unofficial)
Information
• From many
sources at
same time

Internet

Cell Phone
Friends &
Family

Local
Agencies

State
Agencies

Texting
& Social
Networks

PUBLIC

Federal
Agencies
NOAA
Weather
Radio

TV
Reverse
911

Radio

3‐19

Need to Test the System: CARIBE WAVE
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Summary
• Described types of tsunami warning information
• Described how Tsunami Warning Centers work
• Described types of tsunami messages
• Described the warning process and how it
reaches “the last mile on the coast”
• Emphasized importance of communication
testing
3‐22
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Products and Forecast
for
Decision Makers
Ernesto L. Morales
Warning Coordination Meteorologist
NOAA/NWS Weather Forecast Office San Juan
Ernesto.Morales@noaa.gov

NOAA/NWS MISSION
• Provide weather, water, and climate data, forecasts
and warnings for the protection of life and property
and enhancement of the national economy.

1
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WFO San Juan and NHC
• Same Mission but with a different scope

• NHC focus on the forecast of the intensity and
trajectory of the tropical cyclone.

• WFO SJU focus on the impacts in our local
forecast area based on the NHC forecast.

2
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Very Long‐Term
• Seasonal Outlooks
• Climatology/Statistic
• Preparedness talks

Tropical Cyclone Climatology

3
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Long‐Term

(day7‐day2)

• Hazardous Weather Outlook
• Emergency Management briefings
• Media Interviews
• Social Media
• Graphicast
• NHC Tropical Weather Outlooks *
*Issued by NHC

5‐Day Graphical Tropical Weather Outlook

4
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Two‐Day Graphical Tropical Weather Outlook

Hazardous Weather Outlook
Weather.gov/sju

5
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Graphicast

Long‐Term (day2‐12hr)
• Hurricane Local Statement
• TCV
• Emergency Management briefings
• Media interviews
• Social Media
• Track Forecast Cone*
• Hurricane Watch*
• Hurricane Warning*
• NHC Wind speed probabilities*
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NHC Track Forecast Cone
www.nhc.noaa.gov

Old NHC Forecast Cone

7
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New NHC Forecast Cone Product

8
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Short‐Term (12hr‐3hr)
• Hurricane Local Statements
• Tropical Cyclone VTEC (TCV)
• Other short term products
• Stand Alone Products

Very Short‐Term
• Emergency Flash Flooding
• Extreme Wind Warning

10

4/25/2019

Emergency Flash Flooding

Extreme Wind Warning
• Winds associated to the center of the cyclone.
• Hurricane Category 3 or more.
• Sustained winds of 115mph or higher.

11
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Recovery

Follow the Official Source of Weather Information
National Weather Service SAN JUAN PR
(787) 253‐4501 or (787)253‐0615
www.weather.gov/sju
Twitter: @NWSSanJuan
www.facebook.com/
www.nhc.noaa.gov

12
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Puerto Rico Emergency
Management Bureau

CHALLENGES FROM SEVERE
WEATHER OR TSUNAMIS

1
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RISK COMUNICATION
LEARNING FROM THE PAST – IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE

Severe weather

2
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Severe weather

Hurricane

3
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Hurricane

Earthquake

4
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Earthquake

Tsunamis
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In order to response in a proper
way and inform the community
of the hazard or the possibility
of one so they can be prepare
and take the necessary actions
to save lifes

We use different official sources and elements to
collet information and to get it to the public as
fast as we can and necessary

6
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We are in contact all the time
with the NWS via phones, radio
and personal to our EOC if
need it
We are in contact and follow the
information from the National
Hurricane Center in Florida

We recive information from the PTWS,
PRSN and the NTWC, also the NWS
We use the ENWIN System, internet
systems, Ring down systems, faxs and
phones systems

7
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Once confirm de source of information, We
deliver the alert messages to everyone
concern: Regions or Zones, Municipalities,
responds Agencies, using different forms of
communications as: IPOW, regular radios,
p-25 interoperability's radios, 100w radios,
internet, phones and the media, included
commercial TV and radio stations

This alert information could
be just up date information,
watching awareness or a
warning alert for a Tsunami
already in a way to hit Puerto
Rico

8

4/25/2019

At the same time we will active the State
EOC and all the components of every EFS to
give the support need it at the field

Basically the key and critical point handling this
phenomes is the risk to loose the communication
before, in the middle or after the emergency
happened, so you can not give the coordination
and help to the communities that you suppose to
offer and they need

9
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We
must
educate
the
communities, other responders,
agencies, work together and be
prepare and ready to anything
and everything in order to
accomplish our mission with
the people of Puerto Rico

Any Question ?

10
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Thank you

11
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Appendix D: Breakout Session 1
Group A
Category

Identified
Response
Challenge

Desensitizing
of alarms

Communic
ation

Not taking
forecast
seriously
Sources of
Information

Resources

Lack of
maintenance
of resources

Lessons/Practices/
Skills Learned

Take culture into
account when
designing
communication
Information needs
to put everyone on
same page (official
source)
Educate public to
follow official
source(s) of
weather
information

Needs to be
prepared before
event , need
maintenance logs
and funding
necessary

Explanation/
Description

Timeframe
Following
Disaster

"Burn out"

Mission Response

Yes (depends on
education)

Mission Response

Yes (depends on
education)

ALL

Mission Response

Yes (depends on
education)

ALL

Too many
unofficial
sources of
information
Government
(NWS) vs
Mass media
& social
media
Infrastructur
e,
equipment,
generators,
machinery,
hospitals,
water
treatment,
dredging
(Most
dependent
on funding)

Cascading delays
across response/
recovery

Safety of
Staff/Staff Families

Yes - everybody

Cross
Shared
Jurisdiction
trust
(federal,
resources
commonwealth,
local)
ongoing
education
ALL

ALL

Funding
availability,
education,
budgeting,
accountabi
lity

Not enough
resources

Cannot properly
respond causing
snowball effect,
improvisation
insufficient = must
plan ahead,
stockpiling supplies
beforehand, Both
access and
distribution,
*More efficient
distribution system
that is equitable,
prior plans
(&funding?) of
impartial parties
responsible for
distribution of
resources to
communities
(NGO, red cross,
churches)

redundancy with
Communicati options, total loss
of communication
on
infrastructure can happen, ham
radio can work
Preparatio
n

Lack of plans
for an event
of this
magnitude

Need to plan,
practice, train for
worst case
scenarios

Priority on
imported
supplies,
permission
limits some
provisions.
Do not
having
enough
resources,
leading to
less
accessibility
and
distribution

Similar to
lack of
maintenance,
structures
failed

Both response
and post event

Yes, directly

ALL

Mission Response

Yes

ALL

ALL (pre, during,
post)

yes

ALL

planning,
knowledge
of
resources
(within
agency and
inter) and
necessary
MOU prior,
awareness
/
transparen
cy of
resources

reliance on
other
agency's
structures

Leadership

Leadership

Empowering
(training,
organizing,
informing)
communities is
crucial, developing
volunteering
structure (cultural
shift) = in response
to communities
not relying on gov.,
training of
leadership,

turnover of
leadership,
lack of
organization,
lack of
commitment
of employees

ALL (pre, during,
post)

yes, indirectly

ALL

Group B
Identified Response
Challenge

Response plans exist

Land Use Plan

Lessons/Practices/Skills
Learned

But not ownership,
accountability,
disseminated, activated
on
We must enforce
sensible use of land use
plan and zoning; assess
on paper but in reality is
different (i.e., zoning)

Explanation/Description

Timeframe
Following
Disaster

Plans existed, not
updated, not used,
systems not adequate,
did not reflect current
codes and standards

Mission
Response

Building again in highhazard area (i.e., schools,
hospital, NWS)

Recovery
Activities

Shared
Trust
Resource
s

Safety of
Staff/Staf
f Families
many
plans
affect
staff/fami
lies
yes schools,
sensitive
public
buildings

Cross
Jurisdiction
(federal,
commonwealt
h, local)

All

commonwealt
h and local

Communicate the severity
danger/risk

Simultaneous hazard events
may require unknown
flexibility

Capacity for multiple,
simultaneous disasters
Marine/land debris hindered
by lack of staging areas and
logistics

Because of the size of
the island, confidence in
the forecast/warning;
people get desensitized
with many hurricanes
missing Puerto Rico; so
many warnings with
nothing happening,
people choose not to
respond
Need tabletop exercises
that are more complex,
multi-scenario, some
scenarios require staff
safety ahead of
protocols, need
redundancy
Climate change could
lead to stressors to
staff/resources/retentio
n.

Having public understand
the risk; people think
they are lucky, manage
expectations, warning
fatigue

There is a plan for NWS
for continuity, but has
not been exercised
Competition for
resources.
Trained/experienced
resources. Turnover of
political/experienced/bur
nout staff
See Florida plans for an
example

Rapid assessments of
damage/debris were critical

Need pre-identified
staging areas
Areas that had quick
assessments made it
easier to scope federal
funding

Don't restructure the
organization during a
disaster*

Building a new type of
structure during a
disaster leads to added
pressure, lack of

Sectors and grant
manager introduced part
way during a disaster
created problems

Mission
response
and
recovery
activities;
large
timeframe

NOAA

yes

Yes - all

Mission
Response

NOAA

yes

Yes - all

no

federal and
commonwealt
h

Mission
Response

no

All

Mission
Response

no

All

yes
(mental
health

federal but
impacts all

FEMA

FEMA

experience, unclear
goals

Policy guidelines need to be
revisited due to change and
new technology, climate
change etc.*

Police evacuated people in
danger zones when cell down

Deadlines need to be flexible,
but…
Be broad and bold on initial
assessments

Lack of pre-scripted mission
assignments/Duplicity of
efforts*

Policies need to be
revised before an
incident
Pre-emergency
coordination with
municipal (door
knocking, whats app)
repeat weather
messages
FEMA extends
deadlines. Are these
good or bad? False
expectations. Inefficient
timeframe
Baseline for FEMA to
consider funding
opportunities (repair,
restoration)
The more pre-scripted
mission assignments,
the quicker response
activities can
commence and
provides training
opportunities within
agencies

and field
safety)

E.g., coral reef and green
technologies

Timeframe
: prior to
disaster

FEMA;
Staff
PAPPG

no

federal

Build relationships prior,
build trust, work
together

Mission
Response

All

yes

All

Both

All

no

All

Repairs and legislation
Puerto Rico initial RSF
was broad and created
opportunity for recovery

Other Federal Agencies
(OFAs) need to be assertive in
their supplemental funding
request*

Community response efforts.
Develop a community plan.

**Bolding indicates priority items

You snooze, you lose
Community members
segregating debris;
reaching out to the
elderly; local
communities will
engage if given the
opportunity, they take
ownership, sense of
community (helping
your neighbors)

There are some things
FEMA cannot fund

Encourage selfsufficiency and help
others. Opportunity to
teach young people.
Resiliency

Group C
Identified Response
Challenge

Lessons/Practices/Skill
s Learned

Communications &
interoperability
between
organizations/groups

Requires a compatible
system

Communication

Back to basics- simple
solutions (e.g., radio,
information runners)

Shared
Trust
Resource
s

Safety of
Staff/Staf
f Families

Cross Jurisdiction
(federal,
commonwealth, local)

Pre-disaster

Yes

All

During, Post-disaster

Yes

All

Explanation/
Description

Timeframe
Following Disaster

Hard to
communicat
e between
regions due
to economic
and technical
barriers
Cannot
assume
standard
communicati
on
infrastructur

Interpersonal- layers of
bureaucracy slowed
progress

Need to identify an
authority- in past only
identified problem

High turnover rate of
response positions

Need to maintain and
document experiences,
and put them into
practice. Done through
education and more
trainings

Did not pre-emptively
involve private sector

Involve private sector
during contingency
plans. Make the link
on how to support
municipalities/local
organizations (e.g.,

e will be
available in
the event of
a disasterneed a backup plan
E.g., resource
request
formwanted
submitted
online but
had no
internet
access,
politics
getting in the
way of
progress
During
Loss of
knowledge
and details
slip through
the cracks.
Use authority
(knowledge
of who has it) Pre-,Post- disaster
Private
sector often
has
resources it
can
contribute to
response
all (pre, during, post)

Commonwealth and
local

Commonwealth and
local

Yes

All

transportation/
gas/food)

Release of emergency
supplies in ports

Circumvent barriers
using emergency
declaration to
streamline that (e.g.,
turn off taxation during
response.)

Getting assets to
people

Use multiple avenues
to distribute resources
(e.g., NGOs, faith based
& private)

Getting community to
know and buy into
existing
procedures/framework
s

Better communication
of information &
informing communities
at the grass roots level

effort- have
resources
and assets
connected at
all levels.

E.g., tax and
revenue
process/polit
ical fix
E.g., FEMA
taking goods,
hotels, etc.
(entire
supply chain)
Get
community
to know
emergency
response
framework
and
procedures.
Guidance
and
mechanism
in place.
Socialize
process and
standardize,
disseminate

During

All

During, Post-disaster

Commonwealth and
local

all (pre, during, post)

Commonwealth and
local

to
municipalitie
s on how to
follow
framework

Logistics

Pre-planning on how to
get resources to the
island, and distributing
in reasonable amount
of time

Prior
contracts
need to be in
place before
disaster,
distribution
networks
need to be
established

all (pre, during, post)

All

Group D
Identified
Response
Challenge

Lessons/Practices/Skill
Explanation/Description
s Learned

Ability to
communicate
with small
communities

Post emergency
communication needs
to be simple and
tailored to community

People
inadequately
prepared for
category 4 or 5
hurricane

Should prepare
regardless of category
level

Lacked proper
terminology to inform
community
Prior close
calls/hurricanes missing
the island gave a false
sense of security &
resources were moved
to VI to deal with
Hurricane Irma

Safety of
Staff/Staf
f Families

Cross Jurisdiction
(federal,
commonwealth,
local)

Recovery
Activities

Yes

Fed-->c.w.-->local

Preparation

Yes

All

Timeframe
Following
Disaster

Shared Trust
Resources

Communities
relying on social
media and not
official sources of
information
Lack of
emergency
planning

More outreach about
what official sources of
information are
Local level
preparedness plan
created with central
point of information

Contingency
planning for
emergency
communication

Need more than everyday, standard
communication

Lack/enforcemen
t of residential
building codes

Vulnerable
population

More damage and loss
of life due to unsafe
structures
Don't wait until
hospital is impacted to
make
decisions/hospital
need redundant or
back up energy
sources

Access to clean
water

Ran out of water

Port accessibility
limited because
of law

Necessary aid could
not be distributed/get
to local communities
quick enough

Lack of exposure to
official sources, too
much exposure to other
information

Pre, During, Post

Yes

Local

Starting from family,
community, local,
regional

Preparation

Yes

All

E.g., radio, paper map,
ham radio

Preparation

Yes

Commonwealth/loc
al

Yes

Commonwealth/loc
al

yes

Maybe federal,
definitely
Commonwealth/loc
al

Yes

Commonwealth/loc
al

yes

Commonwealth/loc
al

Building codes not
enforced, and people did
not understand homes
were unsafe

Disabled/sick/elderly
people were stuck in
place
There was no redundant
water for residents/no
cisterns
San Juan is major port
for food/resources
coming to PR. Other
ports are used for
petroleum products,
coal, etc.

Preparation

Preparation
Preparation

Pre, During, Post

Drinking
water,
protected
resources

drinking
water, clean
water

Current
infrastructure
was/is not
hurricane ready

Maintain/update
infrastructure to
withstand hurricanes

Roads, power lines, etc.

Preparation

infrastructure
, power

Commonwealth/loc
al

Appendix D – Breakout Session II
Group A

Challenge
Category

Communication

Identified Response
Challenge

Communication with
small communities

Explanation/Des
cription

Lessons
Learned

Improvement(s) (Actionable
Tasks)

Lacked proper
terminology to
inform
community

Post emergency
communication
needs to be
simple and
tailored to
community

Map communities & identify
liaisons, focus groups to
identify effective
language/terminology, science
communication training for
personnel in agencies 1.
Database of community needs
based on geography,
demographics, resiliency center
possibilities, existing
infrastructure 2.Establishing
community liaisons

How does
approach
change with
respect to
Tsunami vs
Hurricane?
Island wide
for both
(Pre
emergency),
evacuation
communicat
ion, inland
vs coastal
impacts
different
(Post)

Comments

Lack of exposure
for official
sources, too
much exposure
for other
information

More outreach
about what
official sources
of information
are

Local gov support of NWS,
teach resource quality,
scientists create "internet
image", before season: sit
down with forecast
communicators, consider
certifications, spend time with
communities to ensure
understanding of maps / skills
at community level to ID
official sources. 1. create
official emergency
website/social media and
promote/market it as a user
friendly resource (2) link back
to authoritative sources NWS

No

Having public
understand the
risk; people
think they are
lucky, manage
expectations,
warning fatigue.
"Burn out"desensitizing of
alarms

Because of the
size of the
island,
confidence in
the
forecast/warnin
g; people get
desensitized
with many
hurricanes
missing Puerto
Rico; so many
warnings with
nothing
happening,
people choose
not to respond.
Take culture

"remember Maria", continuous
outreach to remind (e.g.
poster), probability concept,
Message: "You control your
risk" by reducing your
vulnerability

more
desensitizati
on with
Tsunamis
because of
infrequency

Communities relying
on social media and
not official sources
of information

Communication of
the severity
danger/potential
risk

TV
personaliti
es vs NWS
(creation of
controvers
y for
views),
NWS is less
entertainin
g and has
to follow
protocols
vs beliefs

into account
when designing
communication
lines

Infrastructure

No redundant
water for
residents/no
cisterns

Ran out of
water

Promote/fix policy for
rainwater capture, investigate/
revise rainwater capture policy
(resiliency center example),
community workshops on virus
protection fitting into cultural
norms (list of best practices). 1.
Reduce barriers to
home/commercial rainwater
capturing 2. encourage
rainwater collection/capture
with safe treatment

E.g., failure of
infrastructure
(water); waiting
for gov. to
maintain
infrastructure

Empowering
communities to
take
accountability/r
esponsibility of
infrastructure

Enforce construction code,
certified inspectors, education
for empowerment in
maintenance solidarity training.
1. Informal contractor training
2. use best
construction/maintenance
practices from other hurricane/
prone states and countries

Lack of access to
clean water

Poorly maintained
infrastructure

coastal vs
island wide
(different
types but
similar
problem)

benefit for
local may
have
regional
impacts

Leadership

Logistics

Policy

Competition for
resources.
Trained/experie
High turnover within
nced resources.
leadership position
Turnover of
and trained
political/experie
personnel; limited
nced/burnout
capacity for multiple,
staff. Don't
simultaneous
restructure the
disasters
organization
during a disaster

Port accessibility is
limited during
response because of
existing laws

Land use plan

San Juan is
major port for
food/resources
coming to PR.
Other ports are
used for
petroleum
products, coal.

Building again in
high-hazard area
(i.e., schools,
hospital, NWS)

Climate change
could lead to
stressors to
staff/resources/
retention. Need
local level
leaderseducated
through
trainings.
Minimize
turnover.
Necessary aid
could not be
distributed/get
to local
communities
quick enough.
Circumvent
barriers using
emergency
declaration to
streamline that
(e.g., turn off
taxation during
response.)
Enforce
sensible use of
land use plan
and zoning;
assess on paper
but in reality is
different (i.e.,
zoning)

Professionalize emergency
management positions,
establish/increase emergency
management schools, Local
level leader training. 1. develop
curriculum from vocational
schools to higher learning
institutions

No change

Laws impeding maritime
supplies should be temporarily
waived (Jones Act) for
appropriate timeframe (or
permanently). 1. neutral study
on PR relevant Jones Act issues
related to emergency support

no

Enforce code, consistency in
code, implement new code. 1.
approve new land use
regulations with strong focus
on risk zones

no change

process
there but
political
realities
impede use

People inadequately
prepared for
Categories 4 or 5
hurricanes

Preparedness

Lack of Emergency
planning

Prior close calls
gave a false
sense of security
& resources
were moved to
VI to deal with
Irma

Should prepare
regardless of
category level

Starting from
family,
community,
local, regional.

Local level
preparedness
plan created
with central
point of
information.
Need
accountability
w.r.t. response
plans. Preemergency
planning to
include local
law
enforcement
and impartial
parties (e.g.,
NGO, faith
based
organizations)

Education / outreach, use
Maria as an example while
fresh in memories,
For Tsunami: prepare models
and videos of what it would
look like (overlay culturally
significant places), storm surge
water marks / signage (Keep
reminders of physical damage),
Art projects. Media and
education campaign
Table top exercise to improve
plan, use available funding and
follow through, involve local
level. creative solutions like
addressing faith based orgs),
capitalizing on existing program
infrastructure, community
leaders, create plans in daily
life (daycare, work, school with
continuity)

Tsunami =
preparing
for
something
you haven't
experienced
, increased
challenge -

Some hurricane
gives family
level
planning,
Tsunami =
"save self
mindset",

Group B
Challenge
Category

Communication

Policy

Identified
Response
Challenge

Communication
with small
communities

Explanation/
Description

Lacked proper
terminology
to inform
community
Better
integrate
green
Policy guidelines
technologies,
need to be
climate
revisited due to
change
change and new
consideration
technology,
s into existing
climate change etc.
policies for
funding and
mitigation.

Lessons Learned

Improvement(s)
(Actionable Tasks)

Post emergency
communication
needs to be
simple and
tailored to
community
(municipalities)

Be aware of language and
culture needs. Post flyers.
Centralized information in
public location. Verifying
the community leaders.
Pre-training at the
community level.

These policies
need to be
revised before
an incident

High-level policy
agreement on existing
FEMA public assistance,
mitigation and recovery
policies.

How does
approach
change with
respect to
Tsunami vs.
Hurricane

Comments

Both

What to do if
community is
totally isolated and
unable to access
information.

Both

Coasts on island
are particularly
important.

Other Funding
Agencies (OFA)
need to be
assertive in their
supplemental
funding requests

Preparedness

People
inadequately
prepared for
Categories 4 or 5
hurricanes

There are
some things
FEMA cannot
fund

you snooze, you
lose

Prior close
calls gave a
false sense of
security &
resources
were moved
to VI to deal
with Irma

Should prepare
regardless of
category level

Use consistent vocabulary.
Agencies should be
responsible/aware for their
own coverage/vocabulary.
Host workshops/training
on funding/grant
writing/petitions/procurem
ent/opportunities. Include
the local emergency
coordinators along with the
state and mayors at annual
meeting for training (not
limited to local
authority).Training of
federal grant submission
(preparedness).Improve
liaison
outreach/communication.
Social scientists may be
able to help with effective,
engaged outreach.
Education and buy-in from
local community leaders.
More effective exercises
esp. on the items we did
wrong previously (i.e.,
AAR). Don't let AAR sit on a
shelf; reassess. Develop a
checklist of activities.

Both

Both

This might be
unique to Puerto
Rico.

Response

Inequity

Rapid assessments
of damage/debris
were critical. Be
bold on initial
assessment

Vulnerable
population

Baseline for
FEMA to
consider
funding
opportunities.

Disabled/sick/
elderly people
were stuck in
place

Areas/communi
ties that had
quick
assessments
made it easier
to scope federal
funding
Don't wait until
hospital is
impacted to
make
decisions/hospit
al need
redundant or
back up energy
sources

Centralized application to
collect assessment
information multiple
sectors. The public can
report on their
municipalities.

This goes beyond
just FEMA. Post
and report storm
information i.e.,
#hurricanemaria
(include GPS). Post
-Tsunami survey
guide is available.
Language and
culture must be
taken into
consideration.

Both

Group C
Challenge
Category

Identified Response
Challenge

Explanation/
Description

Lessons Learned

Improvement(s)
(Actionable Tasks)

Communicatio
n

Communication with
small communities

Lacked proper
terminology
to inform
community

Post emergency
communication needs
to be simple and
tailored to community

Use of short wave
radios (response), sat
internet, power
(generators)

How does
approach
change with
respect to
Tsunami vs.
Hurricane
same for
both

Comments

Contingency planning
for emergency
communication

Back up
communicatio
n routes,
diverse ways
to request
help (e.g.,
internet not
available)

Starting from
family,
community,
local, regional.

Need more than
standard
communication (e.g.,
radio, paper map, ham
radio)
Local level
preparedness plan
created with central
point of information.
Need accountability
w.r.t. response plans.
Pre-emergency
planning to include
local law enforcement
and impartial parties
(e.g., NGO, faith based
organizations)

Baseline for
FEMA to
consider
funding
opportunities

Areas that had quick
assessments made it
easier to scope federal
funding

Lack of Emergency
planning

Response

Rapid assessments of
damage/debris were
critical. Be bold on
initial assessment

Need of education on
the technology used
(be outside, pay fees
for services), need
power for sat phone,
UHF, PA systems, use
phones as
communication with
low wattage , solar
powered hard drives
Aggressive on pre planwhat is already there,
educate the
community, what
should they do with
supplies (have it ready
before the event- bag
of supplies, food,
water, communication
tools, etc.), have to
train people on the
concept
Require prior base line,
municipalities needed,
pre plan for what we
need to do (before and
after), takes time for
some response (why
preparedness is so
important), be able to
grow food, apply for
grants to building sick
bank, communication
center, etc.

same for
both

Invest and
investigate in
technologies,
government
can't fund all
of it

same for
both

More focus
on the lower
levels of
preparednes
s (families,
communities,
etc.)

same for
both

Inequity

Vulnerable population

Disabled/sick/
elderly people
were stuck in
place

Don't wait until
hospital is impacted to
make
Better assessment of
decisions/hospital need who’s at risk (people in
redundant or back up
hospitals, nursing
energy sources
homes, etc.)

same for
both

Group D
Challenge
Category

Identified
Response
Challenge

Communication
with small
communities
Communication

Communities
relying on social
media and not
official sources
of information

Explanation/
Description

Lacked proper
terminology
to inform
community
Lack of
exposure for
official
sources, too
much
exposure for
other
information

Lessons Learned

Improvement(s) (Actionable
Tasks)

Post emergency
communication
needs to be
simple and
tailored to
community

1. Take information to
community, and ask for
feedback. 2. Which sources of
social media are used? 3.
Investigate which app are
applicable to community, and
use contact point to distribute
information 4. pick a central
location/focal point to
distribute information and time
for briefing

More outreach
about what
official sources of
information are

1. do community outreach on
official sources of information,
who and how to access official
information

How does
approach
change with
respect to
Tsunami vs.
Hurricane

n/a

increase use
of
tsunamiread
y guidelines,
WEA

Comments

(e.g., school,
churches,
plaza)

Contingency
planning for
emergency
communication

Infrastructure

Back up
communicatio
n routes,
diverse ways
to request
help (e.g.,
internet not
available)

Having public
Communication
understand
of the severity
the risk;
danger/potential
people think
risk
they are lucky,
manage
expectations,
warning
fatigue. "Burn
out"desensitizing
of alarms
Building codes
not enforced,
Lack of and
and people
enforcement of
did not
residential
understand
building codes
homes were
unsafe

Need more than
standard
communication
(e.g., radio, paper
map, ham radio)
Because of the
size of the island,
confidence in the
forecast/warning;
people get
desensitized with
many hurricanes
missing Puerto
Rico; so many
warnings with
nothing
happening, people
choose not to
respond. Take
culture into
account when
designing
communication
lines

More damage and
loss of life due to
unsafe structures

1. Encourage folks to get
amateur/ham radio license. 2.
preposition sat phones, work
with technology companies to
develop low tech solutions 3.
training/drills

1. Show damage from previous
storms, and consistent
messaging each season. 2. less
emotion when messaging, keep
message calm to prepare
rather than scare community
1. Messaging related to
maintaining a safe structure,
not exclusively collecting
water. 2. Critical infrastructure
should be evaluated 3. Properly
use federal funds to repair and
maintain infrastructure 4.

useful for
both
situations

encourage
regular drills,
practices to
maintain
capabilities

same for
both

same for
both

dept. of
transportation

professional education,
assessment of curriculum in all
academic settings

Lack of access to
clean water

Logistics

Port accessibility
is limited during
response
because of
existing laws

Marine/land
debris hindered
by lack of
staging areas
and logistics

No redundant
water for
residents/no
cisterns

San Juan is
major port for
food/resource
s coming to
PR. Other
ports are used
for petroleum
products,
coal.

Ran out of water
Necessary aid
could not be
distributed/get to
local communities
quick enough.
Circumvent
barriers using
emergency
declaration to
streamline that
(e.g., turn off
taxation during
response.)

See Florida
plans for an
example

Need preidentified staging
areas

1. Education on rainwater
harvesting, the importance of
it. 2. Improve residential water
collection to maintain a
reserve. 3 education on low
cost filters (e.g., sand). 4.
Education on maintenance of
individual water sources. 5.
proper installation of
tanks/cisterns

1. Landside facilities are geared
toward handling only one type
of commodity, 2. Require
private ports to be capable,
and ready to act in the case of
a disaster. 3. identify alternate
airports/transportation that
would be viable in event of
storm
1. Having a plan for where to
put marine debris, 2. Destroyed
buildings/construction
materials, 3. identify final
location for debris (e.g., landfill
vs. taking off island)

same for
both

same for
both

Major airport
is in splash
zone for
tsunami.
Potential to
stage
resources

same for
both

see x-prize
winner

Minimize
duplicity of
efforts

Local level
preparedness plan
created with
central point of
information.
Need
accountability
w.r.t. response
plans. Preemergency
planning to
include local law
enforcement and
impartial parties
(e.g., NGO, faith
based
organizations)
The more prescripted mission
assignments, the
quicker response
activities can
commence and
provides training
opportunities
within agencies

Disabled/sick/
elderly people
were stuck in
place

Don't wait until
hospital is
impacted to make
decisions/hospital
need redundant
or back up energy
sources

Lack of
Emergency
planning

Preparedness

Starting from
family,
community,
local, regional.

Lack of prescripted mission
assignments

Inequity

Vulnerable
population

1. Re-institute CERT program in
schools, churches,
communities, 2. Use in
coordination with
neighborhood watch programs,
3. use "nextdoor" type apps,
1. Do more outreach with
state/territory/govt level to
educate about what they can
ask for in terms of mission
assignments 2. looking back at
historical lessons, to drive
assessments
1. Census data/demographic
data to focus efforts and
identified during emergency
preparedness planning to
create a special needs plan. 2.
Compliance checks done in low
income communities, first. 3.
Recommendations for

same for
both

same for
both

Evacuation
plan may
vary
between T
and H

Time of day
may influence
who is
present in the
community,
family plan
would identify
who is

improvements rather than
fines. 4. Messages tailored to
underserved communities.

available
during the day
vs. night.

Appendix D – Breakout Session III
Group A
Challenge
Category

Identified
Response
Challenge

Communication
with small
communities

Explanation/
Description

Lessons Learned

Recommendation for
Implementation

Lacked
proper
terminology
to inform
community

Post emergency
communication
needs to be
simple and
tailored to
community

1a. Evaluate/find
existing data (private
and public), (identify
orgs already doing work
in community)
1b.
Visiting communities to
document needs and
points of contact (2)

Lack of
exposure for
official
sources, too
much
exposure for
other
information
No
redundant
water for
residents/no
cisterns

More outreach
about what
official sources of
information are

1. team (graphic artist,
website builder, science
communication expert,
marketing specialist,
social media expert)

Ran out of water

1. create tax incentives
to make
collection/filtration
more widespread
2.educate on proper
use of water catchment
filtration systems

Ease of
Implementat
ion (1=easy,
5= hard)

2.5

Coordination w.
Partners
Academia, NGOs,
Community based orgs
with established
gov/commonwealth/ter
ritory partnership for
information sharing

Communication
Communities
relying on social
media and not
official sources
of information

Infrastructure

Lack of access to
clean water

1

1. 2.5
2. 1

PREMA & VITEMA,
academia or other
private partners at local
level

Homeowner
association, private
industry, engineering
organizations,
academia, government,
SME (Small Medium
Enterprise) incubators

Current
infrastructure
was/is not
hurricane ready

Leadership

roads, power
lines, etc.

E.g., failure
of
infrastructur
Poorly
e (water);
maintained
waiting for
infrastructure
govt to
maintain
infrastructur
e
Competition
for
resources.
Trained/expe
High turnover
rienced
within leadership
resources.
position and
Turnover of
trained
political/expe
personnel;
rienced/burn
limited capacity
out staff.
for multiple,
Don't
simultaneous
restructure
disasters
the
organization
during a
disaster

maintain/update
infrastructure to
withstand
hurricanes
Empowering
communities to
take
accountability/re
sponsibility of
infrastructure

Climate change
could lead to
stressors to
staff/resources/r
etention. Need
local level
leaderseducated
through
trainings.
Minimize
turnover.

Create courses and
certifications, mandate
training. Build cat 4&5
rated buildings and
implement best
practices for Tsunami
resilience

4

1. curriculum
development (at all
levels)

Government and
engineering
organizations, insurance
industries, community
involvement/participati
on

Academia & dept. of
education

2.5

Logistics

Policy

Preparedness

Port accessibility
is limited during
response
because of
existing laws

Land use plan

People
inadequately
prepared for
Categories 4 or 5
hurricanes

San Juan is
major port
for
food/resourc
es coming to
PR. Other
ports are
used for
petroleum
products,
coal.

Building
again in highhazard area
(i.e., schools,
hospital,
NWS)
Prior close
calls gave a
false sense of
security &
resources
were moved
to VI to deal
with Irma

Necessary aid
could not be
distributed/get
to local
communities
quick enough.
Circumvent
barriers using
emergency
declaration to
streamline that
(e.g., turn off
taxation during
response.)
Enforce sensible
use of land use
plan and zoning;
assess on paper
but in reality is
different (i.e.,
zoning)
Should prepare
regardless of
category level

1. conduct study and
analyze potential
impacts of change

Academia, think-tank

Study=1
Change = 5

1. Meet with risk
experts and planning
board to ensure best
practices

Community involved:
award competitions for
campaign, education
outreach all ages
involved. Conduct for
both hurricane and
tsunamis at schools,
mass media, higher ed.
Institutions

4

local and state gov.,
(Permitting agencies,
municipalities),
community feedback

All

2.5

Starting from
family,
community,
local,
regional.
Lack of
Emergency
planning

Local level
preparedness
plan created with
central point of
information.
Need
accountability
w.r.t. response
plans. Preemergency
planning to
include local law
enforcement and
impartial parties
(e.g., NGO, faith
based
organizations)

project based learning
platforms, find and edit
existing checklists that
can be PR relevant and
distribute, emulate
other places with
similar programs,
Create emergency
management education
program for
communities at all
levels year-round

All

2.5

Group B

Challenge
Category

Communication

Identified
Response
Challenge

Communication
with small
communities

Explanation/
Description

Lacked proper
terminology
to inform
community

Lessons Learned

Post emergency
communication needs to
be simple and tailored to
community
(municipalities)

Ease of
Recommendation for Implementation
Implementation
(1=easy, 5= hard)

Coordination
w. Partners

In community
workshops with
community leaders
and focus on rural
and underserved
communities.

NGOs, local
emergency
mgmt.
organizations,
faith-based
orgs, schools
& universities.

2

Policy
guidelines need
to be revisited
due to change
and new
technology,
climate change
etc.

Better
integrate
green
technologies,
climate
change
considerations
into existing
policies for
These policies need to be
funding and
revised before an
mitigation.
incident

Policy
Other Funding
Agencies (OFA)
need to be
assertive in
their
supplemental
funding
requests

There are
some things
FEMA cannot
fund

You snooze, you lose

GAO-focus group.
Agency feedback to
GAO and FEMA.
Agencies/academia
provide information
on how green
infrastructure fits
into FEMA facilities.
Interagency training
on procedures of
funding
opportunities. Create
a survey (to
commonwealth
agencies) to gather
post-event lessons
learned on
supplemental grant
processes. Federal
agencies aware of
supplemental
funding
opportunities (grant,
special project
funding) and
responsible for
requests relative to
their mandates.
Federal agencies
should be prepared
with requests to

4

Federal
agency.
Ongoing GAO
focus group
on Maria.
Universities

3

Federal
agencies.
Commonweal
th is unique in
that funding
budget does
not allow for

Congress for
supplemental
funding according to
their agency
mandates.

People
inadequately
prepared for
Categories 4 or
5 hurricanes
Preparedness

Lack of prescripted mission
assignments

Prior close
calls gave a
false sense of
security &
resources
were moved
to VI to deal
with Irma

Should prepare
regardless of category
level

Minimize
duplicity of
efforts.

The more pre-scripted
mission assignments, the
quicker response
activities can commence
and provides training
opportunities within
agencies

Social science (this is
not a technical
problem) how we
can improve transfer
of information.
Research the
effectiveness of
training/translation.
Implement NWS
Storm Ready. Expand
CERT to include
specific training to
community (i.e.,
storm surge, flood)
Agencies review
what they have
currently. Agencies
develop new ones as
appropriate. Conduct
exercise to review
and update PSMAs.
Develop checklist for

4

YES (NWS
etc.)

3
Federal
Agencies,
state and local

the state to use to
make requests.
Recommend to GAO?

Response

Rapid
assessments of
damage/debris
were critical. Be
bold on initial
assessment

Baseline for
FEMA to
consider
funding
opportunities.

Areas/communities that
had quick assessments
made it easier to scope
federal funding

Implement #hashtag.
Field exercise like
CARIBEWAVE.
Develop app (see
SERT-FL).

Coordinators,
NWS, FEMA,
multiagencies.

2

Group C

Challenge
Category

Communica
tion

Identified
Response
Challenge
Communication
with small
communities

Recommendation for Implementation
Explanation/
Description

Lacked proper
terminology
to inform
community

Lessons
Learned
Post
emergency
communication
needs to be
simple and
tailored to
community
Equipment compatibility

Ease of
Implementat
ion (1=easy,
5= hard)

Coordination
w. Partners

3
state level

Contingency
planning for
emergency
communication

Policy

Interpersonallayers of
bureaucracy
slowed progress

Lack of
Emergency
planning

Back up
communicatio
n routes,
diverse ways
to request
help (e.g.,
internet not
available)

Need more
than standard
communication Training and education, map of who is
(e.g., radio,
able to educate. Being able to buy, use,
paper map,
and maintain the equipment. Use
ham radio)
universities
People need to know their jobs
(checklist), communication to avoid
different decisions being made, held
accountable by making sure people
Need to
report problems (investigation), teams
identify an
of public oversight to help. This might
authority- in
not help everyone but it could in the
Politics getting past only
future. Turn over the information to
in the way of
identified
theirs and new leaders (who has that
progress
problem
information for when you are gone?)
Local level
(1) Educate- workshops to build the
preparedness
knowledge for the local leaders to bring
plan created
back to their communities (ex. kids can
with central
take it home to their families), break up
point of
the workshops into regions to allow
information.
more people to attend (for different
Need
cultures), NOAA office for coastal
accountability
management. (2) Outreach- media
w.r.t. response blitz (ads at the movies, on roads,
plans. Preradios, TV stations, at stores), public
emergency
and private classes (home
planning to
improvement stores), youth
Starting from
include local
organizations (boy scouts, girl scouts,
family,
law
etc.), these need to be on how to
community,
enforcement
prepare for these events. (3) Goal is to
local, regional. and impartial
create self-sufficient communities. Put

4

state level

4
all levels
(state
municipalitie
s)

3

community
levels, NGO,
Universities ,
media
outlets,
photo
journalist
workshops

parties (e.g.,
NGO, faith
based
organizations)

Response

Inequity

Rapid
assessments of
damage/debris
were critical. Be
bold on initial
assessment

Vulnerable
population

Baseline for
FEMA to
consider
funding
opportunities

Disabled/sick/
elderly people
were stuck in
place

Areas that had
quick
assessments
made it easier
to scope
federal funding
Don't wait until
hospital is
impacted to
make
decisions/hospi
tal need
redundant or
back up energy
sources

people on the ground in pilot
communities (more difficult to
implement but more results), share the
results!

4.5
Assessments, inventory, create culture

communities,
state, and
municipalitie
s

2

all levels

Group D
Challenge
Category

Identified
Response
Challenge

Explanation/D
Lessons Learned
escription

Communication
with small
communities
Lacked proper
terminology
to inform
community

Communic
ation
Communities
relying on
social media
and not official
sources of
information

Lack of
exposure for
official
sources, too
much
exposure for
other
information

Post emergency
communication
needs to be
simple and
tailored to
community

More outreach
about what
official sources of
information are

Recommendation for
Implementation

Be targeted (e.g., agencies
and groups developing
message, can plan events
such as town hall) and
opportunistic (e.g., if
community is having an
event, use the event to share
information). Use an event
organized by the community
(especially with food and
activities)
Be targeted (e.g., agencies
and groups developing
message, can plan events
such as town hall) and
opportunistic (e.g., if
community is having an
event, use the event to share
information). Use an event
organized by the community
(especially with food and a

Ease of
Implementa
tion
(1=easy, 5=
hard)

2.5

Coordination w.
Partners
Communities/municipali
ties leaderships (e.g.,
mayor, elected political
officials); grassroots
community
organizations (e.g.,
churches). Official
message developers
(e.g., NWS, FEMA, local
emergency
management- PREMA,
VITEMA). SeaGrant

2.5

Pre- events --> same
partners as Comm 2

Contingency
planning for
emergency
communication

Communication
of the severity
danger/potenti
al risk

Back up
communicatio
n routes,
diverse ways
to request
help (e.g.,
internet not
available)

Having public
understand
the risk;
people think
they are lucky,
manage
expectations,
warning
fatigue. "Burn
out"desensitizing
of alarms

Need more than
standard
communication
(e.g., radio,
paper map, ham
radio)
Because of the
size of the island,
confidence in the
forecast/warning
; people get
desensitized with
many hurricanes
missing Puerto
Rico; so many
warnings with
nothing
happening,
people choose
not to respond.
Take culture into
account when
designing
communication
lines

Connect with university/radio
clubs. Identify funding
source/opportunities.
Demonstrations to solicit
interest, go to events and set
up table. Stories/outreach
about why some
communities were better off
post disaster because had sat
phones/ham. Continuing
education, training

5 (technical
skills and
need buy in,
might still
be problem
with sat
phone in
PR)

2.5

Create traveling exhibit of
how things went wrong and
why you should be prepared;
vivid, be targeted and
opportunistic. Creating
videos/photo show

Federal communications
commission (FCC), ARRL
- amateur radio relay
league, emergency
management agency,
amateur radio clubs,
local technical university
(e.g., electrical
engineering)

Communities/municipali
ties leaderships (e.g.,
mayor, elected political
officials); grassroots
community
organizations (e.g.,
churches). Official
message developers
(e.g., NWS, FEMA, local
emergency
management- PREMA,
VITEMA). SeaGrant

Lack of and
enforcement of
residential
building codes

Building codes
not enforced,
and people
did not
understand
homes were
unsafe

More damage
and loss of life
due to unsafe
structures

Infrastructu
re

Lack of access
to clean water
No redundant
water for
residents/no
cisterns

Logistics

Port
accessibility is
limited during
response
because of
existing laws

San Juan is
major port for
food/resource
s coming to
PR. Other
ports are used
for petroleum
products,
coal.

Ran out of water
Necessary aid
could not be
distributed/get
to local
communities
quick enough.
Circumvent
barriers using
emergency
declaration to
streamline that

Detailed assessment of
critical infrastructure;
meeting with
engineers/architects in
municipalities to go around
communities to identify most
important aspect of a
structure. Different source of
funding for public, private
and municipal
New construction require
redundant water systems,
existing construction improve
collection systems, create
document/demonstration for
rainwater harvesting; low
cost, implement at a few
locations within the
community to encourage
community members to
copy. educating about how
to clean water/maintain
system

Have diverse ports, capable
of handling other goods;
back-up port for response
operations. Policy shift by
port authority by diversifying
use of port. Contingency
plans to have more than one
viable port available.

5
Municipal
architects/engineers;
FEMA capacity build
sector;

sliding scale
(depends on
local water company,
technology
non-profits, private
of choice)
business,
commonwealth/territor
y/municipality
responsible for building
codes

5

port authority, govt of
PR, private industry

(e.g., turn off
taxation during
response.)

Marine/land
debris hindered
by lack of
staging areas
and logistics

See Florida
plans for an
example

Lack of
Emergency
planning

Starting from
family,
community,
local, regional.

Need preidentified staging
areas
Local level
preparedness
plan created with
central point of
information.
Need
accountability
w.r.t. response
plans. Preemergency
planning to
include local law
enforcement and
impartial parties
(e.g., NGO, faith
based
organizations)

Identifying locations ahead of
time in contingency plans,

Look to VITEMA model to
replicate, find more avenues
of socializing information;
demonstrations in
communities during events,
continued community
outreach. Improve
consistency of delivery.
Institutionalizing self-reliance
(i.e., stop relying on federal
govt to make fixes)

1.5-2

FEMA, USCG, local
agencies, NOAA Marine
Debris, Public Works

1.5-2
Local agencies,
emergency
management agencies,
FEMA, school
system/education
system, community
members

Lack of prescripted mission
assignments
Minimize
duplicity of
efforts

Private sector
was not preemptively
involved

Inequity

Vulnerable
population

Private sector
often has
resources it
can contribute
to response
effort- have
resources and
assets
connected at
all levels.

Disabled/sick/
elderly people
were stuck in
place

The more prescripted mission
assignments, the
quicker response
activities can
commence and
provides training
opportuntities
within agencies
Involve private
sector during
contingency
plans. Make the
link on how to
support
municipalities/lo
cal organizations
(e.g.,
transportation/
gas/food)
Don't wait until
hospital is
impacted to
make
decisions/hospita
l need redundant
or back up
energy sources

keep hazard mitigation plan
up to date. educate
commonwealth about FEMA
missions to determine what
can be asked for. FEMA
relies on guidance from local
govt level. Inform what can
be asked for (e.g., guidance
document/ lessons learned)
Multiple companies get hired
or one primary contractor
with sub-contractors.
Advanced contracting
initiatives for pre-planned
contracts. List for potential
companies available if
needed pre-,during, postdisaster
If municipalities’ emergency
contingency plans don't exist,
then develop and identify
vulnerable population(s). If
they do exist, include in
them.

5

Commonwealth/local
govt (e.g., hazard
mitigation office),
FEMA, local
management agencies
(e.g., coastal agencies,
all-encompassing plan),
port authorities,
schools, local chamber
of commerce, private
businesses

sliding scale

5

private businesses, local
govt, contractors
census bureau, social
services, health and
human services, local
law enforcement, local
emergency response
management, planning
and development
agency
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Tsunami Risk Communication
Exercise
NOAA NRPT LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND MOVING FORWARD: RESPONSE
CHALLENGES FROM SEVERE WEATHER OR TSUNAMIS TO SHARED TRUST
RESOURCES AND MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES
San Juan, PR
April 23‐25, 2019
Christa von Hillebrandt‐Andrade and Carolina Hincapié
NOAA NWS Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program

U.S. Tsunami Warning System
Communications Diagram

http://tsunami.gov

Communication Methods
AFTN/NADIN2/AISR
Coastal WFOs
FAA/Airports
Foreign National TWFPs

NWWS

State/Territory Emergency
Management
USCG

EMWIN

State/Territory/Local
Emergency Management
FEMA
Foreign National TWFPs

WMO/GTS

Foreign National TWFPs
Media

EAS

All U.S.
Audiences

NWR

All U.S.
Audiences

Coastal
WFOs

NAWAS/HAWAS/AKWAS
State/Territory Emergency
Management
FEMA
USCG

FAX

State/Territory/Local
Emergency Management
FEMA
USCG
Foreign National TWFPs

Telephone

U.S. Tsunami
Warning
Centers

State Department
Operations Center

SMS

Foreign National TWFPs
(RANET)
All Audiences

USGS EIDS/CISN*

State/Territory/Local
Emergency Management
USCG
Foreign National TWFPs

* Earthquake information only

IPAWS/WEA
Website, Email, RSS, Social
Media, CAP/XML, Atom

All Audiences

All Audiences

WWW.TSUNAMI.GOV

Para recibir mensajes del PTWC con productos del Caribe, enviar un Txt al 40404 y escribir en el
mensaje: Follow NWS_CTWP
AFTN: Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network | AISR: Aeronautical Information System Replacement (FAA) | AKWAS: Alaska Warning System | CAP: Common Alerting
Protocol | EAS: Emergency Alert System (FEMA) | EMWIN: Emergency Managers Weather Information Network (NWS) | FAA: Federal Aviation Administration | FEMA: Federal
Emergency Management Agency | HAWAS: Hawaii Warning System | IPAWS: Integrated Public Alert Warning System (FEMA) NADIN2: National Airspace Data Interchange
Network 2 (FAA) | NAWAS: National Warning System (FEMA) | NWR: NOAA Weather Radio (NWS) | NWS: National Weather Service | NWWS: NOAA Weather Wire Service
(NWS) | RANET: Radio and Internet for the Communication of Hydro‐Meteorological and Climate‐Related Information | SMS: Short Message Service | TWFP: Tsunami Warning
Focal Point | USCG: U.S. Coast Guard | USGS EIDS/CISN: U.S. Geological Survey Earthquake Information Distribution System/California Integrated Seismic Network WEA: Wireless
Emergency Alert | WFO: Weather Forecast Office (NWS) | WMO/GTS: World Meteorological Organization/Global Telecommunication System

Shorter Messages
• Order of Message Content is Important
• 90 characters (current WEA):
• Source, guidance, hazard, location, time

• 280 – 360 character (eg. Twitter):

• Source, hazard, location, time and guidance

NOAA Central Library: Creating Alerts and Warnings for Short Messaging Channels
Speakers: Jeannette Sutton, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Communication, University of
Kentucky & Erica Kuligowski, PhD, Research Social Scientist, Engineering Laboratory, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, April 24, 2019
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MH3uBclHezE

Wireless Emergency Alerts
• Current: Tsunami danger on the coast. Go to high ground or move inland. Listen
to local news. –NWS
• Proposed (English/Spanish):
NWS: Tsunami danger on the coast. Move to high ground or inland now.
SNM: Peligro de tsunami. Vaya a un lugar alto o tierra adentro ahora.
• Proposed (Longer Message English/Spanish)

The National Weather Service has issued a tsunami warning. A series of powerful waves and
strong currents may impact coasts near you. You are in danger. Get away from coastal waters.
Move to high ground or inland now. Keep away from the coast until local officials say it is safe to
return. Check local media for more information after you are safe.
El Servicio Nacional de Meteorología ha emitido un aviso de tsunami. Olas y corrientes fuertes
pueden afectar costas cercanas. Está en peligro. Aléjese de aguas costeras. Muévase ahora a un
lugar alto o tierra adentro. Manténgase alejado hasta que las autoridades locales indiquen que
es seguro regresar. Verifique información oficial una vez esté seguro.

Official Roles for Tsunami Warning Process
• Tsunami Warning Center – Responsible for determining alert level and
issuing message
• Pacific Tsunami Warning Center

• Tsunami Warning Focal Point – Responsible for disseminating Official Alerts
to authorities and public

• PR State Emergency Management Bureau is the Primary Tsunami Warning Focal
Point for Puerto Rico, IPAWS (WEA), VHF Radio
• VITEMA/911 is the Primary Tsunami Warning Focal Point for US Virgin Islands
• NWS SJFO – Secondary Tsunami Warning Focal Point for PR and USVI – activate
NOAA Weather Radio and EAS, Social Media
• PRSN – Secondary Tsunami Warning Focal Point for PR and USVI, RSS, Website, Social
Media, VHF Radio, Ham Radio

• USCG – Responsible for disseminating alert to boaters/maritime
community

Roles During Exercise
• CTWP act as PTWC
• TWFP act as TWFP
• USCG acts as USCG
• Others are Social Influencers during warning, assume agency roles
from Cancellation onward
• Define where you are in PR/VI or outside of PR

Enabling Learning Objectives
1. Familiarization with Tsunami Warning Center products and
timelines
2. Improve the communication of the threat message in
PR/USVI by official TWFP and social influencers.
3. Will focus on four stages of warning:
•
•
•
•
•

Response to Earthquake shaking
Tsunami Warning
Tsunami Confirmation
Warning Cancellation
All Clear

Overview and Instructions
• Comms based on natural signs (Activity 1 – 30 min)
• Comms with Message #1 (Activity 2 – 30 min)
• Comms with Message # 3 (Activity 3 – 30 min)
• Comms with Message # 8 (Activity 4 – 30 min)
• Comms for Response/All Clear (Activity 5 – 30 min)
• Working Groups established previously – ONLY Activity 1 to do
individually.
• No communication between groups or consultation with facilitators.
• Mimic time during real event
• Write down your responses/message according to the time stipulated.

Group Learning Scenario Exercise

• Activities simulate M7.9 earthquake NE of Puerto Rico
• Earthquake occurs in Puerto Rico Trench, where North
American Plate subducts under Caribbean Plate

Scenario Activity 1
• Strong earthquake shaking is felt, 11:00 PM
• Some buildings have collapsed.
• Phones lines are immediately jammed as
everyone tries to find out what happened.
• No TWC messages have been issued yet.

Scenario Activity 1 Questions

Including earthquake, you have 3 minutes for
action (all individual), 20 minutes group
discussion
1. How do you respond to the earthquake?
2. What do you think is going to happen, number the risks.
3. What can you communicate, to Who and How are you
going to do it.
Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as Tsunami
Warning Focal Point, USCG as USCG others as a social
influencer

Scenario Activity 2
• Time 11:03
• PTWC message #1 issued
• Telephones are jammed, Social Media is viral
• Earthquake impact has been significant.

Scenario Activity 2 Questions
5 minutes to determine action, 15 minutes group
discussion
1.
2.
3.
4.

What and How did you receive the official product?
What is the alert level?
What is the expected time of arrival of the tsunami?
What, to Who, How and When are you going to
communicate.

Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as Tsunami
Warning Focal Point, USCG as USCG others as a social
influencer

Scenario Activity 3
• It is 11:55 PM
• PTWC message #3 is issued
• Media reports the tsunami is inundating the U.S. Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico.
• Media reports people flocking to beaches to watch the
arrival of the tsunami. This is causing coastal evacuation
problems.

Scenario Activity 3 Questions
5 minutes for action, 15 minutes group discussion
1. What important new information does the message
include?
2. What, to Who, How and When are you going to
communicate.

Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as
Tsunami Warning Focal Point, USCG as
USCG, others as a social influencer

Scenario Activity 4
• It is 0225 AM
• PTWC message #8 is issued
• Media reports the tsunami has inundated Puerto
Rico coasts.
• People are wanting to enter to the evacuated areas.

Scenario Activity 4 Questions
5 minutes for action, 5 minutes group discussion
1. What important new information does the message
include?
2. What, to Who, How and When are you going to
communicate.
Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as Tsunami
Warning Focal Point, USCG as USCG, others as a social
influencers/assume agency role
D‐6

Scenario Activity 5
• PR Governor press conference at 7 AM
• Initial report of the event and its effects.
• Informs that EM Officials are in field doing the
corresponding evaluations and will be issuing the all
clear in a further intervention.
• Curfew for other citizens

Scenario Activity 5 Questions
10 minutes for group discussion
1. What is the government guidance?
2. What are additional information sources?
3. What, to Who, How and When are you going to
communicate.
4. What will be the roles in response?

Everyone assumes agency role

Summary
• Discussed the impact of a local tsunami to at-risk tsunami
communities along the coast.
• Examined the types of Tsunami Warning Center messages in
the scenario
• Considered type, timing, audience and mechanism for
communications

Hurricane Exercise
NOAA Regional Preparedness
and Training (NRPT)
April 25, 2019
Guaynabo, PR

EXERCISE
OBJECTIVE

• Provide an opportunity to familiarize with the
NOAA National Weather Service and NOAA
National Hurricane Center products during
the preparation, response and recovery phase
from a major hurricane that impacted Puerto
Rico.
• Explain Hurricane Threats based on the
reasonable worst-case scenario using plain
language.
• Understand the time in which individuals can
safely assume they will have to prepare for TC
force winds.

Exercise Scenario

Module 1: Pre-Storm
What should be considered when interpreting the
Potential Tropical Cyclone Forecasts?
• It is issued only for systems threatening land within the
watch/warning time period.
• Earlier NHC advisories for systems that pose a long-range threat to
the United States, or other land areas.
• Forecasts are likely to have greater uncertainty!

Model Guidance forecast track (Internal)

Model Guidance intensity forecast (Internal)

Module 1: Pre-Storm
What storm surge product should be used for
planning purpose?
• MOMs- Maximum of MEOWs
– Used in planning to design evacuation zones and operationally
when uncertainty is high
• MEOWs - Maximum Envelope of Water
– Used operationally when you can narrow down to specific
scenarios

https://arcg.is/1jHzP
1

https://arcg.is/1jHzP
1

Module 1: Pre-Storm
What are the typical NHC track errors?
•

Average NHC track errors increase by about 35 to 40 nautical miles per day.
– 2-day error ~ 75 n mi
– 4- day error ~ 160 n mi

- 3-day error ~ 110 n mi
- 5-day error ~ 220 n mi

Module 2: Close to Landfall
How can you determine
when will preparation
should be rushed to
finished based on the
arrival of tropical storm
force winds?
• Earliest Time of Arrival
Graphic
– Time in which
individuals can
safely assume that
they will have to
prepare for
tropical-storm
force winds.

Module 2: Close to Landfall
What information provide
the Most Likely Time of
Arrival Graphic?
•

Messaging Concept:
– The expected, or
most-likely time for
the onset of
tropical-storm
force winds.
– Individuals may
have this much
time, but shouldn’t
plan on it.

Module 2: Close to Landfall
What is the difference between a hurricane watch
and a warning?
•

A warning means that hurricane conditions are expected whereas a watch means
that conditions are possible.
– A Hurricane Watch means that hurricane conditions (sustained winds of 74
mph or higher) are possible within the specified area. A hurricane watch is
issued 48 hours in advance of the anticipated onset of tropical-storm-force
winds in an area.
– Hurricane warnings indicate that hurricane conditions (sustained winds of
74 mph or higher) are expected somewhere within the specified area. The
hurricane warning is issued 36 hours in advance of the anticipated onset of
tropical-storm-force winds to allow for important preparation.

Module 2: Close to Landfall
Which product provide a good
overview of the overall tropical
impacts situation?
•

Hurricane Local Statement (HLS):

– Good overview of the overall
tropical situation in a given CWA
– Provides a summary of the worst
impacts to plan for with areal
descriptions

What It Does Not Represent.
•
•

It contains no specific meteorological
or threat information
It is not detailed for decision makers

Header
New Information

National Weather Service San Juan

Potential Impacts

National Weather Service San Juan

Potential Impacts

National Weather Service San Juan

Precautionary
Statements

National Weather Service San Juan

Hurricane Threat and Impacts

Consist of four elements:
• Wind
• Storm surge
• Flooding rain
• Tornado
Provide the reasonable worst case
scenario, taking into account the forecast
magnitude of the hazard, along with the
associated uncertainty of the forecast.
Grids are available at:
• http://digital.weather.gov/

Module 3: Landfall
When is issued an Extreme Wind
Warning (EWW)?
•
•
•

It is only issued in association with
major hurricanes.
The criteria for an EWW is sustained
surface winds of 115 mph or greater.
The EWW is intended to alert the
public to prepare for potentially lifethreatening conditions.

Extreme Wind Warning

★ Major Hurricane Irma (Category 5)
★ Three (3) warnings were issued by
WFO San Juan
★ September 6, 2017

Module 3: After landfall
Which is the difference between a Flash Flood
Warning and a Flash Flood Emergency?
•

A Flash Flood Warning is issued to inform that flash flooding is in progress, imminent, or
highly likely. Flash Flood Warnings are urgent messages as dangerous flooding can develop
very rapidly, with a serious threat to life and/or property.

•

A Flash Flood Emergency is an exceptionally rare life-threatening situation.
–Total failure of a major dam.
–Multiple swift water rescue teams have been or are being deployed in response to flash flooding
of an exceptional magnitude.
–Water has rapidly risen or will rapidly rise to levels where people who are ordinarily in safe
locations during previous flash flood events are now placed in life-threatening situations.

Module 4: Post-Storm
After warning and watches expired, what products are issued?
WFO-SJU returns to normal
operations. Any weather hazard
is then treated on a case by case
scenario.
For example:
•
•
•
•
•

Flash Flood Warning
Coastal Flood Warning
Severe Thunderstorm Warning
Special Weather Statements
Hazard Weather Outlook

If required, WFO-SJU will
provide IDSS briefing in order to
assist the recovery process.

Exercise Tools

Exercise Scenario

ACTIVITY #1: Preparation
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the Tropical
Cyclone Formation Chance to regional EMs.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Weather Outlook (TWO),
a) Which is the formation chance through 48 hours?
b) Which is the formation chance through 5 days?
1) What represents the hatched area?
In addition, they asked you about:
1) Which is the difference between a Tropical Storm Watch and a Tropical Storm
Warning?
1) Which is the difference between a Hurricane Watch and a Hurricane Warning?

ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and ThreatsTC Watches and Warnings in effect
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the earliest
time of arrival as well as the most likely time of arrival to regional EMs.
1) Provide the earliest time of arrival for:
a) Saint Croix
b) San Juan
c) Arecibo
d) Mayaguez
1) Provide the most likely time of arrival for:
a) Saint Croix
b) San Juan
c) Arecibo
d) Mayaguez

SCENARIO OUTLINE - Imminent

SCENARIO OUTLINE - Imminent

ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and ThreatsTC Watches and Warnings in effect
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following
information to regional EMs.
1) Based on the latest Hurricane Local Statement (HLS)
a) Which are the current Watches and Warnings?
b) Which are the Potential Impacts?
c) When will be the next forecast update?

ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and ThreatsTC Watches and Warnings in effect
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following
information to regional EMs. Now you are focused over southeast Puerto Rico.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV)
a) Provide the Threat Level (None, Elevated, Moderate, High, Extreme) for
i) Winds
ii) Storm Surge
iii) Flooding Rain
iv) Tornado

ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and ThreatsTC Watches and Warnings in effect
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following
information to regional EMs. Now you are focused over San Juan and Vicinity.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV)
a) Provide the Potential Impacts for
i) Winds
ii) Storm Surge
iii) Flooding Rain
iv) Tornado

ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and ThreatsTC Watches and Warnings in effect
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following
information to regional EMs. Now you are focused over Saint Croix.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV), provide the following
information
a) Timing for tropical storm force winds
b) Timing for hurricane force winds
c) Peak wind and gust
d) Equivalent Category

Tweet posted by a Social Media Influencer

ACTIVITY #3: Risk Communication
You as EM wants to communicate threats and impacts using social media.
1) Provide an example of a social media post, including #hashtags to communicate
threats and impacts.
You as EM wants to clarify which are the official forecast sources.
1) Provide an example of a social media post in order to identify the official forecast
sources.

ACTIVITY #4: Ongoing ThreatsTC Watches and Warnings in effect
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to clarify the following
information to regional EMs.
1) Which is the difference between a Flash Flood Warning and a Flash Flood
Emergency?
1) What means an Extreme Wind Warning?

SCENARIO OUTLINE - Post Storm

Appendix F: Conclusions and Outcomes Notes
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Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge

Explanation/Description

Lessons Learned

Ability to communicate with small
communities

Post emergency
communication needs to be
Lacked proper terminology to simple and tailored to
inform community
community (municipalities)

Communication

Communities relying on social
media and not official sources of
information

Lack of exposure for official
sources, too much exposure
for other information

Contingency planning for
emergency communication

Communicate the severity
danger/risk

Back up communication
routes, diverse ways to
request help (e.g., internet
not available)

Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)

How does approach change with respect to
Tsunami vs Hurricane?

1. Use of short wave radios (response), SAT internet, power
(generators).
2. Be aware of languge and culture needs. Develop focus
groups to identify effective language/terminology, science
communication training for personnel in agencies. 3.
Outreach before events, such as posting informational flyers.
Take information to community, and ask for feedback on
material. Ask which sources of social media are most widely
used, investigate which apps are applicable to community
and use contact point to distribute information. 4. Identify
centralized information in public location. Map communities
& identify liaisons (e.g., community leaders). 5. Verify the
community leaders, and conduct pre-training at the
community level. Pick central location(s)/focal point to
distribute information and time for briefing. 6. Maintain a
Same for both:
database of community needs based on geography,
Island wide for both (Pre emergency), evacuation
demographics, resiliency center possibilities, existing
communication, inland vs coastal impacts different
infrastructure
(Post)

1. Ensure local agencies have unified message before events.
Conduct community outreach on official sources of
information, who and how to access official information. 2.
Encourage local government support of NWS, teach how the
products published by NWS can be interpreted and how to
use them. Before each hurricane season, NWS sit down with
forecast communicators, consider the use of a certificate to
authenticate sources. 3. Teach resource quality. 4. Create
official website/social media to document official emergency
sources and promote/market the platform (have links back to
each resource e.g., NWS). 5. Need to ensure power for and
use of: SAT phones, UHF, PA systems, and encourage using
More outreach about what
Same for both:
phones with low wattage, solar hard drives.
official sources of information Education/outreach campaign on how to use the different
increase use of tsunami ready guidelines, clarify
technologies/pay for services
tsunami warning 'cancellation' vs. 'all clear', WEA
are

1. Encourage folks to get amateur/ham radio license. 2.
Preposition sat phones, work with technology companies to
develop low tech solutions 3. Conduct training/drills to teach
community and make sure technology is working
useful for both situations

Need more than standard
communication (e.g., radio,
paper map, ham radio)
Because of the size of the
island, confidence in the
forecast/warning; people get
desensitized with many
hurricanes missing Puerto
Rico; so many warnings with
having public understand the nothing happening, people
risk; people think they are
choose not to respond. Take
1. Show damage from previous storms, and consistent
lucky, manage expectations, culture into account when
messaging each season. 2. Less emotion when messaging,
warning fatigue. "Burn out"- designing communication
keep message calm to prepare rather than scare community Same for both
desensitizing of alarms
lines

Comments

Recommendation for Implementation

1. Determine equipment compatibility and
necessities for each community/region. 2.
Conduct community workshops with
community leaders and focus on rural and
underserved communities. Re-identify local
responders willing to be translators. 3.
Evaluate/find existing data (private and
public), (identify orgs already doing work in
community) 4. Visit communities to
document needs and points of contact. Be
targeted (e.g., agencies and groups
developing message, can plan events such as
town hall meetings) and opportunistic (e.g., if
What to do/where should people go if community is having an event, use the event
the community is isolated and unable to share information). Use an event organized
to access information after a disaster. by the community (especially with food and
activities)
(e.g., school, churches, plaza)
1. Training and education for community
members, identify who is capable of
conducting education sessions. At the
outreach events, teach how to buy, use, and
maintain the equipment. Use universities for
outside assistance.
2. Develop an outreach team to include:
graphic artist, website builder, science
communication expert, marketing specialist,
social media expert. Messaging should be
concise, easy to read, contain critical
information at the forefront. Use graphics
Invest and investigate in technologies; (avoid large files), lists, various colors and
government cannot fund all of it (seek fonts, and simple language (accommodating
outside grants/funding sources)
cultural preferences e.g., English vs. Spanish).
TV personalities vs NWS (creation of 3. Be targeted (e.g., agencies and groups
controversy for views), NWS is less
developing message, can plan events such as
entertaining and has to follow
town hall) and opportunistic (e.g., if
protocols vs beliefs. Invite celebrities community is having an event, use the event
to share information). Use an event organized
and influencers to social media
trainings
by the community

encourage regular drills, practices to
maintain capabilities

Connect with university/radio clubs. Identify
funding source/opportunities.
Demonstrations to solicit interest, go to
events and set up table. Stories/outreach
about why some communities were better off
post disaster because had sat phones/ham.
Continuing education, training

Ease of
Implementation Coordination w. Partners
(1=easy, 5=
hard)

3

3
State level (PREMA & VITEMA), academia or
other private partners, local level,
communities/municipalities leadership (e.g.,
mayor, elected political officials); grassroots
community organizations (e.g., churches).
Official message developers (e.g., NWS,
FEMA, local emergency managementPREMA, VITEMA). Sea Grant

5 (technical
skills and need
Federal communications commission (FCC),
buy in, might still
ARRL - amateur radio relay league,
be problem with
emergency management agency, amateur
sat phone in PR)
radio clubs, local technical university (e.g.,
electrical engineering)

2.5
Create traveling exhibit of how things went
wrong and why you should be prepared; vivid,
be targeted and opportunistic. Creating
videos/photo show

State level, NGOs, local emergency
management organizations, faith-based
orgs, schools & universities.
Academia, NGOs, Community based orgs
with established
gov/commonwealth/territory partnership
for information sharing.
Communities/municipalities leaderships
(e.g., mayor, elected political officials);
grassroots community organizations (e.g.,
churches). Official message developers
(e.g., NWS, FEMA, local emergency
management- PREMA, VITEMA). Sea Grant

Communities/municipalities leaderships
(e.g., mayor, elected political officials);
grassroots community organizations (e.g.,
churches). Official message developers
(e.g., NWS, FEMA, local emergency
management- PREMA, VITEMA). Sea Grant

Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge

Lack/enforcement of residential
building codes

Infrastructure

Explanation/Description

building codes not enforced,
and people did not
More damage and loss of life
understand homes were
unsafe
due to unsafe structures

Access to clean water

no redundant water for
residents/no cisterns

Poorly maintained infrastructure

Leadership

Logistics

Lessons Learned

Leadership and capacity for
multiple, simultaneous disasters

Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)

How does approach change with respect to
Tsunami vs Hurricane?

1. Messaging related to maintaining a safe structure, not
exclusively collecting water. 2. Critical infrastructure should
be evaluated 3. Properly use federal funds to repair and
maintain infrastructure 4. Professional education,
assessment of curriculum in all academic settings
Same for both
1. Education on rainwater harvesting, the importance of it.
Community workshops on virus protection fitting into
cultural norms (list of best practices) 2. Improve residential
water collection to maintain a reserve. Encourage rainwater
collection/capture with safe treatment. 3. Education on low
cost filters (e.g., sand). 4. Education on maintenance of
individual water sources. Reduce barriers to
home/commercial rainwater capturing. 5. Proper installation
of tanks/cisterns. 6. Promote/fix policy for rainwater capture.
7. Investigate/ revise rainwater capture policy (resiliency
center example).

e.g., failure of infrastructure
(water); waiting for govt to
maintain infrastructure

Same for both
Enforce construction code, certified inspectors, education for coastal vs island wide (different types but similar
Empowering communities to empowerment in maintenance solidarity training. 1. Informal problem)
take
contractor training 2. Use best construction/maintenance
accountability/responsibility practices from other hurricane/ prone states and countries
of infrastructure

Competition for resources.
Trained/experienced
resources. Turnover of
political/experienced/burnout
staff. Don't restructure the
organization during a disaster

Professionalize emergency management positions,
Climate change could lead to establish/increase emergency management schools, local
stressors to
level leader training. 1. Develop curriculum from vocational
staff/resources/retention.
schools to higher learning institutions
Need local level leaderseducated through trainings.
Minimize turnover.

need pre-identified staging
areas

benefit for local may have regional
impacts

Same for both

1. Having a plan for where to put marine debris, 2. destroyed
buildings/construction materials, 3. Identify final location for
debris (e.g., landfill vs. taking off island)
Same for both
1. Enforce code, consistency in code, implement new code. 2. Same for both
we must enforce sensible use Approve new land use regulations with strong focus on risk
building again in high-hazard of land use plan and zoning; zones.
Land Use Plan
area (i.e., schools, hospital,
assess on paper but in reality
NWS)
is different (i.e., zoning)
Better integrate green
High-level policy agreement on existing FEMA public
assistance, mitigation and recovery policies. Maintain and
Policy guidelines (*PAPPG) need to technologies, climate change
restore corals and natural infrastructure to protect coastal
be revisited due to change and new considerations into existing
These
policies
need
to
be
policies
for
funding
and
communities. Simplify FEMA’s public assistance program
technology, climate change etc.
Same for both
revised before an incident
mitigation.
policies for non-traditional natural features
see Florida plans for an
example

dept. of transportation

People ran out of water

1. Landside facilities are geared toward handling only one
Same for both
type of commodity, 2. Require private ports to be capable,
necessary aid could not be
and ready to act in the case of a disaster. 3. Identify alternate
distributed/get to local
airports/transportation that would be viable in event of
Port accessibility limited because of
communities quick enough. storm 4. Identify laws impeding maritime supplies, and push
law
San Juan is major port for
Circumvent barriers using
for them to be temporarily waived (e.g., Jones Act) for
food/resources coming to PR. emergency declaration to
appropriate timeframe. 5. Neutral study on Puerto Rico
Other ports are used for
streamline that (e.g., turn off relevant Jones Act Issues related to emergency support
petroleum products, coal.
taxation during response.)
Marine/land debris hindered by
lack of staging areas and logistics

Comments

Recommendation for Implementation

Ease of
Implementation Coordination w. Partners
(1=easy, 5=
hard)

Detailed assessment of critical infrastructure;
meeting with engineers/architects in
municipalities to go around communities to
5
identify most important aspect of a structure.
Municipal architects/engineers; FEMA
Different source of funding for public, private
and municipal
capacity build sector;
1. Educate on proper use of water catchment
Homeowner association, private industry,
filtration systems. Educating about how to
engineering organizations, academia,
Education = 2 government, SME (Small Medium
clean water/maintain system 2. Create
Implementation Enterprise) incubators
document (e.g., one-pager)/demonstration
=3
for rainwater harvesting; low cost, implement
local water company, non-profits, private
Policy Change = business,
at a few locations within the community to
5
encourage community members to copy. 3.
commonwealth/territory/municipality
sliding scale responsible for building codes
Create tax incentives to make
(depends on
collection/filtration more widespread. 4. New
technology of
construction require redundant water
choice)
systems, existing construction improve
collection systems,
Create courses and certifications, mandate
training. Build cat 4&5 rated buildings and
implement best practices for Tsunami
resilience

4

1. Curriculum development (at all levels)

Government and engineering organizations,
insurance industries, community
involvement/participation

Academia & dept. of education

3

The process is there but political
realities impede use. Major airport is
in splash zone for tsunami. Potential
to stage resources

see x-prize winner

1. conduct study and analyze potential
impacts of change
2. Have diverse ports, capable of handling
other goods; back-up port for response
operations. 3. Policy shift by port authority by
diversifying use of port. 4. Update
contingency plans to have more than one
viable port available.
1. Identifying locations ahead of time in
contingency plans, 2. Encourage use of
central drop-off locations for community
members to dispose of household hazardous
waste (HHW)
1. Meet with risk experts and planning board
to ensure best practices

Coasts on island are particularly
important.

GAO-focus group. Agency feedback to GAO
and FEMA. Agencies/academia provide
information on how green infrastructure fits
into FEMA facilities.

Academia, think-tank
port authority, govt of PR, private industry
Study =1
Change = 5

1.5-2

4

4

FEMA, USCG, local agencies, NOAA Marine
Debris, Public Works, EPA
local and state gov., (Permitting agencies,
municipalities), community feedback

Federal agency. Ongoing GAO focus group
on Maria. Universities

Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge

Policy

Explanation/Description

Lessons Learned

OFAs (other federal agencies) need
to be assertive in their
supplemental funding request

There are some things FEMA
can not fund
You snooze, you lose

Interpersonnel- layers of
bureaucracy slowed progress

People inadequately prepared for
cat. 4 or 5, tsunamis (high impact,
low frequency events)

Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)

Use consistent vocabulary. Agencies should be
responsible/aware for their own coverage/vocabulary. Host
workshops/training on funding/grant
writing/petitions/procurement/opportunities. Include the
local emergency coordinators along with the state and
mayors at annual meeting for training (not limited to local
authority).Training of federal grant submission
(preparedness).Improve liaison outreach/communication.

How does approach change with respect to
Tsunami vs Hurricane?

Same for both

1. Create checklist to identify tasks for each person, 2.
need to identify an authority- communicate/socialize checklist and responsibilities, 3. hold
politics getting in the way of in past only identified
organizations accountable for responsibilities, 4. share
progress
problem
information with managers
Same for both

For Hurricane : 1. Involve social scientists, they may be able
to help with effective, engaged outreach. 2. Education and
buy-in from local community leaders. More effective
exercises especially on the items we did wrong previously
(i.e., AAR). Use Hurricane Maria as an example and spread
lessons learned. Don't let AAR sit on a shelf; reassess.
Develop a checklist of activities. 3. Contingency planning to
include multiple back-up NWS offices outside of threat zone
Prior close calls gave a false
For Tsunami: prepare models and videos of what it would
Both
sense of security & resources
look like (overlay culturally significant places), storm surge
were moved to VI to deal with Should prepare regardless of water marks / signage (Keep reminders of physical damage), Tsunami = preparing for something you haven't
category level
Art projects. Media and education campaign
experienced, increased challenge Irma

Comments

This might be unique to Puerto Rico.

Recommendation for Implementation

Ease of
Implementation Coordination w. Partners
(1=easy, 5=
hard)

Interagency training on procedures of funding
opportunities. Create a survey (to
commonwealth agencies) to gather postevent lessons learned on supplemental grant
processes. Federal agencies aware of
supplemental funding opportunities (grant,
special project funding) and responsible for
requests relative to their mandates. Federal
agencies should be prepared with requests to
Congress for supplemental funding according
to their agency mandates.

3

People need to know their jobs (checklist),
communication to avoid different decisions
being made, held accountable by making sure
people report problems (investigation),
teams of public oversight to help. This might
not help everyone but it could in the future.
Turn over the information to theirs and new
leaders (who has that information for when
you are gone?)

4

Social science (this is not a technical problem)
how we can improve transfer of information.
Research the effectiveness of
training/translation. Implement NWS Storm
Ready. Expand CERT to include specific
training to community (i.e., storm surge,
flood). Conduct multi-district/municipality
exercises.
community involved: award competitions for
campaign, education outreach all ages
ex. In US Storm Ready in Florida has 3 involved. Conduct for both hurricane and
counties, in Puerto Rico there are 78 tsunamis at schools, mass media, higher ed.
municipalities under 1 person.
Institutions

federal agencies. Commonwealth is unique
in that funding budget does not allow for

all levels (state municipalities)

3 to 4

YES (NWS etc.)

Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge

Explanation/Description

Lessons Learned

Lack of emergency planning
Preparedness

Starting from family,
community, local, regional.

Lack of federal Pre-Scripted
Mission Assignments (PSMA)

Did not pre-emptively involve
private sector

Response

Rapid assessments of
damage/debris were critical. Be
bold on initial assessment.

Inequity
Vulnerable population

Local level preparedness plan
created with central point of
information. Need
accountability w.r.t. response
plans. Pre-emergency
planning to include local law
enforcement and impartial
parties (e.g., NGO, faith based
organizations)

Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)

How does approach change with respect to
Tsunami vs Hurricane?

1. Aggressive on pre plan: (a) what programs already have a
plan in place? (b) create plans for schools, daycare, work,
etc., (c) work with existing organizations or program
infrastructure/community leaders. 2. Educate the community
regarding: (a) necessary supplies, (b) what should they do
with supplies, (c) have it ready before the event- bag of
supplies, food, water, communication tools, etc.), 3. Conduct
community training/perform drills/table top exercises. 4. Use
table top exercises to improve plan/make changes. 5. Reinstitute CERT program in schools, churches, etc. and use in
coordination with neighborhood watch programs (e.g., "nextBoth
door" type app). 6. Consider worst case scenarios (e.g.,
Some - hurricane gives family level planning,
downed communications, limited tools available)
Tsunami = "save self mindset",

1. Review of existing and development of PSMAs. Integrate
commonwealth and FEMA prescripted efforts prior to
The more prescripted mission disaster. 2. Conduct more outreach with state/territory/govt
assignments, the quicker
level to educate about what they can ask for in terms of
response activities can
mission assignments. 3. Automated PSMAs for approval,
commence and provides
signatures. 4. Include mission assignments in training and
training opportunities within exercises. 5. Review historical lessons learned to drive future
Minimize duplicity of efforts. agencies
Same for both
assessments
Involve private sector during
Private sector often has
contingency plans. Make the
resources it can contribute to link on how to support
response effort- have
municipalities/local
1. Getting to conversation early. 2. Potential for new
resources and assets
organizations (e.g.,
contracts/prepositioning equipment ahead of time.
connected at all levels.
transportation/ gas/food)
Same for both
1. Establish baseline prior to event for municipalities; 2.
Centralized application to collect assessment information for
multiple sectors (i.e., communication center); 3. Pre-plan for
Areas/communities that had what we need to do (before and after), include lag time for
quick assessments made it
response operations (why preparedness is so important), be
Baseline for FEMA to consider easier to scope federal
able to grow food, apply for grants to build-in redundant
funding opportunities.
funding
funding; 4. The public can report on their municipalities
both
1. Census data/demographic data to focus efforts and
identified during emergency preparedness planning to create
a special needs plan (i.e., assess who is at risk in each
don't wait until hospital is
town/region). 2. Compliance checks done in low income
impacted to make
communities, first. 3. Recommendations for improvements
decisions/hospital need
disabled/sick/elderly people redundant or back up energy rather than fines. 4. Messages tailored to underserved
Evacuation plan may vary between T and H
communities.
were stuck in place
sources

Comments

more focus on the lower levels
(families, communities, etc.)

Recommendation for Implementation
( )
p
knowledge for the local leaders to bring back
to their communities (ex. kids can take it
home to their families), break up the
workshops into regions to allow more people
to attend (for different cultures), NOAA office
for coastal management. See VITEMA model
as a starting point. (2) Outreach- media blitz
(ads at the movies, on roads, radios, TV
stations, at stores), public and private classes
(home improvement stores), youth
organizations (boy scouts, girl scouts, etc.),
these need to be on how to prepare for these
events. Use project based learning platforms,
find and edit existing checklists than can be
relevant to Puerto Rico and distribute to
community members. Create emergency
management education program for
communities at all levels year-round. Using
existing avenues/organized community
events to demonstrate how to use a map,
why it is important to have freshwater, etc.
(3) Goal is to create self-sufficient
communities. Put people on the ground in
pilot communities (more difficult to
implement but more results), share the
results! (4) Update contingency plans to
include equipment pre-stage locations

1. Agencies review what they have currently.
2. Agencies develop new ones as appropriate
(e.g., funding for and using NOAA SSC's during
non-pollution, weather-related deployments).
3. Keep hazard mitigation plan up to date. 4.
Educate commonwealth about FEMA
missions to determine what can be asked for.
FEMA relies on guidance from local govt level.
5. Conduct exercises to review and update
PSMAs. Develop checklist for the state to use
to make requests. Recommend to GAO? 6.
Inform what can be asked for (e.g., guidance
document/ lessons learned)
Multiple companies get hired or one primary
contractor with sub-contractors. Advanced
contracting initiatives for pre-planned
contracts. List for potential companies
available if needed pre-,during, post- disaster

This goes beyond just FEMA. Post and
report storm information i.e.,
#hurricane Maria (include GPS). Post Tsunami survey guide is available.
1. Assessments, inventory, create culture;
Language and culture must be taken 2.Implement #hashtag. Field exercise like
into consideration.
CARIBEWAVE. Develop app (see SERT-FL).
If municipalities emergency contingency plans
don't exist, then develop and identify
vulnerable population(s). If they do exist,
Time of day may influence who is
include in them. Prioritize installation of 100
present in the community, family plan Watt radios in hospitals, police stations, EMS
would identify who is available during communication centers, OEM offices around
the day vs. night.
the island

Ease of
Implementation Coordination w. Partners
(1=easy, 5=
hard)

3

community levels (school system,
community members), NGOs, Universities,
media outlets, photo journalist workshops,
emergency management agencies, FEMA

4

Federal Agencies (FEMA), state and local
emergency management agencies (e.g.,
coastal agencies, all encompassing plan),
port authorities, schools, local chamber of
commerce, private businesses.
Commonwealth/local govt (e.g., hazard
mitigation office),

sliding scale
private businesses, local govt, contractors

3.5
Communities, municipalities, state and ,
federal (NWS, FEMA).

4

census bureau, social services, health and
human services, local law enforcement,
local emergency response management,
planning and development agency

